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Vicki C. Jackson*
Global  developments  in  domestic  constitutionalism  and
international  human  rights  law  have  engendered  a  new  set  of
dynamic  relationships between  and among legal  systems.  Scholars
and jurists have taken note of "transnational judicial conversations,"
"dialogue"  or "transjudicial  communication"  about human rights,'  of
a  rise  in  "world  constitutionalism," 2  of a  global  "community  of
law,"3  of the possibilities  of "comparative  constitutional  law'  and
for  "comparative  reasoning,, 5  and of the  globalization  not  only  of
*  With  thanks to Judith  Resnik  (who envisioned  a  law  school  course  on
"Gender,  Locally, Globally,"  and invited me to teach it with her, thus inspiring
this essay,  and who  generously gave  much needed comments on earlier drafts
of this  paper),  Alex  Aleinikoff,  Jane  Stromseth,  Susan  Deller  Ross,  Kim
Rubenstein,  Bob  Taylor,  Mark  Tushnet  and  Robin  West  for  helpful
conversations  and  comments  and  to  Amber  Dolman,  Emily  O'Brien,  and
Kristy Martin for superb research assistance.
1. See  Christopher  McCrudden,  A  Common  Law  of Human Rights?:
Transnational  Judicial  Conversations  on Constitutional  Rights, 20 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 499, 527-30 (2000); Claire L'Heureux-Dub6,  The Importance of
Dialogue: Globalization  and the International  Impact of  the Rehnquist Court,
34  TULSA  L.J.  15,  21-23  (1998);  Anne-Marie  Slaughter,  A  Typology  of
Transjudicial  Communication, 29 U. RICH L. REv. 99, 103-12 (1994).
2.  Bruce  Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism,  83 VA. L. REV.
771  (1997).
3. Laurence  R.  Heifer  & Anne-Marie  Slaughter,  Toward a  Theory  of
Effective Supranational  Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 366-73 (1997).
4.  Mark  Tushnet,  The  Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law,
108 YALE L.J. 1225  (1999); see also David Fontana, Refined Comparativism  in
Constitutional  Law, 49 UCLA L. REv. 539 (2001).
5.  Sarah  K.  Harding,  Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review,  28
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constitutional  interpretation,6  but  also  of judging  and  judiciaries.7
Focusing  on developments  in gender equality,  this Article  explores
distinctive  features  of the new  transnational  legal  discourse  and  its
relationship to domestic  constitutional  law (with special  attention to
the United States).
Gender equality is a particularly fruitful area in which to explore
transnational  judicial  discourse.  First,  there  have  been  enormous
legal  changes  in the last half century on gender equality, reflected in
large numbers of national and transnational legal sources and a broad
area  of at  least  formal  agreement  among  many  countries  on  core
values.  Gender equality claims under both national and international
legal  sources are being heard in national  courts,8  transnational  legal
bodies9  and  international  human  rights  tribunals.1 0  Second,  there
6.  See Sujit Choudhry,  Globalization in Search ofJustification: Toward a
Theory of Comparative Constitutional  Interpretation, 74  IND.  L.J.  819,  821
(1999).
7.  See Anne-Marie  Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA.  J. INT'L  L.
1103,  1103-04 (2000) [hereinafter Slaughter, Globalization];  see also Helfer &
Slaughter,  supra  note  3,  at  370-73;  Anne-Marie  Slaughter,  A  Global
Community of Courts, 44 HARV.  INT'L  L.J.  191,  202-04  (2003)  [hereinafter
Slaughter, Global Community].
8.  See, e.g.,  United  States  v.  Virginia,  518  U.S.  515  (1996);  Benner v.
Canada, [1997]  1 S.C.R. 358; see also Vriend v. Alberta,  [1998]  1 S.C.R. 493;
Lawrence v. Texas,  123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).  For a helpful discussion of gender
equality cases in Colombia, see Martha I. Morgan,  Taking Machismo to Court:
The  Gender Jurisprudence of the  Colombian  Constitutional Court, 30  U.
MIAMI  INTER-AM.  L. REv. 253,  283-85, 294-97  (1999)  (describing decisions
finding  equal  protection  violations  in  laws  providing  lesser  penalties  for
marital rapes than others and due process violations in exclusion of gay student
from military school).
9.  The European Court of Justice has decided a number of gender equality
cases. See, e.g., Case  C-158/97, Badeck & Others v. Germany, 2000 E.C.R. I-
1875,  [2001]  2  C.M.L.R.  6  (2000)  (affirmative  action  for  women  in
employment);  Case C-409/95,  Marschall  v.  Land Nordrhein-Westfalen,  1997
E.C.R.  1-6363,  [1998];  Case C-285/98,  Kreil  v. Bundesrepublik  Deutschland,
2000  E.C.R. 1-69  (invalidating  law  prohibiting  military  service by women);
Dory v.  Germany,  2003  ECJ LEXIS  99 (April  2003)  (upholding  limitation  of
compulsory  military  service  to men);  Case  C-273/97,  Sirdar v. Army Board,
1999  E.C.R.  1-7403,  [1999]  3 C.M.L.R.  559  (1999)  (upholding  exclusion of
women from Royal Marines);  Case C-109/100, Tele Danmark A/S v. Handels,
2001  E.C.R. 1-06993,  (precluding  dismissal of pregnant workers for failing to
disclose pregnancy when being hired for limited term contracts).  So, too, has
the  European  Court of Human  Rights.  See,  e.g.,  Willis  v. United  Kingdom,
App.  No.  36042/97  (2002)  (finding  denial  of widow's  pension  to  widower
violated  European  Convention's  prohibition  on  gender  discrimination);  cf,GENDER EQUALITY
remains  significant  opposition  to  the  idea  of full  gender  equality,
reflected not only in wide departures  in practice from the stated norm
e.g.,  Dudgeon  v.  United  Kingdom,  45  Eur.  Ct.  H.R.  (ser.  A)  (1981)
(prohibition of sodomy violated privacy rights); Norris v. Ireland,  142 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1988)  (same);  Modinos  v. Cyprus,  259 Eur. Ct. H.R.  (ser. A)
(1993)  (same).  Other regional human rights bodies have also addressed  issues
of  gender  equality.  See,  e.g.,  Inter-American  Court  of  Human  Rights,
Amendments  to  the Naturalization Provisions of the  Constitution of Costa
Rica/Advisory Opinion, reprinted in  5 HuMAN  RTS.  L.J.  161,  163,  171-75
(1984)  (gender  distinctions found to violate articles twenty-four and seventeen
of the American Convention).
10.  See,  e.g.,  Aumeeruddy-Cziffra  v.  Mauritius,  U.N.  CCPR  Hum.  Rts.
Comm.,  12th  Sess.,  U.N.  Doc.  CCPR/C/12/D/35/1978  (1981)  (constitutional
provisions  discriminating  between  foreign  male  and  female  spouses
concerning  application  for  residence  violate  International  Covenant  on  Civil
and  Political  Rights  (ICCPR));  Avellanal  v.  Peru,  U.N.  CCPR  Hum.  Rts.
Comm.,  34th  Sess.,  U.N.  Doc.  CCPR/C/34/D/202/1986  (1988)  (matrimonial
property laws discriminating against women violated ICCPR); Zwaan-de  Vries
v.  The  Netherlands,  U.N.  CCPR Hum.  Rts.  Comm.,  29b  Sess.,  U.N.  Doc.
CCPR/C/29/D/182/1984  (1987)  (denying women, but not men, unemployment
benefits based on marital  status violates ICCPR);  Brooks v. The Netherlands,
U.N. CCPR Hum. Rts. Comm. 29th Sess.,  U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/29/D/172/1984
(1987)  (requiring  women,  but  not  men,  to  prove  that  they  were  the
breadwinners in order to receive unemployment benefits violates ICCPR); Vos
v.  The  Netherlands,  U.N.  CCPR  Hum.  Rts.  Comm.,  34t  Sess.,  U.N.  Doc.
CCPR/C/35/D/218/1986  (1989)  (rejecting challenge to law that  in some cases
had the  effect  of giving a  disabled  widow  less  in the way  of pension  than a
disabled  widower).  Cf  Toonen v.  Australia,  U.N.  CCPR  Hum. Rts.  Comm.,
50th  Sess.,  U.N.  Doc.  CCPR/C/5/D/488/1992  (1994),  (finding  Tazmanian
sodomy  law  in violation of ICCPR);  Lovelace  v.  Canada, U.N. CCPR Hum.
Rts.  Comm.,  13th  Sess.,  CCPR/C/13/D/24/1977  (finding  violation  of
indigenous peoples rights in statute excluding female Indian  married  to a non-
Indian  from  status and rights as Indian),  discussed in Anne F. Bayefsky,  The
Human Rights Committee and the  Case of Sandra Lovelace, 20  CANADIAN
Y.B.  INT'L L.  244, 263  (1982)  (suggesting  that  Lovelace  was  in essence  a
gender discrimination case even though decided under Article 27, dealing with
cultural  minority  groups).  The  Optional  Protocol  of the  Convention  on the
Elimination  of Discrimination  Against  Women  ("CEDAW")  was  opened  for
signature  in December  1999.  As of September 26,  2003,  there are  56 parties
and  75  signatories  to  the  Optional  Protocol.  See
www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/sigop.htm  (last  visited  Oct.  22,  2003).
Under the Optional Protocol,  individual complainants may now file complaints
before  the  CEDAW committee,  in  a procedure  analogous  to  that which  has
long  been available before the U.N. Human Rights Committee, the monitoring
body of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. For helpful
description of different sources  and categories of transnational  gender equality
law,  see Judith Resnik,  Categorical  Federalism:  Jurisdiction, Gender and the
Globe, 111  YALE L.J. 619, 656-64 (2001).
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but also in articulated defenses of discriminatory  practices."'  A rich
context  thus  exists  in  which  to  explore  the  possibilities  for
transnational  consideration of decisions  on seemingly  universalized
norms together with the limitations  imposed by deep differences  in
institutional, historical and cultural context and by disagreement over
the content and enforceability of international human rights norms. 12
Transnational  legal  sources  are  often discussed as  tools for the
development  of domestic  enforcement  and  advancement  of gender
equality. 13  Since  World  War II  there has  been  a dramatic  shift in
international  legal  sources  towards  formal  endorsement  of gender
equality rights.' 4  The U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of
11.  See  text  accompanying  notes  275-291,  294-306  (discussing  cases
upholding  gender  classifications  in  the  United  States,  Bangladesh,  Pakistan,
and South Africa).
12.  It is worth noting that gender equality was not a central  concern of the "constitutional  moment"  of  the  world  community  in  the  1940s,  though  a
formal commitment  to gender equality  in public life begins  to emerge  at this
point in documents like the U.N. Charter and Universal  Declaration.  See infra
note  15.  For  discussion  of  contemporary  development  of  transnational
consensus around some gender equality  norms (opposition to violence against
women)  rather  than  others,  see MARGARET  E.  KECK &  KATHRYN  SIKKINK,
ACTIVISTS  BEYOND  BORDERS:  ADVOCACY  NETWORKS  IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS  160-98 (1998).
13.  See,  e.g.,  Anne  F.  Bayefsky,  General Approaches  to  Domestic
Application of Women's International  Human Rights Law, in HUMAN  RIGHTS
OF  WOMEN:  NATIONAL  AND  INTERNATIONAL  PERSPECTIVES  351,  353
(Rebecca  J.  Cook  ed.  1994);  see  also Andrew  Bymes,  Using International
Human Rights Law and Procedures  to Advance Women's Human Rights, in 2
WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL  HUMAN  RIGHTS LAW  189,  190 (Kelly D. Askin
& Dorean  M.  Koenig,  eds.,  2000).  By  "transnational"  I  mean  to  include
international  law and legal sources, regional human rights law and sources, and
national  constitutional  law  being  considered  by  other  countries'  domestic
courts.
14.  Although  New  Zealand  extended  the vote to women  in  1893,  women
were not guaranteed the  right to  vote in Britain or the  United States until the
end of World War I; in France not until near the  end of World War II; and in
Switzerland  not until  1990 were women allowed  to vote  in all elections. (On
April  30,  1989,  the canton of Appenzell Ausserrhoden  gave  women the vote
and Appennzell  Innerrhoden  finally allowed women to vote on November 27,
1990).  See  LEE  ANN  BANASZAK,  WHY  MOVEMENTS  SUCCEED  OR  FAIL:
OPPORTUNITY,  CULTURE  AND  THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  WOMAN  SUFFRAGE  3-4
(1996).  The participation of women as voters in plebiscites on territorial status
following  World  War  I  was  a  milestone,  but  did  not  lead  immediately  to
domestic  constitutions  allowing women  to continue  to exercise the vote.  See
KAREN KNOP, DIVERSITY AND  SELF-DETERMINATION  IN  INTERNATIONAL  LAWGENDER EQUALITY
Human Rights named women as well  as men as rights holders, 15 as
did the two  major  international  human  rights  conventions of  1966,
the International  Covenant on Civil and  Political Rights  (ICCPR)16
and  the  International  Covenant  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural
Rights.17   In  1979,  the  General  Assembly  of the  United  Nations
approved  and  opened  for  signature  the  Convention  on  the
Elimination  of  All  Forms  of  Discrimination  Against  Women
(CEDAW),18  which obligates  state parties  to take  measures  to  end
discrimination against women and assure treatment on an equal basis
with men.19  Its substantive provisions target not only intentional acts
277-309  (2002)  [hereinafter  KNOP,  DIVERSITY  AND  SELF-DETERMINATION].
Today,  women  are  formally  allowed  to  vote  in all  but  a small  handful  of
countries in the world. (In the United Arab  Emirates, neither men nor women
vote; in Kuwait, women are excluded from the franchise exercised by men. See
Website  of  the  International  Organization  of  Parliaments  at
http://www/ipu.org/wmn-e/suffrage.htm  (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
15.  The U.N. Charter's  Preamble  grounds its existence  in  a belief "in  the
equal  rights  of men  and  women  and  of nations  large  and  small."  U.N.
CHARTER pmbl.  See also  U.N. CHARTER art. 55 (calling for "universal respect
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race,  sex, language, or religion").  The Universal Declaration
of Human  Rights'  preamble  affirms  "the  dignity  and  worth  of the  human
person and...  the equal rights of men and women .... ." G.A. Res. 217A (Ill),
U.N. Doc.,  1/810. at 71  (1948).  It includes  both a general anti-discrimination
principle  (declaring that  "[e]veryone  is entitled to  all the rights and freedoms
set  forth  in this  Declaration,  without  distinction  of any  kind,  such  as  race,
colour,  sex,  language,  religion,  political  or  other  opinion,  national  or  social
origin, property, birth or  other status."  id. at Art. 2,  and special emphasis  on
equality rights in marriage.  Id. at art.  16.  ("[m]en  and women of full age...
are  entitled  to  equal  rights  as  to  marriage,  during  marriage  and  at  its
dissolution[;]"  marriage  requires  "the  free  and  full  consent  of the  intending
spouses.").
16.  G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 3, U.N.  GAOR, 21st Sess.,  Supp. No.  16,
at 52,  U.N. Doc.  A/6316  (1966)  (state  parties  "undertake  to ensure the equal
right of men and women  to the  enjoyment of all civil and political rights  set
forth in the present Covenant").
17.  G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 3, U.N.  GAOR, 21st Sess.,  Supp. No.  16,
at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
18.  G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess.,  Supp. No. 46, at 193,  U.N.
Doc. A/34/46 (1979)  (entered into force  1981)  [hereinafter CEDAW].
19.  CEDAW  broadly  defines  discrimination  as  "...any  distinction,
exclusion  or  restriction  made  on  the  basis  of sex  which  has  the  effect  or
purpose of impairing  or nullifying  the recognition,  enjoyment or exercise  by
women,  irrespective  of their marital  status, on a basis of equality of men and
women, of human rights and fundamental  freedoms in the political, economic,
social,  cultural,  civil  or any other  field."  CEDAW,  supra note  18,  at art.  1.
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of discrimination but acts which effect  substantive inequalities;  they
reach  both  private  and  state  conduct;  and  they  obligate  states  not
merely to refrain from  discrimination but actively to seek to redress
and  remedy  private  discrimination  against  women.2°  More  than
ninety-percent  of the  U.N.  members  are  parties  to  CEDAW;  the
United States has signed but not ratified the convention. 21  Moreover,
a number of regional human  rights  conventions  also are  explicit  in
declaring  rights  to be  free  from  gender  discrimination. 22  Looking
The  Convention  also  specifically  addresses  equality  rights  in,  e.g.  education
(art.  10),  employment  (art.  11),  health (art.  12),  law  (art.  15),  family (art.  5),
political life and government positions  (art.  7), and citizenship  and nationality
(art. 9).
20.  See id. at art.  2(e) (state parties  shall "take  all appropriate  measures  to
eliminate  discrimination  against  women  by  any  person,  organization  or
enterprise."); id. at art. 5 ("State Parties shall take all appropriate measures:  (a)
To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with
a view to achieving  the elimination of prejudices  and customary and all other
practices  which are based  on the idea of the inferiority  or the superiority  of
either of the sexes  or on  stereotyped  roles for men  and  women").  CEDAW
reaches  into  deeply  entrenched  gendered  views  of  family  relations.  For
example,  Article 5(b) requires state parties  "[t]o  ensure  that family  education
includes  a proper  understanding  of maternity  as  a  social  function  and  the
recognition of the common responsibility of men and women in the upbringing
and development of their children."  Id. at art. 5. Article  16, to which a number
of parties have reservations, requires states to "take all appropriate measures  to
eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and
family relations."  See id. at art. 16.
21.  According  to the U.N.  website,  174 countries  are  parties  to CEDAW.
See  United  Nation's  Division  for  the  Advancement  of  Women,  at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm  (last  visited  Oct.22,
2003).  CEDAW  has  more  parties  than  any  other  U.N.  human  rights
convention,  with  the exception  of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
See  ANNE  F.  BAYEFSKY,  THE  U.N.  HUMAN  RIGHTS  TREATY  SYSTEM:
UNIVERSALITY  AT THE  CROSSROADS  21  (Martinus  Nijhof, 2001)  [hereinafter
BAYEFSKY,  UNIVERSALITY].
22.  See,  e.g.,  Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Human  Rights  and
Fundamental  Freedoms, Nov. 4,  1950,  art. 14,  213 U.N.T.S.  221  (entered into
force  Sept.  3,  1953)  [hereinafter  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights]
("The enjoyment of rights and  freedoms set forth  in  this Convention  shall  be
secured without discrimination  on any ground such as sex, race colour....");
American  Convention on Human Rights, art.  1, O.A.S.  Treaty  Series No.  36,
1144  U.N.T.S.  123  (1978)  (undertaking  "to  respect the rights  and  freedoms
recognized  herein and to ensure to all persons  subject to their jurisdiction the
free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination
for reasons of race, color, sex, language..  ."); Inter-American  Convention  on
the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, JuneGENDER EQUALITY
outward  to  these transnational  legal  sources  to encourage  domestic
adoption of and compliance with gender equality rights is an obvious
legal strategy.23
Yet  looking  beyond national  borders  is  fraught with normative
and  strategic  questions.  Many  CEDAW  ratifications  are
accompanied  by  significant  reservations  to  central  substantive
provisions,2 4  reflecting  what  the  U.N.  Special  Rapporteur  for
Violence  Against  Women  has  called  an  "ideological  resistance  to
human rights  for women. 25  Some argue  that international  human
rights law,  such  as  CEDAW,  is ineffective,  or worse, may  actually
obstruct  advances  toward  gender  equality  in developing  countries,
through  perceptions  of hegemonic  western  imposition of values  on
9,  1944, art. 5,  33 I.L.M.  1534,  1536 ("Every woman is  entitled to the free and
full exercise of her civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights...  [and
signatories]  recognize  that violence  against women prevents  and nullifies  the
exercise of these rights.");  African Charter on Human and Peoples'  Rights, art.
2, 21  I.L.M. 58 (1982)  ("Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of
the  rights  and  freedoms  recognized  and  guaranteed  in  the present  Charter
without  distinction  of  any  kind  such  as  race,  ethnic  group,  color,  sex,
language..  .").
23.  See Bayefsky, supra note  13,  at 353.  A rights-based  strategy grounded
in  international  law  is  subject  to  the  critique  of  rights  as,  inter  alia,  a
misrepresentation  of  women's  social  experiences,  a  distraction  from
substantive  focus on  material  improvement  in women's  lives,  and a strategy
that to  the extent  it provides  legitimacy  to  other rights,  such  as to  religious
freedom, may oppress women. For a discussion, see, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth,
What Are  "Women's  International Human Rights,? in  HUMAN  RIGHTS  OF
WOMEN:  NATIONAL  AND INTERNATIONAL  PERSPECTIVES  58,  60-63  (Rebecca
J.  Cook, ed.,  1994); Adetoun 0. Ilumoka, African Women's Economic, Social
and  Cultural  Rights,  in  HUMAN  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN:  NATIONAL  AND
INTERNATIONAL  PERSPECTIVES  307,  319-23;  Johanna E. Bond, International
Intersectionality: A  Theoretical and Pragmatic Exploration  of  Women's
International  Human Rights Violations, 52  EMORY L.J.  71,  79-89 (2003). For
a different perspective, see Karen Knop, Here and There: International  Law in
Domestic Courts, 32  N.Y.U. J. INT'L  L. & POL.  501,  505-07,525-35  (2000)
(viewing international  law,  like comparative  law, as  opportunity  for different
domestic court's interpretations  and constructions of meanings).
24.  See Madhavi  Sunder, Piercing  the Veil,  112 YALE  L.J.  1399,  1425-27
(2003); Bayefsky, supra note  13, at  352-53.
25.  Radhika Coomaraswamy,  To Bellow Like a Cow: Women, Ethnicity and
the  Discourse of Rights, in  HUMAN  RIGHTS  OF  WOMEN:  NATIONAL  AND
INTERNATIONAL  PERSPECTIVES  39  (Rebecca  J.  Cook  ed.,  1994)  (suggesting
that "it would be wrong  to  assume that the values  contained  in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights are truly universal.").  Id. at 41.
Fall 2003]LOYOLA  OF  LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 37:271
the  less  powerful.26   And,  like  many  international  human  rights
regimes,  CEDAW  is  a  "softer"  form  of  law  at  the  enforcement
level-there is no adjudicator with binding authority in most cases to
rule on whether practices or conditions are in compliance or to assess
sanctions for noncompliance.27
CEDAW's  widespread  adoption-but  with  reservations-  and
its  reliance  on  reporting  as  a  way  to  encourage  but  not  coerce
compliance stands in sharp contrast with important understandings  of
domestic constitutional  law as judicially enforceable  constraints that
"bind"  governments.28   As  such,  CEDAW  is  in  some  ways
emblematic  of  broader  differences  between  international  human
rights  law  and  domestic  law  in  litigation  in  national  courts.  Like
other international  human rights conventions, CEDAW (even where
not  clearly made  binding  as  law  for courts  to enforce)  is  at times
invoked  in  national  constitutional  decisions  interpreting  and
enforcing  internal  constitutional  norms  favoring  gender  equality.29
26.  For  discussion  of this  concern  generally  about  international  law,  see
Knop, supra note 23,  at 522,  527-30; see also Frederick Schauer,  The Politics
and Incentives of Legal Transplantation,  in GOvERNANCE  IN A GLOBALIZING
WORLD  253  (Joseph  S.  Nye  Jr.  &  John  D.  Donahue  eds.,  Visions  of
Governance for the 21 st Century 2000).
27.  Article  29 of CEDAW, which  has never been invoked,  does authorize
state  parties  to  bring  disputes  about  CEDAW  to  the  International  Court  of
Justice.  See CEDAW, supra note  18,  at art. 29.  See also Andrew Byrnes  &
Jane  Connors,  Enforcing  the  Human  Rights  of  Women:  A  Complaints
Procedure  for the  Women's  Convention?  Draft Optional Protocol to  the
Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of  Discrimination  Against Women,
21  BROOK.  J.  INT'L  L.  679  (1996)  But  the  basic  model  of  CEDAW
enforcement  is  a  report,  discuss,  and  recommend  model,  similar  to  those
employed  in  other human  rights  conventions.  For discussion  of CEDAW's
Optional  Protocol,  see  text accompanying  note  10.  For concerns  about  the
efficacy  of  the  optional  protocol  of  the  ICCPR,  see  BAYEFSKY,
UNIVERSALITY,  supra  note 21,  at 33-35.
28.  Of the  regional  human  rights regimes,  the  European  Convention  has
become the  subject of regular judicial  interpretation  by the Court of Human
Rights  and  fairly  consistent  compliance  by member  nations.  The  ECHR's
gender equality decisions are of importance not only in Europe but around the
world. See Slaughter, Globalization,  supra note 7, at  1109-12.
29.  It  is  unlikely  that  an  international  Convention  like  CEDAW  would
come into force without a substantial number of countries in the world already
prepared  internally to endorse  gender equality as at least a formal norm.  The
mobilizations  needed  to persuade  decision-makers  to  endorse  such  a  move
would necessarily occur at many national levels in order to obtain international
approval and national approval. Indeed, absent existing domestic commitmentsGENDER EQUALITY
So, too,  are decisions  of other national  courts or regional bodies  on
similar issues.
What is the role of judicial references  to these outside sources,
which may occur  even when the sources  are not regarded as legally
binding?  Are  they mere window  dressing  or  even  an unwarranted
diversion from more locally grounded reasoning?  Many post-World
War II constitutions have equality provisions that address or could be
read to encompass  gender  equality,  but  gender equality  regimes in
different countries  differ across a number of vectors;3 0  international
commitments  to  gender  equality  may rightly  be regarded  as  more
formal  than  real  in  many  places.  And  yet,  multi-layered  and
decentralized  development  of gender equality  as  a norm  (including
disagreements  about  its  scope  and  implementation)  seems  to  be
to  such  a  norm,  countries  might  well  be  reluctant  to  ratify.  Cf Oona  A.
Hathaway,  The  Cost  of  Commitment,  55  STAN.  L.  REv.  1821  (2003)
(explaining  expected  compliance  costs  as  component  of decision-making  on
joining international treaties).
30.  Some constitutions  specify or authorize affirmative  measures based on
gender  to  redress  historic  discrimination  or  qualify  equality  clauses  by
reservations  to  permit  "special  provision  for  women  and  children."  INDIA
CONST.,  art.  15(3); see also, e.g.,  CAN.  CONST.  (Constitution  Act, 1982) pt. I,
(Canadian  Charter  of Rights  and  Freedoms),  §  15(2)  (anti-discrimination
clause "does not preclude any law..,  that has as its object the amelioration of
conditions  of  disadvantaged  individuals  or  groups  including  those...
disadvantaged  because  of...  sex);  cf  European  Community  Directive  on
Equal Treatment, Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February  1976,  art. 2 (3)
(anti-discrimination  rules  to  operate  "without  prejudice  to  provisions
concerning  the  protection  of women,  particularly  as  regards  pregnancy  and
maternity").  A  number of countries'  domestic constitutions  require reserved
seats for women in government bodies.  See, e.g.,  BANGL. CONST.,  pt. V, ch. I,
§65 (3);  PAK. CONST.,  pt. III,  ch. 11,  §51(4); see also, e.g.,  Nodlle Lenoir,  The
Representation  of Women  in Politics: From Quotas to Parity in Elections, 50
INT'L & COMP. L.Q.  217 (2001)  (noting amendment of French  Constitution to
permit legislation requiring "parit6" on electoral list between women and men).
Other  countries,  like  the  United  States,  have  elaborated  constitutional  rules
against  gender discrimination  from more general  equality clauses,  extending
the reach of the antidiscrimination principle to public employment, family law,
education,  and  eligibility  for  public  benefits.  See  generally Kathleen  M.
Sullivan, Constitutionalizing  Women 's  Equality, 90 CAL. L. REv. 735, 747-62
(2002)  (discussing  choices  in  constitutional  design  around  gender  issues
including  generality  or  specificity  of clauses,  whether  rights  are  positive  or
negative,  whether the measure  of equality  is  formal  or substantive,  whether
rights  apply against private  parties or  only  against the  state, and  whether to
prohibit classifications using  sex or instead protect the class of women, which
relates to whether special measures based on gender are authorized).
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providing  the  foundations  for  an  increasingly  self-aware
transnational  discourse  among  a number  of countries.  Why  would
nondomestic  sources be  considered  relevant  in resolving  domestic
questions of gender equality?
Although  this  Article  cannot  answer  all  of these  questions,  it
makes  a  beginning  by first,  trying  more  fully to  describe  what  is
occurring in the cases and second, by considering some objections to
transnational judicial discourse about equality rights.  Part I explores
the developing practice  in human rights cases, sometimes expressed
as  an obligation, to consider a  wide range  of legal  sources that are
not "binding"  in any  conventional  legal sense,3'  offers  some reason
for  this  development  and  suggests  a  vocabulary  for  describing  it.
Although  it  is  common  to refer  to  nonbinding  sources  of law  as
"persuasive  authority,"  this phrase may not fully capture the sense of
joint  venturing  or  even  of  obligation  to  consider  other  courts'
decisions  that  informs  some  of this  conversation.32   There  is  a
connectivity  of  human  rights  discourse  suggesting  that  there  are
mutually  shared  interests  in  defining  the  content  of  national,
transnational  and  international  norms,  perhaps  captured  by  the
phrase,  "relational  authority,"33  reflecting  nonhierarchical  judicial
31.  Professor  Slaughter has drawn attention to the rise in use of persuasive
authority in several valuable articles.  See Slaughter, Global Community, supra
note  7,  at  193,  199-202; see also MARY  ANN GLENDON,  RIGHTS  TALK:  THE
IMPOVERISHMENT  OF  POLITICAL  DISCOURSE  158  (The  Free  Press,  1991)
(noting the "brisk international traffic in ideas about rights," in which "national
law  is  increasingly  caught  up  in a process  of cross-fertilization  among legal
systems.").
32.  "Persuasive  authority" is also misleading as a description  for thoughtful
consideration  of the jurisprudence of other nations that are then distinguished,
as  in the  South African  Constitutional  Court's  treatment  of U.S.  and  Indian
approaches  to the death penalty, see infra note 54, or more  generally,  for the
treatment  of  other  constitutional  systems  as  "negative  precedents".  See
Choudhry,  supra note  6,  at  851-55;  Sujit  Choudhry,  The Lochner Era and
Comparative  Constitutionalism,  2 INT'L J. CONST'L L. (I'CON) 1 (forthcoming
Jan. 2004) [hereinafter Choudhry,  The Lochner  Era].
33.  The  relational  quality  of domestic  courts'  discourse  on  constitutional
issues may be a byproduct or a part of the broader transnational legal processes
Professor  Koh  has  described.  See,  e.g.,  Harold  Hongju  Koh,  Transnational
Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE  L.J. 2347, 2394-98  (1991)  (noting benefits
of dialogue between  U.S. courts engaged  in transnational  public litigation  and
law-declaring  international  bodies  over content  of international  law);  Harold
Honguu  Koh, Review Essay: Why  Do Nations Obey International  Law?,  106
YALE  L.J. 2599, 2645-58  (1997)  (arguing that international  law becomes seenGENDER EQUALITY
relationships  experienced  as  shared  locations  of the  authority  to
interpret  the law.34  Reasons  for this development  include  the post-
World  War  II  reaction  against  gross  human rights  abuses, judicial
self-conceptions as protectors of rights, the influence of international
and  regional  conventions  on  domestic  constitutional  drafting,  and
increased  awareness  of  the  possibilities  of  judges'  decisions
influencing understandings of law beyond borders.
In  Part  II,  I  consider  arguments  that  resort  to  foreign  or
international  law  as  nonbinding authority  in resolving  questions  of
domestic  constitutional  law  is  inconsistent  with  commitments  to
democratic self-rule  and with the role and competence of the courts.
Originally made without the participation of women and itself thus in
some  tension  with  norms  of  democratic  self-rule,35  the  U.S.
Constitution,  like  older  constitutions  more  generally,  may  benefit
from the insights of courts interpreting  newer constitutions that have
integrated commitments to gender equality at the same time as other
rights.  Being  aware  of other  legal  regimes'  approaches,  however,
does not necessarily mean following them;  comparison may provide
the basis for reasoned disagreement with fundamental assumptions or
greater awareness of contextual particularities; the question is how to
interpret  one's  own  domestic  norms,  in  the  light  of  experience
elsewhere.36  Consulting transnational  legal sources has the capacity
to improve the quality of judicial reasoning, a basic aspect of judicial
legitimacy and accountability.37  But doing  so  also raises questions
of training,  expertise and competence  in understanding  international
and  foreign  sources.  There  are,  no  doubt,  differences  between the
as norms to be obeyed through repeated processes of interaction,  interpretation,
and internalization  which reconstitute nations'  understandings  of their identity
and interest).
34.  See Slaughter, Globalization,  supra  note 7, at 1112-15.
35.  For  related  discussion,  see  Deborah  Cass  &  Kim  Rubenstein,
Representation  of Women in the Australian Constitutional  System,  17 ADEL. L.
REv.  3, 28-39 (1995).
36.  Thus,  in  a  sense, the  decision  to  treat  another  system's  authority  as
helpful is  itself grounded in domestic norms. See Bayefsky, supra note  13,  at
359.
37.  This  paper  will  focus  primarily  on  national  courts'  resolution  of
domestic  constitutional issues which refer to  transnational  human rights legal
materials. See supra note  13.
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persuasive value  of different  sources  on  different  issues.38  But  on
many issues of gender, to which jurists may bring deeply entrenched
senses of the "natural,"  comparative  awareness  may provide helpful
perspectives from which to test initial reactions to legal challenges.
I.  FROM PosrrIvE LAW TO OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS:
"RELATIONAL"  AuTHORiTY
As Professor Slaughter observes, there has been apparent growth
in  recent  years  in  references  to  "persuasive  rather  than  coercive
authority"  by  courts  around  the  world.39   The  functions  of these
references  are many.  Thus, it has been argued, some courts rely on
other  courts'  decisions  in  order  to  enhance  their  own  legitimacy, 40
avoid  adverse  reputations  in  international  or  transnational
communities,41  or  even  to  reflect  shifting  political  relationships
between  countries.42  Consideration  of foreign  or  international  law
may  be  part of a  more  expressive  project  of constitutionalism,  in
which references  may help establish that a country is breaking from a
38.  See infra text at notes  167-68, 248-53  (discussing differences between
settled and new  issues and between standards  in international  conventions  and
adjudicated  judgments  of  domestic  courts  in  other  countries  on  similar
questions).
39.  See Slaughter, supra note 1,  at 122.
40.  For a sophisticated description of the mutually  legitimating references
between the two major European courts, and of their "wooing" national courts,
see Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 3, at 308,  323-28. Transnational discourse
can be found in lower national courts as well as in transnational  courts and the
highest  national  courts.  See  e.g. infra  note  99  (referring  to  lower  court
decision in Tanzania), text at notes  112-13  (discussing lower court decision in
New  Zealand).  An  interesting  project,  not  undertaken  here,  would  be  a
comparative  study  of the use  of transnational  sources  by judges  at  different
levels within national judicial hierarchies.
41.  See Reem Bahdi,  Globalization of Judgment: Transjudicialism  and the
Five Faces of  International  Law in Domestic Courts,  34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REV.  555, 590-95 (2002)
42.  See G.L. Davies" & M.P. Cowen,  The Persuasive  Force of Decisions of
United States Courts in Australia, 15  AUSTL.  B. REV.,  1996 ABR Lexis 27, *8
(suggesting  that Australia's  interest  in  independence  made  it  "more open  to
influence"  from countries other  than the U.K.,  including  the U.S.).  Professor
Schauer  proposes  that "the  transnational...  spread of law  and legal  ideas  is
not..,  largely a matter of the power and value of the ideas themselves but may
instead be substantially dependent, both on the supply side and on the demand
side, on political and symbolic factors..  ." Schauer, supra  note 26, at 254.GENDER EQUALITY
troubled  past,43  or  is  concerned  with  appearing  to  comply  with
international human rights law (or contrariwise, that a country's view
of binding  law  is  highly  exceptionalist  and  excludes  international
norms  absent  domestic  implementing  legislation).  Citations  to
foreign  authorities  may  also  reflect  a  national  court's  effort  to
distinguish  itself  from  countries  or  legal  norms  with  which  it
disagrees,44  an important  form  of comparison  not foreshadowed  by
the term "persuasive authority."
References  to  transnational  sources  may relate  not only  to  the
place of the court's nation  in the community of nations,  but also to
the status and relationship of courts to each other in the development
of law, thus fostering an autonomous professionalism of independent
courts (to which end the display of knowledge  alone may have some
perceived  value)  and/or  the  autonomous  content  of law under  the
interpretive  control  of  judges.45  Recognizing  the  dignity  and
authority  of  other  decision-makers  may  add  to  their  legitimacy
within their own legal orders,46 or confer it on others.47  This kind of
recognition  may  go  beyond  interests  in  establishing  the  autonomy
and professionalism  of courts,  insofar as it focuses on the  dignitary
sense  that  all  national  courts  and  transnational  tribunals  may  have
something  to  contribute  to  transnational  discourse.48  Interests  in
43.  See Bahdi, supra note 41,  at 587-90;  Schauer, supra  note 26, at 254-55
(noting  incentives  of countries  emerging  from  colonial  control  to  manifest
autochthonous constitutional choices).
44.  See Choudhry, supra note  6; Heinz  Klug, Model and Anti-Model: The
United States Constitution and the  "Rise of World Constitutionalism,  "  2000
WiS. L. REV.  597, 601-02 (2000).
45.  See McCrudden,  supra note  1, at 512-16;  Slaughter, supra note  1, at
114-17;  see  also  Slaughter,  Global Community,  supra note  7,  at  200-02.
Judicial  commitments  to  human  rights  may  also  be  reinforced  by  judges'
concern  for judicial  independence  in  adjudication  which,  like human  rights,
requires a certain tolerance for disagreement in politico-legal culture.
46.  See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
47.  See,  e.g.,  Beth  Lyon,  Discourse in  Development:  A  Post Colonial
"Agenda" for  the  United Nations  Committee  on  Economic,  Social  and
Cultural  Rights Through the Post-Colonial  Lens, 10  AM.  U. J.  GENDER  SOC.
POL'Y  & L.  535,  578 n.235  (2002)  (noting the  South  African  Constitutional
Court's citation to the work of the U.N. Committee on Economic,  Social and
Cultural  Rights  as  a  potentially  important  "source  of recognition"  for  the
authority of that committee's work).
48.  See  Slaughter,  Global  Community,  supra note  7  at  194,  205-10.
(emphasizing  comity among courts as well as among  legal systems);  see also
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.  113,  163--64 (1895).  For exploration of the concept
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recognizing the dignity of other courts can be seen as an embodiment
in  the practice  of judicial  discourse  of normative  commitments  to
values of participation and equal dignity of national courts.49
In addition  to dignitary forms of citation designed to recognize
or  enhance  the  stature  of particular  courts  or  countries,  a  related
function  of  transnational  citations  may  be  that  of  expressing
agreement with the content of decisions of other courts  in ways that
tend to enhance the precedential  value of a decision.50  This function
may be  linked to the  idea of the autonomous  development  of law.
However, the ideological  or substantive values  of the decisions may
be  the  most  important  factor  rather  than  their  autonomous
of the  dignity of sovereigns  or political groups,  with  particular  emphasis  on
dignity as  part of the "political  vocabulary"  of indigenous  peoples  and other "marginalized  groups,"  see Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult
to Injury: Questioning the Role of  Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55
STAN.  L. REV.  1921,  1941-46 (2003).
49.  Dignitary  interests,  for  example,  may  be  particularly  at  stake  in
reversing  the  "one  way"  direction  of  constitutional  influence  that  U.S.
constitutional  law  was  seen,  until  the  early  1990s,  as  having.  See  Peter
McCormick,  The  Supreme Court of Canada and American Citations, 1945-
1994: A Statistical  Overview, 8 (2d) S.CT. REv.  527 (1997);  Davies & Cowen,
supra note 42 at *8; cf Bahdi, supra note 41,  at 599-601  (urging that western
courts consider  decisions  from  non-western  cultures,  to  send  a message  that
international  human  rights law constitutes  a shared undertaking  and to afford
"due  recognition"  to  rebut  concerns  that  international  human  rights  law  is
imperialist). Note that even critical  references to another nation's  or tribunal's
judicial  decisions  might  convey respect for  their dignity;  conversely,  even if
positive, references  may be seen as condescending.  Cf  infra text at notes 67-
72  (discussing the U.S.  Supreme  Court's  mid-twentieth  century references  to
foreign practices).
50.  See,  e.g.,  Knight v. Florida, 528  U.S.  990,  995-97  (1999)  (Breyer, J.,
dissenting  from  denial  of  certiorari)  (discussing  decisions  by  courts  that
otherwise "accept  or  assume the lawfulness of the death penalty"  concluding
that long delays in carrying out a death  sentence "renders  ultimate execution
an inhuman, degrading or unusually cruel" and prohibited practice, including  a
Privy  Council  decision  for  Jamaica, and  decisions  of the  Supreme Courts  of
India and Zimbabwe and of the European Court of Human  Rights; noting that
each  faced  a  "roughly  comparable"  issue  in a  roughly  comparable  context).
But  see id.  at  990  (Thomas,  J.,  concurring)  (if there  were  any  American
authority, "it  would be unnecessary  for proponents of the claim to rely on the
European  Court  of Human  Rights,  the  Supreme  Court  of Zimbabwe,  the
Supreme Court of India, or the Privy Council").  For more recent iterations of
the  disagreement  between  the  Justices  on  the  relevance  of foreign  law  on
issues relating to  the death penalty,  see, e.g.,  Foster v. Florida,  537 U.S.  990
(2002); Atkins v.  Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).GENDER EQUALITY
development  by  courts  as  such.  For  example,  when  the  Canadian
Supreme Court held in Vriend v. Alberta51 that it violated the Charter
of  Rights  and  Freedoms  to  discriminate  against  a  person  in
employment  because of his homosexuality,  it quoted with approval
from the U.S.  Supreme  Court decision  in Romer v. Evans, 5z but  did
not refer to Bowers v. Hardwick. 53  By contrast, the  South African
Constitutional  Court  canvassed  constitutional  decisions  both
affirming  and rejecting the validity of the death penalty in the State
v. Makwanyane54 decision, exploring their reasoning before deciding
that  in  South  Africa  the  death  penalty  was  barred  by  its
Constitution.  Ignoring  contrary authority  may be  consistent  with
some uses  of foreign  authority,  for  example,  to demonstrate  that a
court is not alone in holding views, or to align oneself with or against
the views based on the country they emanate  from, but it is open to
51.  [1998]  1 S.C.R. 493.
52.  Id. at 549 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.  620 (1996)  (invalidating a
state  constitutional  amendment  prohibiting  extension  of anti-discrimination
protections  for gays and lesbians)).
53.  478  U.S.  186  (1986)  (rejecting  constitutional  challenge  to  criminal
prohibition of homosexual  sodomy), overruled by Lawrence v.  Texas,  123 S.
Ct.  2472,  2484  (2003).  Consider  also  Justice  Breyer's  reference  to  the
commandeering  practices  of Germany,  Switzerland  and the E.U.,  as relevant
to  the  constitutionality  of a  federal  statute  that  required  state officials  to
perform background  checks  on gun purchasers  in Printz  v. United States,  521
U.S.  898, 976  (1997)  (Breyer, J.,  dissenting).  Neither Justice  Breyer, nor the
majority opinion, which disagreed with Breyer on the relevance of comparative
constitutional law, cited Canadian authority  (probably far less well known and
more  ambiguous  than  Printz) that  seems  to  look  in  different  directions.
Compare Reg'l Municipality of Peel v. MacKenzie, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 9 (treating
federal  mandate  to  municipalities  to  spend  money  on  particular  kind  of
juvenile detention facility  as beyond federal constitutional  power over criminal
law) with Reference  re Goods and Services Tax, [1992]  2 S.C.R. 445, 482-85
(upholding  application  to  provinces  of obligations  for  suppliers  of goods  to
collect a federal  consumption tax and distinguishing Peel).
54.  State v. Makwanyane,  1995  (6)  BCLR 665 (CC),  1995 SACLR LEXIS
218;  see also Knight  v. Florida,  528  U.S.  at 996  (Breyer, J.,  dissenting from
denial  of certiorari)  (recognizing  that  "[n]ot  all  foreign authority  reaches  the
same  conclusion"  on  lawfulness  of delay  in carrying  out death  sentence);  cf
South  Africa  v.  Grootboom,  2000  (11)  BCLR  1169  (CC),  2000  SACLR
LEXIS  126  (discussing  the  International  Covenant on Economic,  Social  and
Cultural  Rights,  distinguishing  its  text  from  that  of  South  Africa's
Constitution,  and  distinguishing  institutional  competence  of domestic  court
from that of the U.N. Human Rights Committee).
55.  See Makwanyane,  1995  (6)  BCLR  665(CC),  1995  SACLR LEXIS  at
*64,  *70-81.
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claims  either  that such  selective  use of foreign  sources  reflects  an
increase in the unconstrained discretion of  judges to decide in accord
with preferences  rather  than  law,  or that  foreign  authority  is mere
after-the-fact  decoration.
6
Transnational judicial  discourse  may  also reflect  a  more open,
deliberative judicial  decision  process,  one that draws  on  a  broader
range of sources for challenge and critique of analytical assumptions,
both  for  elaboration  of  common  normative  values  in  different
institutional  settings  and for developing  understandings  of national
distinctiveness.  Scholars have noted the rise in "constitutional  cross-
fertilization,"  a  sharing  of  knowledge  and  possible  innovation
sparked  by  greater  familiarity  with  other  countries'  practices,  a
knowledge  not  necessarily  reflected  in  citations. 57  Sometimes
citations reflect  acknowledgment  that the  decision of another  court
has  been  helpful  because  it  is  analyzing  a  similar  problem  in  a
58 similar  context,  or  because  the  subject  area  has  some  universal
quality to it,59 or because  one polity's approach  helps illuminate  the
consequences  of a particular  interpretive choice.60  Consideration of
the reasoning  of other  constitutional  courts,  whether  referred  to  in
56.  See  McCrudden,  supra note  1, at  527-29;  Pradyumna  K.  Tripathi,
Foreign Precedents and Constitutional  Law,  57  COLUM.  L.  REv.  319,  322,
328-29  (1957);  Fontana, supra note 4,  at 557  n.81.  For discussion,  see  text
accompanying notes 240-45 infra.
57.  See Slaughter,  Global Community, supra note  7,  at  193,  194-204; see
also Michael Kirby, Think Globally, 4 GREEN BAG 2D. 287 (Spring 2001).
58.  Cf Tushnet,  supra note 4,  at  1238-69  (exploring  functionalism  while
expressing  skepticism  about  empirical  and  theoretical  bases  for  useful
functional  comparison).  Additionally,  where  an  international  instrument  is
binding  in a  country  its courts  might refer to  decisions  by courts  of another
country concerning the same instrument, even though the interpretive decision
is not binding.
59.  See  Donald  P.  Kommers,  The  Value  of Comparative Constitutional
Law, 9  J. MARSHALL  J. PRAC.  & PROC.  685,  692  (1976)  (noting capacity  of
comparative  study to identify "constitutional  values  and ideas about man and
his  relationship  to  the  state  [that]  are  commonly  shared  across  national
boundaries..  .[as  part  of]  a  search  for  principles  of justice  and  political
obligation that transcend...  a particular political  community");  Bahdi, supra
note  41,  at 568-69 (discussing  the "universalistic  impulse"  in cases  involving
torture and gender discrimination).
60.  See  Printz  v.  United  States,  521  U.S.  898,  976  (1997)  (Breyer,  J.,
dissenting);  see also Tushnet, supra note 4,  at  1229-30;  cf  Stephen Breyer,
Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.  245  (2002)  (discussing role
of consequentialism in constitutional interpretation).
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citations or not, may reflect efforts to improve the quality of judicial
reasoning  by eliciting  more  complete  understanding  of differences
between  systems  and of the reasons  for one or another  approach  to
similar issues.
61
A.  Persuasive  Authority, Then and  Now:  Separated  Sovereignties to
Relational  References
The phrase "persuasive  authority"  is invoked  to describe  all  of
these practices of courts in considering materials that are not binding
within the positive hierarchy of controlling legal norms.  In contrast
to the hierarchic obligation to apply "binding" law,62 Professor Glenn
treats  "persuasive  authority"  as "authority  which attracts  adherence
as opposed to obliging it" and which is consulted primarily because
of its persuasiveness,  in a quest to find better answers or solutions to
legal  issues.63  But the range of reasons  for transnational  references
extend well beyond those suggested by such a definition; the phrase
61.  Compare Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt,  Affirmative
Action: An International  Human Rights Dialogue, 21  CARDozo L. REv.  253,
261-81  (1999)  (describing status of affirmative  action in the  U.S.,  India, and
European  Union)  with  Grutter  v.  Bollinger,  123  S.  Ct.  2325,  2347  (2003)
(Ginsburg,  J.,  concurring)  (discussing  international  covenants  contemplating
temporary  affirmative  measures);  Gratz v.  Bollinger,  123  S. Ct. 2411,  2442
(2003)  (Ginsburg,  J.,  dissenting).  Neither  of  Justice  Ginsburg's  written
opinions referred to foreign national practices, such as those in India described
in her paper, although she asked at oral argument in Gratz about constitutional
experience in other countries:
General  Olson-we're  part of a  world,  and this problem  is  a global
problem. Other countries operating under the same equality norm have
confronted  it. Our neighbor  to the  north,  Canada,  has,  the European
Union, South Africa,  and they have all approved this kind of, they call
it positive discrimination. Do we-they have rejected what you recited
as the ills that follow  from this. Should we shut that from  our view at
all or should we consider what judges in other places have said on this
subject?
See Official  Transcript Proceedings  Before the Supreme  Court of the United
States,  Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (No. 02-516), at 24-25, at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oralarguments/argument-transcripts/02-
516.pdf.
62.  See  McCrudden,  supra note  1, at  502.  For a  helpful  discussion  of
precedent,  see Evan H. Caminker,  Why  Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior
Court  Precedents?,  46 STAN. L. REv. 817 (1994).
63.  See H. Patrick Glenn, Persuasive  Authority, 32  MCGILL L.J. 261,  263
(1987);  see also id. at 263-64,  268,  272, 277;  Fontana, supra note 4,  at 557-
59.
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"persuasive authority," when used to cover the multitude of functions
described  above,  may  obscure  some  of  their  distinctive  aspects.
There  are  important  "negative"  use  of foreign  precedents  (i.e.,  as
"aversive"  rather than "persuasive" authority),64 as well as "dialogic"
references,  in  which  a  foreign  source may  be persuasive  within  its
system  but  distinguishable  from  the  other.65   Such  uses  fit  well
within  Professor  McCrudden's  broader  definition  of  persuasive
authority  as  any  "material...  regarded  as  relevant  to  the  decision
which has to be made by the judge, but ...  not binding on the judge
under  the  hierarchical  rules  of  the  national  system  determining
authoritative sources. 66
In some of the current transnational discourse of rights, there is a
qualitatively  new  tone  to  references  to  nonbinding  authority,
consisting of an implicit assumption  of relationality.  A contrast may
help illustrate  what  I mean.  In the mid-twentieth  century,  the U.S.
Supreme Court's occasional  references  to constitutional practices  of
nations proceeded  on the basis  that  "they"  and  "we"  were  entirely
separate  polities.67  One  note  accompanying  some  comparative
references  is  that  of exceptionalism,  or superiority.  In Miranda v.
Arizona,68 after canvassing foreign practices concerning warnings for
or limitations on the admissibility  of custodial statements, the Court
wrote:
[I]t is consistent with our legal system that we give at least
as  much  protection  to  these  rights  as  is  given  in  the
jurisdictions described.  We deal  in our country with rights
64.  See  supra  text  accompanying  note  44;  Kim  Lane  Scheppele,
Aspirational and Aversive  Constitutionalism: The  Case for Studying Cross-
Constitutional Influence  Through Negative Models,  1 INT'L  J.  CONST'L  L.
(I'CON)  296 (2003); see also Klug, supra note 44, at 605-07  (noting that the
U.S.  served  as a negative  model  for  India, which  declined  to  include  a due
process clause  to avoid Lochnerization,  and South Africa, that drafted a clause
protecting  property  so  as to distinguish  carefully between  expropriations  and
regulations);  Choudhry, The Lochner Era, supra note 32 (Lochner as negative
model in Canada).
65.  See Choudhry, supra  note 6, at 835-38, 855-65.
66.  McCrudden, supra  note 1,  at 502-03.
67.  There  may have been  more use of foreign  law on constitutional  issues
in the 1940s-60s than in more recent  decades.  See McCrudden, supra note  1,
at  509-10  (noting  decline  in usage  of foreign  law after  Frankfurter  left  the
Court).
68.  384 U.S. 436 (1966).GENDER EQUALITY
grounded in a specific requirement of the Fifth Amendment
of the Constitution,  whereas  other jurisdictions  arrived at
their conclusions on the basis of principles of justice not so
specifically defined.69
In  other  words,  given  that  the  United  States  has  a  written
constitution, one with "specific  requirement[s],"  it should do at least
as  well  as  those  other  jurisdictions.  Oblique  references  to  the
dangers  of Nazism  or  fascism  (from  which  the  U.S.  Constitution
protected)  in  the  Court's  decisions  in  cases  such  as  Youngstown
Sheet &  Tube Co. v. Sawyer,7 0  represent  a second kind of reference
to other nations, here as a basis for sharper differentiation.  In Justice
Frankfurter's  reference  to  Canadian decisions  on intergovernmental
tax  immunity,71  we  see  a  third  use,  this  time  of other  countries'
69.  1d.  at  489-90  (emphasis  added).  In  addition  to  the  competitive
overtones  in  the  text  quoted  above,  the  Court  made  a  more  functional
argument, relying  on experience in England, Scotland, Ceylon, and Canada to
suggest  that  the dangers to  law enforcement  of requiring  warnings  had  been
overstated.  Miranda's  use of foreign authority seems to build on Frankfurter's
opinion  in  Culombe v. Connecticut, 367  U.S.  568  (1961).  In  discussing the
relationship  between  custodial  confessions  and the personal  liberty protected
by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  Frankfurter  engaged  in  a  wide-ranging
treatment  of other  systems'  approach  and  of state  and  federal  statutory  law
about  custody  and interrogations,  which,  he concluded,  demonstrated  a broad
consensus  of  concern  about  custodial  interrogations  with  considerable
difference  on details.  See id. at 576-602  (discussing English  and continental
practice and contrasting  Scottish rule with English, Canadian, and inquisitorial
systems).
70.  343  U.S.  579,  593-94  (1952)  (Frankfurter,  J.,  concurring)  (implicitly
referring to fascist government  as reason to enforce  separation of powers even
though  it  "is  absurd  to  see  a  dictator"  in  Harry  Truman);  see  id.  at  641
(Jackson,  J.)  (noting  "instruction  from  our  own  times"  in  dangers  of
"totalitarian" government);  see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S.  624,  641-42  (1943);  Terminiello  v.  Chicago,  337  U.S.  1, 4-5  (1949)
(referring  to  what  sets  the  United  States  apart  from  totalitarian  regimes);
Griswold v.  Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965)  (distinguishing totalitarian
regimes that limit family size); United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S.  Ct.
2297,  2322  (2003)  (Souter,  J.,  dissenting)  (noting  the  impact  of European
fascism on resistance to library censorship).
71.  See  United  States  v.  Allegheny  Co.,  322  U.S.  174,  198  (1944)
(Frankfurter, J.,  dissenting) ("In respect to the problem we are considering, the
constitutional relation of the Dominion of Canada to its constituent Provinces
is the same as that of the United States to  the States. A recent decision of the
Supreme  Court  of Canada  is  therefore  pertinent.  In  City of  Vancouver v.
Attorney-General of  Canada,  [1944]  S.C.R.  23,  that  Court  denied  the
Dominion's claim to immunity in a situation  precisely like this, as I believe we
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constitutional  decisions  as  "persuasive  authority"  based  on  an
assumed  similarity  in  the  details  of  domestic  constitutional
allocations of functions.  Notwithstanding Frankfurter's references to
"English  federalisms," 72 many  of these mid-century  forms of usage
proceeded  on  the basis of a world  of entirely separate  and distinct
national  states generating their own sovereign law.
There is beneath the surface of some of the more contemporary
transnational  constitutional discourse, particularly outside the United
States, a different sense of "persuasive  authority," a broad sense of a
common  venture,73  of related  national  entities,  captured  in  Justice
Albie Sachs'  phrase of a "world jurisprudence."74  In many countries
courts  with  jurisdiction  over  constitutional  questions-both  those
acting  with  and  those  acting  without  explicit  constitutional
permission  to  consider  foreign  or  international  law-invoke
international  human  rights  conventions  and the  decisions  of other
national  courts  as  an  interwoven  part of the  interpretive  fabric  of
decision-making.
1. Constitutional authorization to consider foreign authority
Some  constitutions  specifically  or  implicitly  authorize
consideration  of foreign  or  international  law  in  the  resolution  of
constitutional  rights  questions. 75   The  South  African  Constitution
should deny the claim of the Government.") (emphasis  added); see also Graves
v.  New  York  (ex  rel  O'Keefe),  306  U.S.  466,  491  (1939)  (Frankfurter,  J.,
concurring)  (noting that despite the gravitational  pull  of the U.S.  constitution
on the other great "English federalisms,"  Canada and Australia, those systems
had  shifted  view  on  the  intergovernmental  tax  immunity  issue  before  the
Court).
72.  See Graves, 306 U.S. at 490-91  (Frankfurter, J.,  concurring)  (referring
to  Canada  and  Australia  as  the  "two  other  great  English  federalisms").
"Genetic"  uses  of English materials,  that  are  designed  to reflect  on original
understandings of U.S. constitutional  provisions, are distinct from other uses of
comparative  materials.  For  discussion,  see  Vicki  C.  Jackson,  Ambivalent
Resistance and Comparative  Constitutionalism:  Opening Up The Conversation
on  "Proportionality,  " Rights and Federalism, 1  U. PA. J. CONST'L L. 583,  588
n.25 (1999)  [hereinafter Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance].
73.  See  Slaughter,  supra note  1, at  122;  Slaughter,  Global Community
supra  note 7, at 193 (referring to sense of "common judicial enterprise").
74.  Albie  Sachs,  Social  and Economic  Rights:  Can  They  Be  Made
Justiciable?,  53 SMUL. REv. 1381,  1388 (2000).
75.  A  number  of  constitutions,  for  example,  specifically  authorize
interpretation of rights  in light of the Universal  Declaration of Human  Rights.
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specifically  provides  that  "When  interpreting  the  Bill  of Rights,  a
court...  must  consider  international  law;  and...  may  consider
foreign  law, 76  and  the  South  African  Court  has  done  both  on  a
number of occasions.77  The Constitutional Court has repeatedly held
that the constitutional  mandate to consider international human rights
law  "would  include  nonbinding  as  well  as  binding  law,"  an
interpretation  by no  means  obvious  though  apparently  accepted  as
correct.78   In  addition  to  provisions  specifically  authorizing  the
See Hurst Hannum, The Status and Future of  the Customary International  Law
of  Human Rights: The Status of the Universal  Declaration of  Human Rights in
National and International  Law, 25  GA.  J. INT'L & COMP.  L.  287,  313  (Fall
1995/Winter  1996)  (citing  provisions  in Portuguese,  Romanian,  and  Spanish
constitutions);  see also id. at  377-91  (listing  domestic  decisions  in twenty-
eight countries citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
76.  See  S.  AFR.  CONST.,  § 39  (1997);  see  also CONSTITUTIONS  OF  THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, Vol. XVI (Gisbert H. Flanz, ed.,  1997). Section 35
of  the  predecessor  Interim  Constitution  of  South  Africa  also  required
consideration of international law and authorized consideration of foreign law.
Separate  provisions  of  the  South  African  Constitution  govern  when
international law applies of its own force. See id. §§ 231-32.
77.  See,  e.g.,  State  v.  Makwanyane,  1995  (6)  BCLR  665  (CC),  1995
SACLR  LEXIS  218,  *53-56 (citing  foreign  approaches  to role of legislative
history  in  constitutional  interpretation);  Id.  at  *64,  *70-81  (discussing
international and foreign comparative  law on substantive issues relating to the
death penalty); South Africa v. Grootboom, 2000 (11)  BCLR 1169 (CC), 2000
SACLR  LEXIS  126,  *47-57  (discussing  international  law  bearing  on
interpretation  of  constitutional  right  to  housing,  including  International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).
78.  See Makwanyane, 1995  SACLR LEXIS at  *73,  quoted with approval
Grootboom, 2000  SACLR  LEXIS  126  at  *49; see generally John  Dugard,
International  Human Rights, in RIGHTS  AND  CONSTITUTIONALIsM:  THE NEW
SOUTH  AFRICAN  LEGAL  ORDER  191-95  (Dawid  van Wyk  et al.  eds.,  1996)
(noting  that  because  the  South  African  bill  of  rights  was  inspired  by
international  human  rights  conventions,  drawing  on  their  language  and
structure, even without the direction to consider international law "there can be
little doubt" that the courts "would  have been obliged  to turn to international
human  rights law  for guidance").  Id. at  193.  Dugard also  argued  from  the
language of other provisions  of the then  interim constitution that the intention
was  plain  to  require  consideration  of sources  of international  law to  which
South Africa was not a party; "it would be ridiculous to limit [consideration of
human  rights  treaties]  to  those  to  which  South  Africa  is  a  party  (or  may
become  a  party)  as  this  would  prevent  a  court  from  considering  the
jurisprudence of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, which
provides the most valuable  source of international  human rights law."  Id. at
194.  Dugard  points  out as  an  advantage  of this approach  that  courts  may
consider  sources of international  law, without having  to determine "whether  a
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consideration  of foreign  law, clauses  like Canadian Charter  Section
1, permitting  only those  limitations  of rights  demonstrably justified
in a "free and democratic"  society, implicitly invite consideration  of
the  practices  of other  democratic  nations.79   Similar  language  is
found in some provisions of the  ICCPR and of the regional  human
rights conventions. 80
2.  Other consideration of international or foreign law for
constitutional interpretation
Yet the  felt need to consider foreign  and international  authority
is  not  limited  to  settings  with  these  forms  of  constitutional
authorization.  The  Chief Justice of Norway  in  1998  wrote of "the
duty of national courts-and especially in the highest court in a small
country-to  introduce  new legal  ideas  from  the outside world  into
national judicial  decisions.'  There appear to be a number of cases
in  domestic  national  courts  (whose  constitutions  do  not  expressly
particular principle..,  is backed by sufficient  practice (usus) and opinio  juris
to  qualify  as  a  customary  rule  binding  on  South  Africa  [under  another
constitutional provision]."  Id.
79.  See also Lorraine  Weinrib,  Canada's  Constitutional  Revolution: From
Legislative to Constitutional State, 33  ISR. L. REV.  13,  30  (1999)  (discussing
how  Charter  language  by  which  rights  could  be  restricted  only  in  manner
justified in a "free  and democratic society" "tie[s]  the limitation analysis to the
post-war international  and national  rights-protecting  systems"); cf Mary Ann
Glendon, A  Beau  Mentir  Qui  Vient  De  Loin:  The  1988 Canadian Abortion
Decision in  Comparative Perspective, 83  Nw.  U.L.  REV.  569,  579  (1989)
(noting uses of foreign cases to  illustrate "more  than  one vision of...  a free
and democratic society").
80.  See e.g.,  ICCPR, supra note 10, at art. 22(2) (prohibiting restrictions on
freedom of association right except for "those which are prescribed by law and
which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security
or public  safety, public order,  ...  the protection of public health or morals  or
the protection of the rights  and freedoms of others");  European Convention of
Human Rights, art. 8 (prohibiting "any interference"  with privacy right "except
such as  is in accordance  with the law and is necessary  in a democratic  society
in the interests of national security, public safety or  ...  economic  well being.
. . for  the  prevention  of disorder  or  crime,  for  the  protection  of health  or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms  of others"); id. at art. 9
("Freedom to manifest  one's religion  or beliefs  shall be subject only  to such
limitations as are  prescribed by law and are necessary  in a democratic  society
in the  interests  of public  safety,  for the protection  of public  order, health  or
morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others").
81.  Carsten  Smith,  The  Supreme Court in  Present-Day Society,  in  THE
SUPREME  COURT OF NORWAY  96,  145 (Stephan Tschudi-Madsen  ed.,  1998).GENDER EQUALITY
authorize  resort  to  foreign  or  international  law  for  interpretive
purposes) that refer to foreign decisions or international human rights
sources not yet legislatively incorporated into domestic law. In India,
for example,  the Supreme  Court in  Vishaka v.  State of Rajasthan, 82
concluded  that  the  state's  failure  to  prevent  rape  and  sexual
harassment violated equality provisions of the Indian Constitution as
well as  CEDAW.  Although  the status of treaties  as internal  law  is
unclear from India's constitutional text,83 in Vishaka, the Court wrote
that  "[a]ny  international  convention  not  inconsistent  with  the
fundamental  rights  [of the Indian Constitution] and in harmony with
its  spirit must be read  into these  provisions  to enlarge  the meaning
and  content  thereof,  to  promote  the  object  of  the  constitutional
guarantee." 84 In the same opinion  the Court relied on an  Australian
82.  A.I.R.  1997  S.C.  3011,  reprinted in  3  Butterworths  Human  Rights
Cases 261  (1997).
83.  See  AM.  SOC'Y INT'L LAW,  NATIONAL  TREATY  LAW  AND  PRACTICE,
STUDIES  IN TRANSNATIONAL  LEGAL  POLICY  No.  27  85-86,  91-92  (Monroe
Leigh & R. Blakeslee eds.,  1995).  India became  a party  to CEDAW  in  1993
but evidently  no implementing  legislation existed  at  the time of the  Vishaka
decision. Article  51  of the  Indian Constitution provides that "[t]he  State  shall
endeavor  to... foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the
dealings of organised peoples with one another,"  while article  19(2)  authorizes
restrictions  on rights in order to preserve  friendly relations with foreign  states.
See INDIA  CONST.,  arts.  19(2),  51,  in CONSTITUTIONS  OF  THE  COUNTRIES  OF
THE WORLD,  Vol. VIII (Gilbert  H. Flanz,  ed.,  Oceana Publications,  1997). In
Article  253,  the  constitution  also  specifically  empowers  "Parliament...  to
make  any  law...  for  implementing  any  treaty...."  See AM.  SOC'Y  INT'L
LAW, supra at 106. According to commenters,
There  is  no  provision  in  the  Indian  Constitution  similar  to  Article
VI(2) of the United  States Constitution,  which proclaims  treaties the
supreme  law  of the  land.  Article  253  of the  Indian  Constitution,
which confers  legislative  powers  on  Parliament,  does not  give  clear
direction  as  to  whether  enactment  by Parliament  is required  for the
implementation of treaties and agreements..  . . The question whether
a  particular  treaty  or  agreement  calls  for  implementing  legislation
depends very much upon its subject matter.
See id. at  91-92.  In  Vishaka,  decided  two years  after this commentary,  the
Court  held  that it  was  "implicit"  in  Article  51  and  the enabling  power  of
Parliament that treaties  not inconsistent with the Constitution should be "read
into  it"  so  as  to  enlarge  its  guarantees,  "[i]n  the  absence  of domestic  law
occupying  the  field."  Vishaka  v. Rajasthan, 3 Butterworths  Human  Rights
Cases 261,  264 (India, 1997).
84.  Vishaka, 3 Butterworths Human  Rights Cases at 264 (emphasis  added).
The  Court  uses  several  formulations  to  describe  the  relationship  between
international  norms  and  domestic  constitution.  See  id.  (constitutional
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decision  to  support reading  "international  conventions  and  norms"
into judicial understandings of fundamental constitutional rights.85 In
the United States,  Justice  Ginsburg has invoked  both  CEDAW and
the Covenant Against Race Discrimination in support of the idea that
"affirmative  action"  measures  should  be  for  a  temporally  limited
period  of time-even  though  the  United  States  has  not  ratified
CEDAW, and ratified the  Race  Covenant with  a  reservation  that  it
was not self-executing.8
6
provisions "permit" use of "international  conventions and norms"  in judicial
interpretation "in the absence of domestic  law occupying the field"); id. at 265
(international  norms on gender equality are of "great significance");  id. at 266
(referring  to  an  "accepted  rule  of  judicial  construction"  to  consider
international law).  See also Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India, 1 LRI 353,  *8
(India,  1999) (stating that domestic courts "are under an obligation to give due
regard  to  international  conventions  and norms  for  construing  domestic  laws
when  there  is  no  inconsistency  between  them,"  referring  to  CEDAW  and
interpreting guardianship  law to allow mothers as well as fathers to serve).  For
other Indian Supreme Court cases in which judges invoked international law or
foreign decisions  as interpretive aids  in resolving constitutional questions,  see
for  example,  Shri  D.K.  Basu  v.  State  of West  Bengal,  (1996)  S.C.C.  416
(India)  (addressing  custodial  violence  as  human  rights  violation);  Madhu
Kishwar  v.  State  of  Bihar,  (1996)  5  S.C.C.  125  (India)  (Judgment  of
Ramaswamy, J.) (citing CEDAW  as well as Indian constitutional provisions to
challenge customary  inheritance  rules  that  disfavored women).  According  to
the Women's Rights Resource Center, the outcome of the latter case was that
women  who were dependent  on the land could not be removed  from the land
but  did  not  inherit,  while  the  right  of male  succession  was  in "suspended
animation";  Ramaswamy's  dissenting  opinion would  have recognized  greater
rights  for  the  female  heirs.  See  Bora  Laskin  Law  Library,  University  of
Toronto,  Women's  Human  Rights  Resources  Web  Page,  at
http://eir.library.utoronto.ca/whrr  (type "madhu  kishwar"  in  search  box)  (last
visited Oct. 20, 2003) [hereinafter  WHRR  Web Page].
85.  See  Vishaka,  3  Butterworths  Human  Rights  Cases  at  266  (citing
Minister  of Immigration  & Ethnic  Affairs  v.  Teoh,  (1995)  183  CLR  273
(Austl.)).
86.  See Grutter v. Bollinger,  123  S.Ct. 2325, 2347-48 (2003)  (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring)  (noting  that  the  Court's  view  that  affirmative  action  measures
should be temporally limited  "accords  with the international understanding of
the office of affirmative action" and expressing hope, but not "firm[]  forecast,"
that  within  a  generation  such  measures  would  not  be  needed).  Justice
Ginsburg relied  first on the International  Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms  of Racial  Discrimination,  id. at  2347,  which  the United  States  has
ratified but with  a reservation  that it was not self-executing.  See U.S. Senate
Resolution of Advice and Consent Ratification of the International Convention
on  the  Elimination  of All  Forms of Racial  Discrimination,  103d  Cong.,  2d
Sess.,  140 CONG.  REc.  S7634 (daily  ed. June  24,  1994).  She then  cited andGENDER EQUALITY
International human rights norms and comparative constitutional
decisions  may  both  be  referred  to,  reflecting  a  "blurring  of
international  law  into  comparative  [constitutional]  law."87  Justice
Breyer,  in  the  United  States,  has  invoked  the  constitutional
experience  of "roughly  comparable" countries  on the death penalty,
and has noted that the United States'  reservation to the ICCPR on the
death penalty  might not  extend to claims  that delay  in carrying  out
the  death  penalty  because  they  violate  prohibitions  on  cruel
punishments,88  in  a context  suggesting  that the  ICCPR  supports  a
reading  of  the  U.S.  Constitution  to  prohibit  such  delayed
executions.89  In Quilter v. Attorney-General, 9 0  New Zealand Court
quoted from CEDAW, see Grutter,  123 S.Ct. at 2347, which the United States
has signed but not yet ratified.
87.  Knop, supra  note 23, at 525.
88.  See  Knight  v.  Florida,  528  U.S.  990,  996-97  (1999)  (Breyer,  J.,
dissenting  from denial of certiorari) (discussing decisions of European Court of
Human  Rights,  the Privy  Council  on the Jamaican  death penalty,  the Indian,
Zimbabwean  and  Canadian  Supreme  Courts,  the views  of the  U.N.  Human
Rights Committee,  and U.S.  reservations  to the ICCPR).  See also Foster  v.
Florida,  537  U.S.  990, 992-93  (2002)  (Breyer,  J.,  dissenting  from  denial  of
certiorari)  (referring  to  decisions  of other  countries  on effects  of  delay  in
constitutionality  of carrying  out death penalty);  Patterson  v. Texas,  536  U.S.
984, 985 (2002) (Stevens,  J. dissenting from denial of certiorari)  (referring to a
consensus  among  states  and  the  international  community  against  the  death
penalty  for juveniles).
89.  Alternatively Justice Breyer may have been suggesting  that the ICCPR
directly  applied  to  prohibit  such  executions,  notwithstanding  that  the  U.S.
ratification of the ICCPR specified that it was not self-executing. See Knight v.
Florida, 528  U.S. at  996-97; see also U.S.  Senate  Resolution of Advice and
Consent to  Ratification  of the International  Covenant  on Civil  And Political
Rights,  102d Cong., 2d Sess.,  138 CONG. REc.  S4781  (daily ed. Apr. 2,  1992);
see  generally Curtis  A.  Bradley,  International Delegations, the  Structural
Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55  STAN.  L.  REV.  1557,  1593  n.177
(2003)  (compilation of recent ratifications of treaties specified by the Senate as
non-self-executing).  At the outset of his opinion Justice Breyer identified the
issue in the case as one of U.S. constitutional law alone.  See Knight, 528 U.S.
at 993  (Breyer, J.,  dissenting from denial of certiorari).  I thus think it is fair to
read  his  discussion  of  the  ICCPR  as  bearing  on  interpretation  of  the
constitutional question.
90.  [1998]  1  N.Z.L.R.  523,  1997  NZLR  LEXIS  644  (three  justices,
Richardson, Keith and Gault, finding that the Marriage Act, limiting  marriage
to a union between a man and a woman, did not breach the anti-discrimination
provision  of Section  19 the  1990  New Zealand  Bill of Rights Act).  Justice
Thomas,  by contrast, found that the Marriage  Act was in  violation of Section
19 of the Bill of Rights Act, id. at 528,  1997 NZLR LEXIS at  *13-15,  while
Fall 2003]LOYOLA  OF  LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 37:271
of Appeals justices with differing perspectives  on a challenge to the
exclusion of gay marriages  from the statutory  definition of marriage
referred  extensively  to  other  courts'  constitutional  decisions  and
international  sources.91
In  Unity Dow  v.  Botswana, 92  the  Botswanan  High  Court  and
Court  of Appeals  struck  down  a  statutory  discrimination  against
female citizens'  capacities to pass on citizenship to their children and
rejected  a  reading  of  the  Botswana  Constitution  as  excluding
protection from gender discrimination.  They did so even though the
Constitution's  equality clause defined discrimination by reference to
prohibited  classifications  which  did  not  include  gender93  and the
Justice  Tipping  found  an  apparent  discrimination  that was  at least  arguably
justifiable. Id. at  571,  577,  1997 NZLR LEXIS at *136,  *153.  Section  19  of
the Bill of Rights  in  effect applies  to discrimination based on  sex and  sexual
orientation, but while the Bill of Rights Act requires  the interpretation of other
statutes  in a manner consistent  with the rights set forth if possible, it does  not
permit  the  Court  to  invalidate  legislation  on  that  basis.  See  Stephen
Gardbaum,  The New  Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49  AM.  J.
COMP.  L. 707,  728-29  (2001);  Paul Rishworth,  Review: Human Rights, 2003
N.Z. L. REv. 261, 273-74 (2003).
91.  See Quilter v. Attorney-General,  [1998]  1 N.Z.L.R.  at  528,  531,  545,
1997 NZLR LEXIS at *14-15, *21-22, *62-63 (Thomas, J.) (citing, inter alia,
Canadian,  United  States  and Hawaii  cases); see also id. at  566,  1997 NZLR
LEXIS  at  *122-23  (Keith,  J.)  (noting  both  Romer  and  Bowers).  For  a
discussion  of CEDAW and  the ICCPR, see id. at 550,  1997 NZLR LEXIS at
*76-86  (Thomas,  J.).  The justices  disagreed  on  whether  international  law
could be relied  on to contract, as well as to expand, the meaning of the rights
protected under the New Zealand Bill of Rights.  Compare id. at 552-54,  1997
NZLR LEXIS at *82-89 (Thomas, J.)  (rejecting argument that limited reach of
ICCPR equality provisions should limit scope of equality provisions of Section
19 of New Zealand  Bill of Rights),  with id. at 560-63,  1997 NZLR LEXIS  at
* 105-13  (Keith,  J.)  (relying on understandings  that ICCPR would not require
gay marriage to limit scope of equality clause).
92.  See Unity Dow  v. Att'y Gen.,  reprinted  in 15  HuM.  RTS Q. 614 (Bots.
High Ct. 1991), affirmed in relevant  part,  Unity Dow v. Att'y Gen.,  103 I.L.R.
128,  (Bots. Ct. App. 1992) (1996).
93.  Section  15(1)  of  the  Botswana  Constitution  provided,  with  some
qualifications,  that  "no  law  shall  make  any provision  that  is  discriminatory
either  of itself or in its effect."  Unity Dow, 103  I.L.R.  at 149  (Amissah,  J.).
Section  15(3)  stated  "In  this  section,  the  expression  'discriminatory'  means
affording different treatment to different persons, attributable wholly or mainly
to their respective descriptions by race, tribe, place of origin, political opinions,
colour or creed ... ." Id. Section  15(4) went on to exclude from the application
of  Section(15)1  certain laws, including "personal law[s]"  relating to adoption,
marriage  and so forth.  See id. (Amissah,  J.).  The government  argued that theGENDER EQUALITY
original  Constitution  itself  included  a  gender  distinction  in
citizenship. 94  Both  courts  relied  in  part  on  international  and
transnational  legal sources, including the African  Charter on Human
and Peoples'  Rights  ban  on  sex  discrimination, 95  even  though  the
African  Charter  had  not  been  made  enforceable  by  domestic
legislation.96  The  Botswanan  opinions  also  invoked  the  Universal
purpose of excluding gender from Section  15  was to preserve the "patrilineal"
character of Botswanan society. Id. at 136 (Amissah, J.), 188 (Bizosja, J.).  The
majority judges, although noting  the "difficulty"  of the question, concluded  in
light  of  Section  3  of  the  Constitution  as  well  as  international  law's
commitment to gender equality that the listing of categories in  Section  15  was
illustrative,  not  comprehensive.  Id. at  161  (Amissah,  J.)  (justifying  use  of
international  human rights materials "in the interpretation of what no doubt are
some  difficult  provisions of the Constitution").  Section  3 of the Constitution
stated  in part:
Whereas  every  person  in  Botswana  is  entitled  to  the  fundamental
rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, the right, whatever
his race, place of origin, political question, colour, creed or sex..,  to
each and all of the following,  namely--(a) life, liberty, security of the
person  and the protection  of law;  (b)  freedom  of conscience...  (c)
protection  for  the  privacy  of his  home..  .and  from  deprivation  of
property without compensation ....
Id. at 140 (Amissah, J.P.).
94.  See id. at  158 (Amissah, J.P.); id. at 192 (Schreiner, J., dissenting).  The
government's  argument  in  support  of  the  statute  rested  not  only  on  the
omission of gender  as a prohibited  ground of discrimination in  Section  15  of
the  Constitution  but  also  on  the  fact  that  another  chapter  of the  original
constitution  had  explicitly  provided  one  citizenship  rule more  favorable  for
men than for women. The latter point, Justice Schreiner said in dissent, was a
"very  fair  indication"  that  Section  15  was  not  intended  to  prohibit
discrimination  against  women.  Id.  The  significance  of  the  international
materials  relied  on  looms  larger  in  the  face of domestic  legal  support  for a
contrary interpretation.
95.  See Unity Dow, 13 Hum. Rts. Q. at 623; Unity Dow, 103  I.L.R. at  161.
96.  See Unity Dow, 13 Hum. Rts. Q. at 623  ("I bear in mind that signing the
Convention does not give it the power of law in Botswana but the effect of the
adherence  by Botswana to the Convention  must show  that a construction"  of
Section  15  should  extend,  "in  harmony  with  the  convention"  to  ban  sex
discrimination);  Unity Dow, 103  I.L.R.  at  161  (Assimah, J.P.)  (assuming that
Universal  Declaration and African Charter "do not confer enforceable rights on
individuals,"  they  may  still  be  referred  to  as  aids  in  interpreting  the
constitution).  Moreover,  one Court of Appeals justice relied on the reasoning
of a New Zealand judge that "[a]n international  treaty, even one not acceded to
by New Zealand, can be looked at by the court on the basis that in the absence
of express  words  Parliament would not have  wanted  a  decision-maker  to  act
contrary  to  such  a treaty."  Id. at  178  (Aguda,  J.), citing Birds  Galore Ltd v.
Attorney  General,  [1989]  LRC  (Const.)  928,  939, reprinted in 90 I.L.R.  567,
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Declaration  of Human  Rights,  Privy  Council  decisions  reviewing
cases  from Zimbabwe  and Australia and referring  to the "comity  of
civilised  nations,"  the  U.N.  Declaration  on  the  Elimination  of
Discrimination  Against Women  (1967)  and CEDAW.97  Unity Dow,
in  turn,  has  been  invoked  by  the  Supreme  Court  of Zimbabwe98
along with decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and the
Human Rights Committee of the U.N. 99
578  (N.Z.  High  Ct.  1988)  (1992);  see  also Unity Dow,  103  I.L.R.  at  159
(Amissah,  J.P.)  (relying  on  statutory  Interpretation  Act  1984  authorizing
"regard to...  any relevant international treaty, agreement or convention" as an
aid  to  "construction  of  the  enactment...  including  the  pre-existing
Constitution  where its provisions  were not clear").  But cf id. at 202 (Puckrin,
J.,  dissenting)  (suggesting  danger  to  national  sovereignty  in  relying  on
international  declarations  where  the  Constitution  sought  to be  interpreted  is
unambiguous).
97.  See  Unity  Dow,  103  I.L.R.  at  159-61  (Amissah,  J.P.)  (referring  to
African  Charter,  Declaration  on  Elimination  of  Discrimination  Against
Women;  discussing Lord Wilberforce's opinion concerning the constitution of
Bermuda,  framed  in  light  of the  European  Convention  and  the  Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and stating that Botswana's Constitution had the
same  antecedents  "with  regard  to  the  imperatives  of  the  international
community;"  describing  Botswana  as  "member  of  a  comity  of  civilized
nations"),  177-78  (Aguda,  J.)  (CEDAW  and African  Charter  on Human  and
People's Rights).  See also id. at  139  (Assimah,  J.)  (referring to decisions  in
Canada, Nigeria, Namibia  and the United States);  Unity Dow, 13  Hum  Rts Q.
at  617-19,  623-24,  626  (discussing  African  Charter,  European  Convention,
Declaration on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, as well as Lord
Wilberforce's  Bermuda  constitution  opinion,  Zimbabwe  and  Australian
decisions).
98.  Rattigan v. Immigration Office, 103  I.L.R. 224, 228,  1995 (2)  SA  182,
185  (Zimb.  1994) (referring to  Unity Dow); see also 103  I.L.R..  at 231,  1995
(2)  SA  at  188  (citing  U.S.  Supreme  Court  decisions).  Rattigan found  a
violation  of the  constitutional  right  to  freedom  of movement where  the  law
provided that a foreign born husband of a Zimbabwe citizen,  unlike a foreign
born wife, was not entitled to stay in the country.
99.  See Rattigan, 103 I.L.R. at 232-33,  1995 (2) SA at 189-90 (discussing
Aumeeruddy-Cziffa  v. Mauritius decision of the Human Rights Committee and
Abdulaziz  Cabales  v.  United  Kingdom  decision  of  the  ECHR).  For  other
references  to  international  norms  in  resolving  gender  disputes  in  African
countries,  see Longwe v. Intercontinental  Hotels,  [1993]  4 LRC  221,  227-31
(Zambia  High  Ct.  1992)  (concluding  that  a  private  hotel's  refusal  to  serve
women  in  its  bar  violated  the  Constitution,  referring  to  both  the  African
Charter and CEDAW); Ephrahim v. Pastory, [1990] LRC 757, reprinted in  87
I.L.R.  106,  110  (Tanz.  High  Ct.  1990)  (referring  both  to  the  Universal
Declaration  and  to  CEDAW  to  conclude  that  a  sex  discriminatory  bar  on
women's  selling  clan  land was condemned  by Tanzanian  constitution).  NoteGENDER EQUALITY
A caveat:  I do not mean to suggest that all of the constitutional
courts of the world are involved in this kind of discourse, 00 nor that
those  which  do  refer  on  occasion  to  transnational  sources  do  so
consistently or  for the same  reasons,  or generally  act  in accordance
with international human rights law or with equality rights-protecting
foreign  constitutional  court  decisions,  in  resolving  domestic
constitutional  challenges. 1 0 1  There  are  cases  in  which  domestic
courts note international  legal norms but conclude,  sometimes  with
evident reluctance, that conflicting domestic norms control.1 02  There
that the African Charter has been invoked not only to reject but on occasion  to
uphold  gender discrimination.  See Magaya  v.  Magaya,  [1999]  3 LRC  35,  49
(Zimb.)  (referring  to  scholarly  discussion of preamble  to African  Charter  on
Human  and  People's  Rights  and  its  emphasis  on  the  virtues  of  African
"historical  tradition"  in  course  of  upholding  customary  inheritance  law
discriminating in favor of male progeny).
100.  Perhaps because  of the common British colonial  influence and patterns
of comparison  in  Privy  Council  review,  many  of the  decisions  noted  come
from  Commonwealth  nations.  See  also infra note  130.  My  ability  to read
cases  is limited by their availability  in English,  a limitation  which itself may
result  in  over-attention  to  decisions  of  Commonwealth  or  former
Commonwealth  countries,  albeit  in  different  parts  of the  world.  But  even
among  countries  sharing  a Commonwealth  legal  background,  there  are vast
differences,  and some appear more likely to engage in transnational references
than others. See also infra note 130.
101.  See, e.g.,  Sharifan v. Fed'n of Pakistan,  P.L.D.  1998 Lahore  59, 50 All
Pak. Legal Decisions 59, 62-63 (1997)  (Lahore) (rejecting challenge to gender
discrimination  in  citizenship  law,  noting  sources  from  the  U.S.  and  Privy
Council in nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,  India in the mid-1970s and
"private international  law" of the mid-twentieth  century); Magaya v. Magaya,
[1999]  3 L.R.C.  35  (Zimb.  Sup.  Ct.)  (rejecting  challenge  to  discrimination
against women in customary inheritance  rights); see also Knop, supra note 23,
at 524-25 ("domestic interpretation of international  law is not everywhere the
same  nor, indeed,  everywhere  good  or everywhere bad");  McCrudden,  supra
note 1, at 507 (noting concerns about inconsistency  in courts'  consideration of
foreign cases); cf Hannum, supra note 75, at 312 (noting that "mere recitation"
of human  rights  values  "may  not  necessarily  reflect  an  honest  intention  to
adhere to them"); Mumbi Mathangani,  Women's Rights in Kenya: A Review of
Government Policy, 8  HARV.  HuM.  RTS.  J.  179,  191  (1995)  (describing
violations  of  CEDAW  by  legislative,  executive  and  judicial  branches  of
government  and asserting  that in practice,  courts  in Kenya  have "completely
disregarded" CEDAW).
102.  See,  e.g.,  Bahdi, supra note  41,  at 581-82  (discussing  Dunghana  v.
Nepal decision, refusing to  strike down a law conditioning daughters'  rights to
inherit on being unmarried at age 35);  UNIFEM,  BRINGrNG EQuALrrY  HoME
22-23 (Ilana Landsburg-Lewis  ed.,  1998) (describing  decision in Dhungana  v.
Nepal,  Writ  No.  3392  (1993)(SC)(unreported  and  unofficial).  Although
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are  also  instances  in  which  a  court  appears  interested  in  using
international  human  rights  law as  an  aid  to interpretation  on  some
issues,  but  rejects  them  on  others.1 0 3  What  interpretive  principles
CEDAW had  domestic  status in Nepal,  the  Court declined  to invalidate  the
law; according to  Bahdi and UNIFEM,  the Nepalese court ordered discussions
in the political arena concerning the impact of the legislation on equality rights,
thus arguably  invoking a  dialogical  model  of rights definition.  Cf Quilter v.
Attorney  Gen.,  [1998]  1 N.Z.L.R.  523,  528-30,  1997 NZLR  LEXIS  644,  at
*13-18  (Thomas,  J.)  (finding  discrimination  but  agreeing  that  under  New
Zealand  Bill  of Rights  court  lacked  power to  invalidate  statute).  See  also
Magaya, 3  LRC at 49 (arguing  that it is for  the legislature,  not the court,  to
address  gender  inequality  in customary  inheritance  law);  Kishwar v.  State  of
Bihar,  (1996)  5  S.C.C.  125  (Punchhi,  J.)  (India)  (expressing  concern  for
judicial activism  and need  for legislation to  deal with  intricacies of change  in
customary  land  inheritance).  For  discussion  of the  benefits  of a  "dialogic"
model  in  mediating  competing  currents  in  Muslim  countries  on  gender
equality, secularism and religious identity, see Sunder, supra  note 24, at  1433-
41.
103.  Thus,  notwithstanding  its Rattigan decision,  supra notes  98-99,  the
Zimbabwe  Supreme  Court  later upheld  customary  laws  that deny  daughters
inheritance  rights.  See Magaya, 3 L.R.C. at 41-2  (treating customary  law as
exempt  from  constitutional  gender  equality  challenge  because  Section  23
(which, like Section 15  of the Botswana Constitution  discussed in Unity Dow,
forbids discrimintation but does not specifically include gender as a prohibited
basis) has an explicit exception for laws relating to "devolution of property  on
death" or the application of African customary law). The Magaya court treated
the customary  law basis  for  the  gender  discrimination  as  having  overriding
force  in constitutional interpretation.  See id. at 41  (relying on Section 23(3)  of
the Constitution as an exception to the gender equality norm for the application
of African customary  law in cases involving Africans).  Although in Rattigan
(which rested on the right to freedom of movement) the Court held that Section
11  of the  Zimbabwe  Constitution  (which,  like  Section  3 of the  Botswana
Constitution discussed above, guarantees "fundamental rights and freedoms"  to
each  individual  "whatever  his  race,  tribe. ..or  sex")  was  not  merely
preambulatory  but was  meant to  establish  substantive  rights,  in Magaya the
Court expressed  some doubt whether the Constitution  forbade discrimination
based  on  sex,  but noted that  it  might  be construed  to  do  so  "on  account  of
Zimbabwe's  adherence  to  gender  equality  enshrined  in  international  human
rights instruments."  Id. at 41.  Nonetheless,  the Court accepted that "allowing
female children to inherit in a broadly patrilineal  society..,  would disrupt the
African customary  laws" which had been  constitutionally protected  in Section
23(3). Id. at 44; cf Bayefsky, supra note  10,  at 247-48  (describing Canadian
defense  in  1980  of  gender  discrimination  in  Indian  status  law  based  on
patrilineality).  Furthermore,  the Magaya court found it  "prudent to pursue a
pragmatic and gradual change which would win long term acceptance" through
appeals  to the legislature "rather than legal revolution  initiated by the courts."
Id. at 49.  For critique,  see  J. Oloka-Onyango,  Human Rights and Sustainable
Development in Contemporary  Africa: A  New Dawn, or Retreating  Horizons?,GENDER EQUALITY
influence what transnational  authorities  are considered  and  for what
purposes  is not always made clear.1°4  In some instances, courts rely
on international  human rights  law,  constitutional  decisions  of other
courts and their own constitutional provisions to reach a decision, as
if  these  different  materials  were  an  entirely  congruent  body  of
overlapping  legal  sources.105  At  other  times,  international  legal
conventions  are discussed  separately  and treated  as having force  in
the  interpretation  of domestic  constitutional  law,  even  if not  yet
implemented  by  domestic  legislation.'0 6   These  divergent  and  at
times  inconsistent  practices,  however,  should  not  obscure  the
6 BUFF. HuM. RTS.  L. REv.  39, 64-66  (2000) (criticizing Magaya's deference
to  customary  law  and  absence  of concern  for  international  law  including
CEDAW).  Courts  in  other African  nations  have  found,  to the contrary,  that
gender  discrimination  in  customary  law  is  trumped  by  constitutional  and
international gender equality norms.  See Ephrahim v. Pastory,  1990 LRC 757,
reprinted  in  87 I.L.R. 106,  110 (Tanz. High Ct. 1990) (discussing CEDAW).
104.  Compare Magaya, 3 L.R.C.  at  44,  49  (discussing  African  Charter  as
suggesting  the importance  of traditional  African values,  apparently  including
women's  status as a "junior male") with  Unity Dow v. Attorney General, 103
I.L.R.  128,  161  (Bots.  Ct.  App.  1992)  (1996)  (Amissah,  J.P.)  (discussing
African Charter's commitments to gender equality).  It has been suggested that
commitments  to  gender equality  are inconsistent  with  other international  law
guarantees of the right of peoples  to self -governance  and to the preservation of
their cultural heritage. See, e.g.,  David M. Bigge & Amdlie von Briesen, Note,
Conflict in  the Zimbabwean Courts: Women's Rights and Indigenous Self-
Determination in  Magaya  v.  Magaya,  13  HARV.  HUM.  RTS.  J.  289,  296-99
(2000).  This position depends on contestable claims about the authenticity and
stability of that which we call culture, but bears mention because  such claims
point  out  the  complexity  and  arguable  tensions  within  the  domain  of
international human rights law.
105.  See, e.g.,  Unity Dow,  13  HuM. RTs.  Q.  at  616-25  (1991);  Rattigan  v.
Chief  Immigration  Officer,  1995  (2)  SA  182,  186-90  (Zimb.)  (discussing
European  Court of Human  Rights, U.S.,  Botswanan,  and  UN Human  Rights
Commission  decisions).  For discussion,  see  Bahdi,  supra note  41,  at  586
(noting  instances in which "judges invoke international  and comparative legal
sources  as  a  package;  they  bundle  together  legally  binding  sources  such  as
ratified treaties with  sources  that cannot give  rise to legal  obligations  such as
the national constitutions of other states and instruments from regional systems
that  do not apply to  the  state in question");  Knop, supra note  23,  at  525-33
(noting  advantages  of blurring  of  distinctions  between  international  and
foreign law in the interpretive processes of domestic courts).
106.  See, e.g.,  Vishaka v. Rajasthan, A.I.R.  1997 S.C.  3011,  reprinted in 3
Butterworths  Human  Rights  Cases  261  (India  1997);  see also  Knight  v.
Florida,  528  U.S.  990,  996-97  (1999)  (Breyer,  J.,  dissenting  from denial  of
certiorari).
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increasingly  common  phenomenon  of  judicial  reference  to
transnational sources of international and foreign constitutional law.
3.  Obligations to consider nonbinding law?
The simultaneous acknowledgment  of the nonbinding character
of external sources of law and an obligatory sense that they must be
considered,  displayed  in  some  instances  of  transnational
constitutional discourse, is especially noteworthy. 1 0 7  Courts not only
are citing to international  materials  which (if not presently binding)
are potentially binding in the future on their legal orders, but they are
also  citing to  (and at times even  distinguishing)  plainly nonbinding
authority  consisting  of the  decisions  of other  national  courts-in
India, New Zealand, South Africa, and Canada. 1 0 8  In some of these
cases  the  challenged  discrimination  is upheld:  In President of the
Republic of South  Africa v.  Hugo,1 0 9  the  Constitutional  Court  of
South Africa rejected a challenge to a law authorizing the President
to extend pardons to incarcerated  mothers of young children but not
107.  See  Mima  E.  Adjami,  African  Courts,  International Law  and
Comparative Case Law: Chimera or Emerging Human Rights Jurisprudence?,
24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 103,  108-13,  147 (2002) (noting that African courts draw
on nonbinding  international  sources  without  explicit  constitutional  approval,
and do not give greater deference  to binding international  instruments, such as
African Charter,  than to nonbinding  law, like the European  Convention);  see
also supra note 105.
108.  See e,.g.,  Vishaka, 3 Butterworths  Human Rights  Cases at  266 (citing
Australian  High  Court decision);  Quilter v. Attorney Gen.,  [1998]  1 N.Z.L.R.
523,  528,  545,  1997  NZLR  LEXIS  644,  *14-15,  *62-63  (Thomas,  J.)  (citing
Canadian  and U.S.  Supreme Court decisions);  State v. Makwanyane,  1995  (6)
BCLR  665,  1995  SACLR LEXIS  218,  at  *77-102,  107-15  (distinguishing,
inter alia, U.S.  and  Indian  death  penalty  cases  in  reaching  conclusion  that
death  penalty violated  South  African  constitution);  R. v.  Keegstra,  [1990]  3
S.C.R.  697,  738-45,  749-55  (Can.)  (citing  and  discussing  U.S.  First
Amendment  caselaw,  European  Convention,  ICCPR,  and  other  international
instruments);  R. v.  Butler,  [1992]  1 S.C.R.  452,  503  (Can.)  (discussing  U.S.
First  Amendment law on obscenity  in challenge  to anti-pornography  statute).
For a  discussion of these Canadian  cases,  see Vicki C.  Jackson,  Gender and
Transnational  Legal Discourse,  14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM  377, 381-85 (2002)
[hereinafter  Jackson,  Transnational Legal  Discourse]; see  also  Slaughter,
Global Community, supra note 7,  at 199 (noting "rise in persuasive authority");
Slaughter,  Globalization,  supra note  7, at  1116-17  (noting many citations to
nonbinding authority); McCrudden, supra note  1, at 512 (noting that courts are
distinguishing cases that are plainly not binding).
109.  1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC),  1997 SACLR LEXIS 91.GENDER EQUALITY
to incarcerated  fathers.  Both the majority and the dissent cited and
discussed  foreign  constitutional  caselaw:l " 0  the majority  concluded
that, while there was a gender discrimination,  it was not an "unfair"
one in light of differences in the situations of mothers and fathers of
young  children,  and  the  dissent  concluded  that  the  distinction
reinforced  stereotypes  and  assumptions  that  underlay  women's
subordination  and  was  prohibited  by  the  South  African
Constitution."'  What  is of interest  here is  the number of judges  in
courts  around  the  world  that  feel  impelled  to  acknowledge  the
decisions of others.
New  Zealand  cases  have  particularly  advanced  the  idea  that
courts have an obligation to consult international human rights law in
resolving  domestic  legal  questions.  In  1977  in  Van  Gorkom  v.
Attorney-General,"2  a  challenge  to  an  administrative  policy  that
discriminated  with regard to payment of moving  expenses for male
and female teachers, the lower court wrote:
The  Universal  Declaration  of Human  Rights  . . . [and]
The Declaration  on Elimination  of Discrimination  against
Women...  [are  not]  part  of  our  domestic  law[,]  [t]hey
represent  goals  towards  which  members  of  the  United
Nations are expected to work...  [and thus] might influence
the  courts  in  the  interpretation  of  statute  law[.]...
[C]omparatively  new [legal powers]...  should not without
compelling  reason  be taken  to allow  the introduction  of a
110.  See id.  at  *66-69  (Goldstone,  J.)  (discussing  Canadian  case  law  on
equality);  id.  at  *106-07  nn.87,  89  (Kriegler,  J.,  dissenting)  (discussing
Mississippi  University  for  Women  v.  Hogan,  458  U.S.  718  (1982)  and
Canadian  caselaw).  The  majority  opinion  spent  more  time  discussing
comparative law on pardons than on gender equality and, interestingly, did not
discuss  CEDAW,  even though  it had been ratified by South  Africa  in  1995.
(Justice Kriegler, in dissent, commented  that  the case was "hard"  because "it
seems  mean spirited  in the extreme  to scrutinise closely the validity of an act
of clemency  by  the  newly  inaugerated  President  aimed  at  enabling  a  few
hundred women prisoners,  sentenced for less reprehensible  crimes, to care  for
their young children." Id. at *89-90 n.80.)
111.  Id. at  *64 (majority) (noting  also that women  bore  much more  of the
burden of childrearing  and  that there  were  far  fewer  women  in prison  than
men);  id.  at  *106  (Kriegler,  J.,  dissenting)  (condemning  the  gender
discrimination here  as  stemming  from a view that is  a "relic  and a  feature of
the patriarchy which the Constitution so vehemently condemns")
112.  [1977]  1 N.Z.L.R.  535,  1977  NZLR  LEXIS  609  (N.Z.  Sup.  Ct.
Wellington).
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policy conflicting  with the  spirit of international  standards
proclaimed by the United Nations documents."l 3
In Tavita v. Minister of Immigration,14 a foreigner married to a
New Zealander sought to obtain legal residency  in New Zealand, and
invoked the ICCPR and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, in
interpreting  New  Zealand's  Bill  of Rights  Act  (which,  despite  its
statutory  character,  is treated  as requiring unusually broad remedial
interpretation). 1 5 The government's  argument that  the international
obligations  were  unenforceable  was,  according  to  the  court,  an
"unattractive  argument"  suggesting  that  international  obligations
were "at  least partly window-dressing." '16  Even though the Human
Rights Committee's  decisions on individual complaints  are not, as a
formal  matter, binding judgments  on New  Zealand  as  a matter  of
113.  Id.  at  542-43,  1977  NZLR  LEXIS  at  *23-25  (internal  quotations
omitted).  The court  also took  note of the International  Labor  Organization's
("ILO") Equal  Remuneration  Convention,  and of the fact that  it was not then
ratified  in New Zealand.  See  Sir Kenneth Keith  K.B.E,  The Application of
International  Human Rights Law in New Zealand,  32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 401,  408
(1997)  (treating  Van Gorkom as an  instance of an unincorporated  treaty being
relied upon as evidence  of public policy or as an aid to the interpretation  of a
statute).  According  to  Keith,  New  Zealand  follows  most  Commonwealth
countries  in the practice  that treaties  do  not automatically  become judicially
enforceable  law;  "[I]f a change  in rights  and duties  under the law is  required
then there must be appropriate legislative action."  Id. at 406.
114.  [1994]  2 N.Z.L.R. 257 (C.A.), 1993 NZLR LEXIS 634.
115.  See,  e.g.,  id. at 260,  1993  NZLR LEXIS  at *11-12; Coburn v. Human
Rights Commission,  [1994] 3 N.Z.L.R.  323, 333-34,  1994 NZLR LEXIS  626,
*33-34 (N.Z.  High  Ct.  Auckland)  (citing other  New  Zealand  precedent);  N.
Reg'l Health Auth. v. Human Rights Comm'n [1998]  2 N.Z.L.R. 218, 234-35,
1997  NZLR  LEXIS  659,  *44-48  (N.Z.  High  Ct.  Auckland).  (For a  brief
description of the distinctive quasi-constitutional approach  to the protection of
human rights in New Zealand, see supra note 90.) As the New Zealand courts
have frequently noted, the ICCPR inspired the New Zealand Bill of Rights act.
See, e.g.,  N. Reg'l Health Auth.,  [1998]  2 N.Z.L.R.  at 232-33,  1997  NZLR
LEXIS  at  *39-41.  Here,  as in many other post-World  War II constitutional
and  human  rights  documents,  the  model  for  enactment  invites  recourse  to
comparative and international sources in subsequent interpretation.
116.  Tavita  v.  Minister  of Organization,  [1994]  2  N.Z.L.R.  257,  265-66,
1993  NZLR  LEXIS  47,  *28-29.  Reem  Bahdi  characterizes  this  form  of
reasoning  as  invoking  the  rule  of  law,  the  idea  that,  even  where  treaty
obligations  have not been  made domestically  enforceable,  "the  state must be
held  accountable  for  its promises made  in  international  instruments."  Bahdi,
supra note 41,  at 560.
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international  law,1 17 its decisions have nonetheless  become important
(and  in  a  sense  obligatory)  to  consider:  New  Zealand  having
acceded  to the  Optional  Protocol of the ICCPR,  the United Nations
Human  Rights  Committee  was  "in  a  sense  part  of this  country's
judicial  structure,  in  that  individuals  subject  to  New  Zealand
jurisdiction have direct rights of recourse to it." '' 18
What  is  different  here  is  the  sense  of joint purpose,  of being
embedded  not  only  in  a  community  of nations  making  decisions
about  similar  issues  under  similar  domestic  constitutional
instruments,  but  of an  overarching  legal  order  of  internationally
recognized  human  rights  norms  that,  whether  or not  domestically
incorporated,  provides  reason  to  strive  to  meet  the  international
standard  and  to  be mindful  of other  interpretations  in  doing  so.11 9
This  sense  of connectedness  seems  new, and  is  in part  reflected  in
117.  See Steven R. Ratner, New Democracies, Old  Atrocities: An Inquiry In
International  Law, 87 GEo L.J. 707, 724-25 (1999).
118.  Tavita, [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. at 266,  1993  NZLR LEXIS 47, *30-31.  The
court  also  commented  that a  "failure  to  give  practical  effect  to  international
instruments...  may  attract criticism,"  id.,  and  noted the  Balliol  Statement's
reference  "to  the  duty  of  the  judiciary  to  interpret  and  apply  national
constitutions,  ordinary  legislation  and  the  common  law  in  light  of  the
universality of human  rights." Id. at *28-29.  The Tavita court did not decide
exactly what bearing  international  human rights law had on domestic law, but
suggested a reconsideration by the Minister in light of the international  human
rights implications. See also N. Reg '  Health Auth. 2 N.Z.L.R.  at 233-34,  1997
NZLR LEXIS 659, *42-44 (referring to General Comments of the UN Human
Rights Committee);  Tavita, [1994]  2 N.Z.L.R. at 262-63,  1993 NZLR LEXIS
47,  *17-21 (discussing caselaw  of the  European  Court of Human Rights);  cf
Atty-Gen'l v. Refugee  Council of New Zealand, Inc.,  [2003]  2 N.Z.L.R.  577,
Para.  103  (2003)  (discussing difference  between a duty to "give  effect"  to an
international obligation and duty to "have regard" for it).
119.  Professor  Slaughter  has  emphasized  the  increasing  role  of courts  as
institutions  engaging  in  dialogue  and  relationships  with  each  other both  in
adjudicatory decisions and in nonadjudicatory collegial settings. See Slaughter,
supra note 1,  at 1120-23; Slaughter, Global Community, supra note 7, at  193-
95;  McCrudden,  supra note  1, at  506.  The  sense of obligation  to  consider
nonbinding  legal  sources  that  I have described  is written  about by judges as
much (if not more) as  an obligation  to the  law than as a relationship  to other
tribunals,  though  these  two  phenomena  appear  to  be  closely  related  and
mutually reinforcing.  Compare Tavita, [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. at 266, 1993  NZLR
LEXIS  47,  *30-31  (discussing  the  UN  Human  Rights  Committee  and  a
relationship  with  that tribunal  as a  result of the  optional  protocol),  with  Van
Gorkom,  [1977]  1  N.Z.L.R.  at  542-43,  1977  NZLR  LEXIS  at  *24-25
(discussing the Universal Declaration as a source of law).
Fall 2003]306  LOYOLA  OF LOS ANGELES LAW  REVIEW  [Vol. 37:271
the  almost  casual  admixture  of international  sources  and  sources
based  on  the  domestic  law  of  other  nations  found  in  some
decisions.
1 20
But at the same time New Zealand judges assert that comments
of the Human  Rights  Committee "and  similar statements  emerging
from  other  committees  monitoring  U.N.  human  rights
instruments,' 121  can  provide  assistance  (as  can  comparative
constitutional interpretation),  they may also assert that they are not
binding  in  New  Zealand  courts.122   Why,  then,  must  they  be
considered?  Why must the Indian  Constitution's equality provisions
be  read  in  light  of  CEDAW? 1 2 3  Why  must  the  South  African
constitutional  court  consider  international  human  rights  law  in
interpreting  domestic  constitutional  rights,  even  when  that
international  law  is  not  binding?1 2 4   Is  there  a  new  kind  of
"stickiness"  or  attraction  of international  and  comparative  human
rights precedents, that create a sense of obligation to consider even if
not to follow?
120.  See also Tavita, [1994]  2 N.Z.L.R. at 266,1993 NZLR LEXIS 47,  *28-
29 (referring to the Balliol and Bloemfontein statements developed at meetings
of judges of Commonwealth nations encouraging resort to international human
rights  law  in  the  interpretation  of  domestic  constitutions,  statutory  and
common law).  But cf Longwe v. Intercontinental  Hotels, [1993] 4 L.R.C. 221,
233  (Zambia  High  Court)  (distinguishing  appropriate  effect  of Bangalore
principles,  as  mere  resolution  of  a  jurists'  meeting,  from  international
conventions entered into by Zambia).
121.  See,  e.g.,  N.  Reg'l Health  Auth. v. Human  Rights Comm'n, [1998]  2
N.Z.L.R.  218,  235,  1997  NZLR  LEXIS  659,  *46-47 (1997)  (N.Z.  High Ct.
Auckland)  ("[n]one  of the principles  or statements are  binding"  though they
should be considered); Quilter v. Attorney General, [  1998] N.Z.L.R. 523, 531,
1997 NZLR LEXIS  644, *21  (Thomas, J.).
122.  See e.g., Quilter, [1998] N.Z.L.R. at 531,  1997 NZLR LEXIS 644, *21
(Thomas,  J.);  N.  Reg'l  Health  Auth.  v.  Human  Rights  Comm'n,  [1998]  2
N.Z.L.R.  218,  235,  1997 NZLR  LEXIS  659,  *46-47. The judge in Northern
Regional wrote:  "Any analysis of policy which may... discriminate must be
done in the light of the international  principles and experience as  stated in the
relevant conventions  and covenants and,  where appropriate, assistance  may be
drawn from overseas cases,  whether directed  at domestic issues  or emanating
from statements of international committees or colloquia. Any such assistance
as can be derived  is just that: assistance.  None of the principles or statements
are binding  on New Zealand  Courts." (emphasis added).
123.  See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
124.  See S. AFR.  CONST.,  § 39(1)(b)  (1997);  supra  note 78.GENDER EQUALITY
B. Some Explanations
Cross-references  in  individual  rights  cases  today  must  be
understood in a different  light than those of earlier times.  First, the
very  concept  of human  rights  is  in tension  with  commitments  to
strongly  positive  and particularist  notions of law.  Gerald Neuman
has referred  to the "suprapositive"  aspect of human rights, 125 a word
that  resonates  with  a  sense  that  rights  have  existence  outside  of
positive  law,  a  moral  force  derived  from  the  nature  of  human
beings. 126  The founding of the United Nations, the promulgation  of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 127 and the growth in the
125.  Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional  Rights: Harmony
and Dissonance, 55  STAN. L. REv.  1863,  1868-69  (2003). The universality of
human  rights, both in general  and with  respect to particular norms,  including
gender  equality,  has been  challenged.  See,  e.g.,  Sunder, supra note  24, at
1413  & n.56;  Abdullahi  Ahmed  An-Na'im,  State Responsibility to Change
Religious and Customary Laws, in HUMAN RIGHTS  OF WOMEN, supra note 23,
at  172 (explaining  that international  human rights are not universally accepted
but  urging  "high  standard  of proof'  for  those  who  would  challenge  their
applicability).  See also infra note  128.
126.  See Vicki  C.  Jackson,  Narratives of Federalism: of Continuities and
Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51  DuKE  L.J.  223,  272-73  n.207
(2001)  [hereinafter Narratives].
127.  U.S. Supreme Court Justices have, on occasion, acknowledged  the U.N.
Charter  in their reasoning.  See, e.g.,  Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633,  650
n.4 (1948)  (Black, J. concurring,  in case invalidating  application of state laws
that discriminated against U.S. citizens of Japanese  descent); cf Re Drummond
Wren,  [1945] O.R. 778, 781-84,  1945 Ont. Rep. LEXIS 36, *7-13.  But cf Sei
Fujii  v.  State,  242  P.2d  617,  619-22,  630  (Cal.  1952)  (holding  that  U.N.
Charter  is not  self-executing  and thus  does not  provide basis for invalidating
law discriminating  against aliens in land  ownership  but finding that the state
law violated  the Fourteenth  Amendment).  The  U.N.  Charter was noted  as a
possible  basis to  support  federal  voting  rights  legislation,  but one  the Court
need not  reach, in Katzenbach  v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,  647 n.5 (1965).  See
also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 28 n.4 (1948)  (noting but not deciding claim
that  enforcement  of  racially  restrictive  covenants  would  violate  the  UN
Charter); United States v. Alvaraz-Machain,  504 U.S. 655,  678-79 n.20 (1992)
(Stevens,  J.,  dissenting).  References  to the Universal  Declaration  of Human
Rights are  found on occasion  in opinions  for the Court.  See Zemel  v. Rusk,
381 U.S.  1, 15,  n.13 (1965);  Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,  372 U.S. 144, 161
n.16 (1963);  Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,  521  n.14 (1970)  (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Int'l Assn. of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 776-77 (1961)
(Douglas,  J.,  concurring)  (citing  debate  concerning  the  Declaration).  After
1970 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was not cited in the Supreme
Court again until Justice Breyer's dissent from denial of certiorari in Knight v.
Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 996 (1999)  (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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formal  levels  of  adherence  to  major  human  rights  covenants-
including but not limited to CEDAW and  the ICCPR--cast  in a new
light domestic courts'  references to international human rights norms
or comparative constitutional  law.  In the wake of gross violations of
human rights  in World  War  II,  the  world  community  experienced
something  akin  to  a  post-war  constitutional  moment  leading  to
commitments  that, insofar  as they  seek to protect individual  rights,
feel  unmistakeably  legal  as  well  as  political  in  character. 2 8  The
courts  in  many  nations  recognize  the  legal  content  of  these
international human rights commitments and treat them as  ones that
should be considered even if not legally binding.' 29  Cross-references
may reflect how at  least some  significant  actors in  the international
community13  are moving away from highly positivist notions of law,
128.  The post-World War II founding moment and world commitment to the
idea  of human  rights occurred  over a number of years and perhaps  primarily
among  a set of governing elites;  moreover,  like some  constitutional moments
in U.S. history, it was limited by the absence of independent participation from
many countries, then still in the status of colonies.  On constitutional moments
in the U.S., see BRUCE ACKERMAN,  WE THE  PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS  6-7, 266-
88  (1991)  (identifying  more  specific  political  parameters  of  "mobilized
deliberation"  that  define  U.S.  constitutional  moments).  For critique  of the
claimed  universality  of  the  Universal  Declaration,  see,  for  example,
Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, Human Rights: A  Western Construct with
Limited Applicability,  in  HUMAN  RIGHTS:  CULTURAL  AND  IDEOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES  4 (Adamantia Pollis  and Peter  Schwab eds.  1979)  (noting that
Charter  and Universal  Declaration  were  adopted  "at  a time when  most Third
World  countries  were  still  under  colonial  rule");  see also supra note  125.
Nonetheless,  adoption of the Universal  Declaration  constituted  an  important
moment  of significant change  beginning  in basic  conceptions  of sovereignty
and  rights  leading  to  subsequently  adopted  human  rights  conventions.  See
generally LOUIs  HENKIN  ET  AL.,  HUMAN  RIGHTS  286  (1999)  (describing
significance of Universal Declaration).
129.  See Michael Kirby, The Role of the Judge in Advancing Human Rights
By Reference to International  Human Rights Norms, 62 AUSTL.  L.J. 514, 516
(1988)  [hereinafter Kirby, Role of  the Judge].
130.  As  noted above,  supra note  100,  countries  differ significantly in their
participation in transnational discourse, and many of the cases discussed in this
article  are  from  present  or former  Commonwealth  members.  This  apparent
over-attention  to  their  decisions  may  reflect  not  only  their  relatively  easy
accessibility  in  English  but  also  the  influence  of  Commonwealth  legal
institutions on receptivity to comparative analysis.  Different national histories,
legal  structures  and  traditions,  political  institutions,  languages  and  alliances
may all affect national courts'  willingness or capacity to look beyond their own
borders  at  foreign  or  international  law,  as  well  as  the  likelihood  that  a
particular national court's decisions will be considered or referred to by others.GENDER EQUALITY
less worried  about particular  sources  and  their authority,  and more
concerned  with  the  coalescence  of  domestic,  and  international
sources,  around  core  normative  ideas.  This  new  normativity  of
human  rights  law  is  reflected  in  the  way  references  to  other
constitutional  courts'  decisions are often accompanied by references
to  international  legal  norms  as  well.  The  sense  of  distinctive
sovereignties  is  diminished,  as  is  the  strong  distinction  between
domestic constitutional law and international  legal norms in areas of
human rights.
13'
The concept of human rights, moreover, has become a source of
self-identification for the role of judges in many countries around the
world.  Justices  in Australia,  Canada, Israel,  and South  Africa have
Though  not  the  focus  of this  article,  differential  interest  in  transnational
discourse  surely warrants  study.  For one interesting  treatment  of differential
receptivity  to  comparative  analysis  of constitutional  questions,  see Harding,
supra note 5.
131.  Cf  Oscar  M.  Garibaldi,  General Limitations on Human Rights:  The
Principle of Legality, 17  HARV.  INT'L L.J.  503,  517 (1976)  (asserting  that the
criterion determining  the  "boundaries  of human  rights is not  law (especially
written  law) but justice").  One  manifestation  of the  internationalization  of
domestic law (as well  as of the significant position of the U.S.)  is the interest
that  other  countries  and  international  organizations  have  taken  in  the
development of U.S. constitutional  law.  Nguyen  v. INS,  533  U.S. 53  (2001)
involved a  constitutional  challenge  to a gender  discrimination  in the capacity
of unwed mothers and unwed fathers to pass on U.S. citizenship  eligibility  to
children born  abroad.  One amicus  brief was  filed by  a  group  including  the
International  Commission  of Jurists,  the International  Federation  of Women
Jurists,  the  Argentine  Association  of  Women  Judges,  and  the  Ethiopian
Women  Judges  Association,  as  well  as  Equality  Now's  Women's  Action
Network  (which,  according  to the  statement  of interest  in the  amicus  brief,
consists "of more than 5,000 groups and individuals in more than  100 countries
around  the world  including the United  States,  [who]  have  written  to United
States government  officials, urging them to work for the adoption of the same
legal  standard,  based  on  equality,  for  U.S.  citizen  fathers  and  mothers  to
transmit citizenship  to their children born  abroad and out-of-wedlock").  See
Brief of Equality Now et al.  as Amici  Curiae in Support of Petitioners, at ii,
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S.  53 (2001)  (No. 99-2071)  [hereafter "Brief of Equality
Now"].  International participation as amicus curiae also occurred in McCarver
v. North Carolina, 533 U.S.  975 (2001)  (dismissing certiorari as improvidently
granted).  See Brief of Amicus  Curiae  The  European  Union  in  Support  of
Petitioner, McCarver v. North Carolina,  533 U.S.  975  (2001)  (No.  00-8727);
Atkins v. Virginia,  536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21  (2002) (citing  the EU's McCarver
Amicus  Brief);  see also Brief of Mary  Robinson  et  al.  as  Amicus  Curiae,
Lawrence v. Texas,  123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003)  (No. 02-102) [hereinafter Robinson
Brief].
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published extrajudicial accounts of this kind of self-understanding. 132
These descriptions should not be dismissed as merely the specialized
account of a  small and unusually privileged group of justices from a
small  and limited group of nations,  for they are reflected,  as well, in
statements of self-description by international  associations of judges.
Thus,  the  International  Commission  of Jurists  describes  itself  as
"dedicated  to  the  primacy,  coherence  and  implementation  of
international  law  and principles  that advance human rights.' 33  The
International  Association  of Judges describes  itself as having as  its
"main aim...  to safeguard the independence of the judiciary, as an
essential requirement of the judicial function and guarantee of human
rights  and  freedom."' 34  These organizational  statements  of identity
reinforce  Professor  Slaughter's  claim  that judges  in  a  number  of
countries  around  the  world  have  developed  a  "particular  self-
conception"  of their task as including the protection  of human rights
vis-A-vis  governments.  35  This  self-conception  is  also  reflected  in
statements  of  principle  concerning  the  judicial  role  in  using
international  human rights  law in domestic  adjudication,  formed  in
meetings  of judges,  for example,  of the  Commonwealth  nations, 36
and of the LAWASIA region.137
132.  See,  e.g.,  Kirby,  Role  of the Judge,  supra note  129,  at  525-31;
L'Heureux-Dub6,  supra note  1; Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role
of  a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARv. L. REv.  16, 20-21,  26 (2002);
Beverley  McLachlin,  The  Civilization of Difference,  The  Fourth  Annual
LaFontaine-Baldwin  Lecture,  (March  7,  2003)  available  at
http://www.operation-dialogue.com/lafontaine-baldwin/e/2003__speech_1  .html
(last visited Oct. 20, 2003);  Sachs, supra note 74, at  1387-88; see also Smith,
supra  note 81,  at 110-11 (emphasizing, as Chief Justice of Norway,  importance
of courts protecting "civil and political rights").
133.  See  Intemational  Commission  of  Jurists,  at http://www.icj.org  (last
visited Sept. 17,2003).
134.  See  International  Association  of  Judges,  at  http://www.iaj-
uim.org/ENG/mainframe.html  (last visited Sept.  17, 2003).
135.  See Slaughter, supra note  1, at  128; see also id. at 128-29 (describing
judicial "awareness  of the similarity  or commonality of the judicial  enterprise
across  countries,  an awareness  bolstered  in turn by a mutual  recognition of a
common judicial identity and an openness to persuasive authority").
136.  See  "Report  of Judicial  Colloquium  on  the Domestic  Application  of
International  Human  Rights  Norms,  Bangalore,  India",  reproduced  as
Appendix in Kirby, Role of the Judge, supra note  129,  at 531-32  (stating that
"[f]undamental  human rights and freedoms are  inherent in all humankind  and
find expression  in constitutions...  throughout  the world;"  that "international
human  rights  instruments  provide  important  guidance  in  cases  concerning
310GENDER EQUALITY
Third,  international  legal  instruments  have  influenced  the
formation of many post-World  War II bills of rights in national  laws
and  in  regional  conventions.'
3 8  Lord  Wilberforce  in  an  oft-quoted
passage  notes  the  influence  of the  Universal  Declaration  on  the
drafting  of the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights. 139   New
Zealand's  statutory  Bill of Rights  Act is understood  as  intended  to
carry forward the spirit of the ICCPR, though its language  differs in
fundamental  human  rights;"  and praising  the "growing  tendency  for national
courts to have regard  to" international  norms in cases where "domestic law-
whether constitutional,  statute or common  law - is uncertain or incomplete");
see also Michael Kirby, The Road  from Bangalore:  The First  Ten  Years of the
Bangalore Principles on  The Domestic Application of International  Human
Rights  Norms,  at  www. lawfoundation.  net.  au/resources/kirby/papers/
19981226_html (last  visited  Sept.  12,  2003)  [hereinafter  Kirby,  Road from
Bangalore]. The  Bangalore  Principles  encourage  use  of international  human
rights law on open  interpretive questions in domestic law and  have been cited
in  support  of  the  practice  of  consulting  international  law  in  national
constitutional  decisions.  See, e.g.,  Unity  Dow  v. Attorney  Gen.,  103  I.L.R.
128,  J76 (Bots.  Ct.  App.,  1992)  (1996)  (Aguda,  J.,  concurring).  These
principles were intended as a "new approach" to the use of international  law in
domestic courts and were formulated at a meeting in 1988 in Bangalore, called
by the  Commonwealth  Secretariat,  and  attended inter alia by former  Indian
Chief Justice  P.N Bhagwati,  Michael  Kirby,  Anthony Lester of Britain,  then
Judge  Ruth Bader  Ginsburg  and judges from  Maritius  and Zimbabwe.  For
further  description  of Bangalore  and  subsequent  meetings  and  statements  at
Harare, Zimbabwe,  Balliol College, England, and Bloemfontain,  South Africa,
see  Adjami,  supra note  107,  at  125-29.  For  reliance  on  the  Balliol  and
Bloemfontain  statements,  see for example, Tavita v. Minister of Immigration,
[1994]  2 N.Z.L.R.  257, 266, 1993 N.Z.L.R. LEXIS 634,  *29 (N.Z., Ct.  App.);
N. Reg'l. Health Auth. v. Human Rights Comm'n, [1998] 2 N.Z.L.R. 218, 235,
1997 NZLR LEXIS 659, *46-47 (N.Z.,  High Ct, Auckland). But cf Longwe v.
Intercontinental  Hotels,  [1993]  4  LRC  221,  233  (Zambia,  High  Ct,  1992)
(doubting effect to be given to the Bangalore Principle as a mere resolution  of
a meeting of  jurists).
137.  See Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R.  1997 S.C. 3011,  reprinted  in 3
Butterworths  Human Rights  Cases 261,  265  (India,  1997)  (quoting  from the
provision  of the  Beijing  Statement  of the  chief judges  of the  LAWASIA
region on the judicial function aspiring "to promote...  the observance  and the
attainment of human rights").
138.  See Slaughter, supra note  1, at  131-32;  McCrudden, supra note  1, at
500-01;  Hannum, supra note  75,  at  298-300  (noting influence  of Universal
Declaration on constitutions in Canada and India).
139.  See Minister of Home Affairs  v.  Fisher,  1980  App. Cas. 319,  328-29
(P.C.  1979) (appeal taken from Bermuda).
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some respects  from  ICCPR provisions.140  The  German  Basic  Law,
the  Italian  Constitution,  and  the  Indian  Constitution,  all  reflect  a
common store of awareness of basic rights, as well as some marked
variations. 14  The rights commitments expressed in the U.N. Charter
and the Universal  Declaration of Human  Rights had influence well
before the 1966 Covenants,142 as is illustrated by the many references
to "human  dignity" that  begin to appear in constitutions  in the post-
war  period  and  in  U.S.  constitutional  decisions. 43   The  United
States'  Bill of Rights was influential  in the formulation of some  of
these  international  covenants  (which  in  turn have  entered,  albeit in
140.  See  New  Zealand  Bill  of Rights  Act,  1990,  Preamble,  available at
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/nz01000_.html  (last  visited  Oct.  20,  2003)
(stating Act's purposes as including  "affirm[ing]  New  Zealand's commitment
to the International  Covenant on Civil  and Political  Rights");  see also Quilter
v.  Attorney-General,  [1998]  1 N.Z.L.R. 523,  530,  1997 NZLR LEXIS 644,  at
*18  (quoting  purpose of 1993  Human Rights Act  as being "to  provide better
protection of human rights in New Zealand in general  accordance with United
Nations Covenants or Conventions").
141.  See, e.g.,  GERMAN BASIC LAW, articles 1-19; ITALY CONST. arts. 2, 3,  9
and pt.  I (Rights  and Duties of Citizens);  INDIA  CONST.  pt.  IIn (Fundamental
Rights).  Each  of these,  for  example,  includes  some  explicit  guarantee  of
freedom  of movement. See  ITALY CONST.,  art.  16;  GERMAN  BASIC  LAW,  art.
11;  INDIA CONST.,  art.  19(d).  Each includes guarantees of equality, with some
particularities,  see,  for  example,  INDIA  CONST.,  art.  15(2)(b)  (equality
provision  names  "caste"  as  prohibited  basis  and  specifically  prohibits
discrimination  in  access  to  "the  use of wells,  tanks, bathing  ghats,  roads and
places  of public  resort  maintained  wholly  or  partly  out  of State  funds  or
dedicated  to the use of general  public");  ITALY CONST.  art. 3 (declaring equal
"social status" and equality before law and declaring "duty" of state to remove
social  and economic obstacles to full individual development);  GERMAN BASIC
LAW,  art.  3(2)  (state supports  effective  realization  of equality  of women  and
men).
142.  See McLachlin, supra note  132,  at 8 (noting provincial  development  of
bills  of  rights  that  "dove-tailed  with  the  momentum  building  at  the
international  level around the adoption of the Universal Declaration  of Human
Rights"); Hannum, supra note 75,  at 318 (Universal Declaration, according  to
Eleanor Roosevelt, would "serve  as a common standard of achievement  for all
peoples of all nations").
143.  See  e.g.,  DONALD  KOMMERS,  THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  JURISPRUDENCE
OF  THE  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF GERMANY  312-13  (2d  ed.  1997)  (discussing
role  of human  dignity  in  German  Basic  Law);  see also  Vicki  C.  Jackson,
Constitutional Dialogue  and  Human  Dignity:  States  and  Transnational
Constitutional  Discourse,  MONT.  L. REV. (forthcoming  Jan. 2004) [hereinafter
Jackson,  Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity]; cf  Resnik  &  Suk,
supra note 48,  at 1934-41  (noting appearance of term "human dignity" in U.S.
reports starting in World War H1).GENDER EQUALITY
limited  fashion,  U.S.  judicial  discourse  about  constitutional
rights).144  And the  regional  human rights  covenants  borrow  from
U.N. rights'  statements.  These "genetic"  relationships  among rights
provisions provides a basis for shared learning by all generations still
participating in their elaboration and enforcement.145
Finally,  the  development  of this  web  of international  human
rights obligations-whatever their precise status in international  law
as  ratified  or unratified  treaties,  customary  international  law  or  in
some  cases as jus cogens--emphasizes  the increased  likelihood that
international  law  will  be  implicated  by  the  conduct  of a  nation's
government  to  its  own people  (and  even  if not  binding  now  may
become  so  in  the  future). 146   Constitutional  courts  may  be  more
aware  of their  own role, however  small,  in developing  the  body of
legalized  practices  in  "civilized  nations"  which  can  influence
recognition  of principles  of international  law.147  And international
legal  actors  are  aware  as  well  of the  influence  of some  domestic
constitutional  courts  in  shaping  understandings  of  international
144.  See Louis  Henkin, Introduction, in  CONSTITUTIONALISM  AND RIGHTS:
THE  INFLUENCE  OF THE  UNITED  STATES  CONSTITUTION  ABROAD  1, 2  (Louis
Henkin  & Albert  J.  Rosenthal  eds.,  1990);  supra note  127;  Resnik  & Suk,
supra note  48  at  1934-41;  Jackson,  Constitutional Dialogue and Human
Dignity, supra note  143, at n.  92 (identifying  state court decisions referring to
transnational human rights sources).
145.  See Henkin, supra note  144,  at 2,  12-15; Louis Henkin, A New Birth of
Constitutionalism: Genetic Influences and Genetic Defects,  14  CARDOZO  L.
REv.  533,  536-37  (1993);  see also  Choudhry,  supra note  6,  at  866-85
(distinguishing "genetic"  and "genealogical"  influences); U.S v. Then, 56 F.3d
464,  469  (2d.  Cir.  1995)  (Calabresi,  J.,  concurring)  ("[w]ise parents  do  not
hesitate to learn from their children").
146.  See Dugard, supra note  78,  at  189  (noting "potential"  application  of
international  conventions  to  South  Africa)  For  discussion  of international
human  rights  influence  in  Australia,  see Anthony  Mason,  The Influence of
International and Transnational Law in Australian Municipal Law,  7  PUB.
L.R. 20 (1996).
147.  See  Arthur  M.  Weisburd,  The  Significance and Determination of
Customary International  Human Rights Law: The Effect of Treaties and Other
Formal  International  Acts on the Customary Law of  Human Rights, 25 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP.  L.  99,  104  (1996)("all  states are  eligible  at all  times  to take
part  in the  creation of customary  international  law...  [A]ny  act  of a  state,
including  a  violation  of an  existing  rule  of  law,  may  contribute  to  the
development  of a  new  rule  of law.");  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §  701,  n.2 (1987).
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law. 148  Thus,  the  developing  sense of "relational"  authority--of an
obligation  to  consider,  even  if not to  follow,  decisions  on  similar
human  rights  issues by  other tribunals-may  also  be  informed  by
some  recognition  that  the  legal  actions  of the  domestic  national
courts  of the  world  have  a  role  to play  in  defining  the  content  of
customary  international  law  with  respect to  rights  protected  in  the
major international human rights documents. 149  Given the relatively
weak  channels  of  international  human  rights  enforcement, 15 0  the
content  of these rights  is  to some  extent up  for grabs  between  the
multitude  of  state  signatories,  the  U.N.  monitoring  bodies,  the
regional human rights tribunals that interpret often similar provisions
in  their regional  human  rights  documents,  and  the various  national
courts that may have occasion to refer to those norms.  On this view,
national  courts'  participation  as  international  actors  influences  not
only what happens  in their own countries but the status of norms  in
international legal understandings.'I'
148.  Non-domestic actors  have concern  over  domestic  law  not only  in the
sense  of ideological  conviction,  or  in  the  sense  of identification  with  the
discriminations  suffered  by particular rights-asserters, see supra note  131,  but
also  in some  cases  by a concern  that  domestic  law  will have  an  impact  on
international understandings.  Thus, in I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre,  526 U.S. 415
(1999),  the  U.N.  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees  filed  an  amicus  brief
explaining  that  "[r]esolution  of  this  case  is  likely  to  affect  not  only  the
interpretation by the United States of the provisions of the Convention relating
to  who  is  and  who  is  not  entitled  to  the internationally  protected  status  of
refugee,  but  also  the  manner  in  which  other  countries  interpret  those
provisions.  The United  Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  (UNHCR),
therefore, has a  direct interest  in ensuring that this Court's  ruling is consistent
with its own  interpretation  of the Convention."  Brief of Office of the United
Nations  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees  as  Amicus  Curiae  at  1, INS  v.
Aguirre-Aguirre,  526 U.S. 415 (1999)  (No. 97-1754).
149.  See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26,  1945,  art. 38,
59  Stat.  1055,  T.S.  No.  993  (court  in  deciding  disputes  in  accord  with
international  law  is  to apply  international  conventions,  international  custom,
"general principles  of law recognized by civilized  nations," and,  as subsidiary
means  for  determining  rules  of law,  "judicial decisions"  and  teachings  of
scholars).
150.  See text at note  117, supra; BAYEFSKY,  UNIVERSALITY,  supra note 21,
at  7  (discussing  "shortfalls"  in  implementation  scheme  of  human  rights
treaties)
151.  Cf U.S.  v. Bums,  [2001]  1 S.C.R. 283,  287  (characterizing  Canada's
position as an  international leader  in opposition to the death penalty).  Courts
also  occasionally  become  objects  of transnational  legal  attention,  including
filing  of  amicus  briefs,  because  of  the  impact  of  domestic  judicialGENDER EQUALITY
What  vocabulary  can  help  describe  this  shifting  sense  of  a
relationship among courts and tribunals in the elaboration of human
rights norms?  The existing distinction between "binding" precedent
and "persuasive  authority" could be used to identify most, if not all,
of the  above  uses.  But,  as  noted  earlier,  the  idea  of "persuasive
authority" may be quite broad  and includes  a number of distinctive
categories.152  The  sense of an  obligation to consider  legal material
which  may  not  be  binding  and  the  aspiration  to  constitute
overarching  law  through  a  fabric  of nonbinding  decisions  reflect
what  I would call the "relational authority" of human rights norms so
interestingly at work in these more recent cases.153
In  their  important  article  in  1997,  Professors  Heifer  and
Slaughter  described  the  development  of "overlapping  networks  of
national,  regional,  and  global  tribunals"  that  could  engage  in
"collective  deliberation  about  common  legal  questions,"  thereby
"reinforc[ing  the courts'] legitimacy and independence from political
interference,"  and  "promot[ing]  a  global  conception  of the  rule  of
law."' 54  The  sense  of connection,  of "relational  authority"  in  the
increased use of persuasive precedent, is perhaps one example of this
webbed  set of relationships  amongst tribunals  anticipated by Helfer
and Slaughter. These connected relationships may, indeed, be part of
a  broader  trend  in  the  reconception  of  public  law-both
constitutional  law  and  international  human  rights  law-to  be  less
concerned  with  the  hierarchy  of  law's  commands  and  more
concerned  with  participation,  discussion  and  negotiation  across  a
wide range of actors, public  and private, 55 as a basis for both rights
articulation and  implementation.1
56
understandings of international human rights obligations.  See supra notes  131,
148 (describing amicus filings by international organizations in U.S. courts).
152.  See supra text accompanying  notes  39-61  (noting  inter alia negative
precedents,  precedents  cited  for  reasons  unrelated  to  their  deliberative
assistance  in  deciding  the  case (e.g.,  national  legitimacy, political  alliances),
precedents  cited  because  they  analyze  comparable  problems  in  comparable
contexts,  and  precedents  cited  because  additionally  they  are  addressing
comparable  problems  in  a binding  (or potentially  binding)  international  legal
order).
153.  See supra notes  105, 107.
154.  Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 3, at 282.
155.  In a separate  paper I am  exploring  this  possible  trend  in public  law,
which might be described  as one more interested  in coordinated  relationships
than in hierarchy; more concerned with wide participation  in decision-making
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than  speed  of  decision;  in  tentative  rather  than  final  decisions;  and  in
discussion  and  negotiation  rather  than  judgment,  in  a  variety  of  settings.
Examples might be found (1) in the implementation process for CEDAW and
other  human  rights  treaties,  processes  that  involve  reporting,  information
sharing  and  recommendations  by  the  monitoring  committee,  rather  than
judgments  or sanctions;  (2)  in the  development  of constitutional  theories  of
democratic  experimentalism,  with  an  emphasis  on  "learning  by  monitoring"
and  on  decentralized  implementation  and  shaping  of common  norms,  see
Michael  C.  Dorf  &  Charles  F.  Sabel,  A  Constitution  of  Democratic
Experimentalism, 98  COLUM.  L.  REV.  267  (1998);  Michael  C.  Dorf, Legal
Indeterminacy and  Institutional  Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.  875  (2003); (3) in
decisions  like  Reference  re  Secession of Quebec,  [1998]  2 S.C.R.  217, 220,
holding that, in the event of clear vote on a clear majority  in favor of secession
in one province, the rest of the country would  have a duty to discuss possible
secession and negotiate  in accordance  with  values of rule of law, democracy,
federalism  and  protection  of minority  rights;  (4)  in  new  arrangements  for
courts to interpret constitutional rights in a way that legislatures can overcome
or  disagree  with,  see  Gardbaum,  supra  note  90,  at  746  (arguing  that
Commonwealth  models of protecting  rights subject  to  legislative derogations
may replace  "judicial monopoly and monologue on...  constitutional  rights"
with  "inter-institutional  dialogue  between  courts  and  legislatures  that would
improve  the  quality  and  dimensions  of  constitutional  analysis");  (5)  in
emerging international norms requiring democratic participation in constitution
making, described  by Vivien Hart, Democratic Constitution Making, 107 U.S.
INST.  OF  PEACE  1, (2003),  available at  www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/
srl07.html;  and  (6)  in  the  reconstruction  of  the  international  law  of  self
determination  in  light  of  competing  claims  of  identity  and  participation,
described  in KNOP,  DIVERSITY  AND  SELF-DETERMINATION,  supra note  14  at
380-81  (noting as  well  broader implications  for legal  interpretation  in plural
societies).  See generally Harding,  supra note  5, and  especially  at 462-65
(distinguishing "dialogic" and "enforcement" models of  judicial  reasoning and
noting  relationships  of global influences  to local processes of interpreting  law
in "dialogic"  model).
156.  The  connection  between  a  court's  decision  and  its  implementation
cannot  be  assumed.  After  Unity  Dow,  Botswana  amended  its  citizenship
statutes to eliminate  the gender  discrimination  condemned by the court;  after
Rattigan, however,  the Constitution  of Zimbabwe  was amended  to  authorize
the citizenship  discrimination  the  court had  condemned.  See Adjami, supra
note  107  at  157-58.  But cf Karen  Knop  & Christine  Chinkin,  Remembering
Chrystal MacMillan: Woman's Equality and Nationality in International  Law,
22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 523,  533  (2001)  (indicating  that the Zimbabwe Court had
resisted  so  interpreting  the  constitutional  change).  Implementation  and
enforcement  are important questions  in both  international  and domestic  rights
protection, which are the subject  of increasing  literature, see infra note 205; I
note here only  that, even when a country has ratified conventions and adopted
rights-protecting  constitutions  and  issued judgments upholding  human  rights,
those judgments will not necessarily be given effect.GENDER EQUALITY
Professor  Slaughter's  "transjudicialism"  is  reflected  in  a
particular  kind  of "persuasive  authority"-authority  that  courts  in
some  sense  "must"  consider, although  it is  not binding  upon them,
because  of its  relationship  to  their  court  and  their  work. 57   The
suggestions  that  these  "transjudicial"  exchanges  reflect  a  new
community of judging (not for all countries or all courts, to be sure)
related to  an  increasingly  global  (though  not universal)  community
of law, capture important aspects of these exchanges. 58  But it is not
only  a  community  of  judges,  for  its  participants  include
nonadjudicatory fora  like the U.N. human rights committees  as well
as NGOs, grassroots  activists and legal scholars.159  Nor is it only a
community  of shared  law-for  the  scope  of the  felt  obligation  to
consider  external  sources  is not  limited to those  areas  in which  the
external  sources  are  positively  binding  in  accord  with  domestic
norms.  Perhaps we might also see the relationships underlying these
judicial  exchanges  as  reflecting  shared  legal  values  and  historic
experience,  born of a very  specific  moment  in  the wake  of World
War  II,  which  engendered  a  reaction  against  human  rights  abuses,
including but not limited to racism and other forms of discrimination,
with the understanding  that those shared values may be expressed in
157.  See  Slaughter,  Globalization, supra note  7,  at  1109-12  (discussing
influence  of decisions  of the  European  Court  of Human  Rights  on  courts
outside of Europe).
158.  Id. at 1122-24 (noting increasing judicial meetings to promote dialogue
among judges of different courts).
159.  Although  some of the U.N. human rights committees may be assuming
a role  closer  to those of courts,  their judgments are  not generally  viewed as
binding  and enforceable  under  international  law,  and  some  still  do not have
well-functioning individual  complaint procedures.  See Ratner, supra note  117,
at 724-25; cf Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 3 at 366-85 (suggesting changes
in  procedure  to  move  U.N.  Human  Rights  Committee  closer  to  role  of
European  courts);  BAYEFSKY,  UNIVERSALITY,  supra note  21  at ii-iii  (urging
changes  in  role  of  the  U.N.  High  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights  and
consolidation of the different UN human rights committees).  But cf Henkin,
supra note  128,  at 504-05  (raising question whether committee's views  should
be  seen  as  legally  binding).  On  sociological  reasons  for  possible  further
convergences,  see  Ryan  Goodman  & Derek  Jinks,  Toward an Institutional
Theory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN.  L. REV.  1749  (2003)  (describing sociological
processes  of institutional  isomorphism,  not necessarily  reflecting basic  values
or  functional  similarity,  but nonetheless  resulting in the convergence  of basic
elements of governmental design).
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very  different  legal  ways-a  community  of  legal  values  born  of
shared experience, if not a community of law.
Notwithstanding  each of these descriptions'  emphasis  on  some
form  of  global  community  (of judging,  of  law,  or  of  shared
experiences  and  values),160  national  states  will  continue  for  the
foreseeable  future  to  be  a primary  location  for the  enforcement  of
human  rights, 161  including  rights  of  gender  equality.  It  is  thus
important  to  consider  the  objections  that  have  arisen  to  domestic
courts even considering such foreign and international sources.
II. NONBINDING TRANSNATIONAL  AUTHORITY,  CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW AND  GENDER EQUALITY
Many  of the  references  discussed  above  involved  challenges
under  national  constitutions,  which  in  some  respects  might  be
particularly  hostile  locations  for  the  emergence  of  a  deeply
comparative  methodology,  since  national  constitutions  are  often
understood  as  expressions  of  national  particularity.162   National
160.  See,  e.g.,  Quilter  v.  Attorney-General,  [1998]  1  N.Z.L.R.  523,  531,
1997 NZLR  LEXIS 644,  *22 (Thomas, J.)  (referring to "basic  values"); id. at
559-60,  1997  NZLR  LEXIS  at  *103-05  (Keith,  J.);  cf Kirby,  Role  of the
Judge, supra note  129,  at  530  ("in the  world  after  Hiroshima,  all  educated
people have a responsibility to...  act as citizens of a wider world"). As noted
earlier, supra note  12,  gender equality was not a central  concern  in the post-
war  1940s,  though  formal  international  commitments  to  gender  equality  are
made at this time. See supra note 15.
161.  Transnational  judicial  discourse  on  human  rights  may  also  be  a
reflection  of a shift too  large and  ongoing  to be  seen  clearly  yet,  from pre-
World  War  II  understandings  of the  significance  of state  boundaries,  to  a
twenty-first  century  understanding  that  national  sovereignty  is  only  one  of
several  locations  for  the  exercise  of political  power,  legal  constraint,  and
communal  self-expression  in  the  world,  an  anticipation  of a  new  regime  in
which  communities  of people  exist  in both  hierarchical  and nonhierarchical
patterns  whose  connectedness,  permeability,  and  differential  allocation  of
functions to different  levels of governance, may be overtaking the very idea of
sovereignty  itself. For a related  discussion of a "post-sovereign"  Europe,  see
NEIL MACCORMICK,  QUESTIONING  SOVEREIGNTY:  LAW,  STATE AND  NATION
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH  74-75, 76-78, 102-21,  123-36 (1999).
162.  See Schauer, supra  note 26, at 257 (noting that even in countries willing
to  borrow  U.S.  approaches  to  bankruptcy  or  corporate  law,  borrowing
constitutional  law may "suggest a loss of sovereignty, control and much of the
essence of what helps to constitute a nation as a nation in the first place."). The
role  of other  constitutions  may  be  one of differentiation  or dialogue  in  the
project of national self-definition, however. See supra text at notes 44, 64-65.GENDER EQUALITY
constitutions serve many goals,  including not only the protection  of
rights  (many  comparable  to  international  human  rights)  and  the
definition  of  structures  for  workable  governance,  but  also  the
expression of national self-understandings  and the assertion of equal
sovereignty  in the  world setting.  Although  the  meaning  of  rights
(such  as  gender  equality,  or  freedom  of  speech)  may  be  more
amenable  to transnational  analysis  than  questions about  nationally
specific  constitutional  structures  of  governance,163  the  specific
expressions  of a  "human  right"  may  also  vary  with  the  broader
structures  and  suppositions  of  particular  national  constitutional
regimes. 16 4  Moreover, the age of a constitutional regime may matter:
comparative  experience  may  be  less  useful  in  highly  developed
systems of constitutional  law  (on issues already  well  worked  out in
stable  doctrine  or practices)  than  in  newer  constitutional  systems.
Comparative  constitutional  experience  and  international  law  as
nonbinding  sources  of  interpretation  might  offer  both  substantial
attractions, 165 and difficulties, 166 for newly developing  constitutional
163.  Thus,  as  I  have  suggested  elsewhere,  comparative  constitutional  law
may be less directly helpful to jurists on structural issues of federalism than on
human  rights questions.  See Jackson,  Narratives, supra note  126,  at 272-76;
Vicki  C. Jackson,  Comparative Constitutional  Federalism and Transnational
Judicial  Discourse,  2 INT'L J. CONST. L. (I'CON) (forthcoming  January, 2004)
[hereinafter Jackson,  Constitutional  Federalism].
164.  Cf Neuman, supra note  125,  at 1869-72  (noting "institutional"  aspects
of rights).  For Neuman the institutional aspects of rights refer to the particular
structures for enforcement of the rights. Id. at 1869.  The broader institutional
context,  including  general  structures  of  governance,  may  also  impact
understandings and implementations of rights.
165.  Not  only  may  new  regimes  find  it  helpful  to  consider  established
doctrinal  approaches  elsewhere  to  similar  problems,  but  referring  to
international  and comparative  experience  may help signal,  both internally and
externally,  abandonment  of repressive  practices  of prior  regimes  and  the
willingness to be held to account under world standards  of human rights. See
e.g., Schauer, supra note 26, at 259 (describing South Africa's resort to foreign
and international  law as "a reaction against South Africa's recent history as an
outcast  or  pariah  nation"  by  coming  "into  harmony  with  international
standards,"  independent of their merits); see also McCrudden, supra note  1, at
500-01 (noting that citation to foreign jurisprudence  may be "regarded...  as a
sign of a particular orientation towards human rights").
166.  Some  scholars  have  raised  concern  that  considerations  of foreign  or
international  sources  is inconsistent  with the  development  of an  authentically
national  constitutional  tradition.  See  Carlos  F.  Rosenkrantz,  Against
Borrowings and Other Nonauthoritative Uses of Foreign Law,  1 INT'L  J.
CONST.  L. (I-CON)  269,  285-86  (2003); see also Schauer, supra note  26, at
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In some kinds of cases, however, comparative  and international
experience  is  worth considering,  both  in those constitutional  orders
with highly elaborated  doctrine and those  with newer constitutional
regimes.  First, issues unforeseen  by prior lawmakers  are generated
by new  phenomena,  such  as the  development  of new technologies
(for  example,  informational  privacy  issues  created  by  new
information  technologies,  or  genetic  engineering  and  human
reproduction). 167 Deciding on constitutional  approaches  to such new
problems  may  be  ongoing  simultaneously  in  a  number  of courts,
whose deliberation  could only be better informed by considering the
range of approaches  being taken or considered elsewhere.' 68 Second,
there  are sets of hard issues  (which  sometimes  overlap with  "new"
issues),  often  driven  by developments  in  claims  of rights  resulting
from  mobilization  of  new  understandings  of individual  or  group
identity, and presenting issues over which there is deep-seated legal,
political  and moral division.  The presence of deep controversy over
254-55  (suggesting that  countries  emerging from  colonial or communist rule
focus on establishing indigenous constitutional culture).
167.  For  illustrative  discussion  of one  such  area,  see  Daniel  J.  Solove,
Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information
Privacy, 53  STAN.  L. REv.  1393,  1440,  1460-61  (2001)  (discussing  database
privacy  in U.S.  and  favorably  discussing E.U.'s  approach);  New York Times
Co.  v.  Tasini,  533  U.S.  483,  506  n.13  (2000)  (comparing  other  nations'
copyright  protection  for  copying  of  information  in  electronic  databases).
Approaches  of other  countries  to  new  technology  issues  may  directly  affect
constitutional  adjudication.  See, e.g.,  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.  186, 205-
06  (2003)  (rejecting  constitutional  challenge  to  federal  copyright  extension,
and  noting  legitimacy  of  government  interest  in  changing  U.S.  law  to
harmonize  US  statute  with  Europe's);  id. at  206-08  (noting,  in  addition  to
"international  concerns,"  changes  in demography,  economy and technology as
rational  bases  on  which to  uphold  the  legislation);  cf  Amer.  Ins.  Assn  v.
Garimendi,  123  S.  Ct.  2374,  2392  (2003)  (expressing  concern  that state  law
would undercut German privacy policies).
168.  In this setting the notion that with more deliberating bodies exchanging
views  on  constitutional  problems  better  solutions  will  emerge  may  have
particular  salience.  See Slaughter,  Global Community, supra note  7,  at  193,
201; see also GLENDON, supra note  31,  at 159  (criticizing  U.S.  "arrogance,"
"willful  ignorance"  and  "unconscious  insularity"  of "how  other high  courts
ha[ve]  dealt with the same vexing  issues").  On the other hand, it may not be
reasonable  to  expect  judicial  systems  with  highly  developed  and  complex
jurisprudence  on a well-worn  field to  continually be open  to new  ideas, both
for rule of law and judicial efficiency reasons.GENDER EQUALITY
internal  norms,  as  is  often  encountered  in  gender  equality  issues,
might  be  itself  a  particular  reason  to  look  outside-not  for  the
purpose  of  adopting  external  norms,16 9  but  rather  to  critically
interrogate  our  own  "instincts"  or predispositions  which,  in  deeply
controversial  cases,  it  is  so  important  to  become  aware  of before
coming to judgment. 17 0  Third, there  are issues of particular concern
to legal  communities beyond  the  country of decision-because,  for
example, they concern treatment of foreign nationals, 71 or the status
of aliens as claimants for citizenship 172 (though the areas experienced
as being of special concern may be expanding).173  Awareness of the
legal  framework within which domestic  decisions will be viewed, at
least  on some issues, may be a prudent component of constitutional
interpretation. 1 74
169.  But  cf  Brian  R.  Opeskin,  Constitutional Modelling:  The  Domestic
Effect of International  Law in Commonwealth Countries, 2000 PUBLIC  LAW
607,  625  (suggesting  that in  some  countries  with  turbulent  group  relations,
references  to "neutral"  laws from beyond their own country  may be helpful in
resolving internal divisions).
170.  See  also  L'Heureux-Dub6,  supra note  1, at  39  ("considering  and
comparing  judgments  from  various  jurisdictions  makes  for  stronger,  more
considered  decisions,  even  if the  result  is  the  same");  cf  BENJAMIN  N.
CARDOZO,  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  JUDICIAL  PROCESS  172-73,  176  (1921)
(suggesting  that  greater spirit  of self-searching  can help judges  decide  cases
free from "unconscious prejudices");  JEROME FRANK, LAW AND  THE MODERN
MIND  114,  362 (6th  ed.  1949)  (arguing that  greater awareness of factors that
influence judicial  judgments  will enable  "sound  intelligence  to play  a larger
part in the process of  judging").
171.  See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S.  371  (1998).
172.  See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
173.  See, e.g., supra notes 131,  148( noting  EU and UN High Commissioner
amicus  briefs).  The  spread  of human  rights  consciousness  and  other recent
developments  reflected  in  these  amicus  filings  and  also,  e.g.,  in  the
establishment  of the  International  Criminal  Court,  suggest  that  we  may  see
increasing  interest  or concern by other countries  in constitutional  decisions in
the United States, at least in part for reasons of principle  (apart from possible
political tactics in dealing with the U.S. as a world power).
174.  See  Jackson,  Narratives,  supra  note  126,  at  261-62,  266-68
(contrasting  internal  and  external  "legitimacy"  as  reasons  sometimes
supporting  and  sometimes  cautioning  against  overt  reference  to  foreign  or
international authority). Concern for how a decision, or its reasoning, would be
viewed  by  its  audience  might  be  understood  to  involve  prudential
considerations.  For a classic treatment of the role of prudence in constitutional
adjudication, see  ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE  LEAST  DANGEROUS  BRANCH
132-33 (2d ed. 1986).
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Recent references to transnational  legal materials have appeared
in U.S.  Supreme Court cases dealing with issues that are "hard" in an
intensely  controversial  way. 175  Thus,  in  Lawrence  v.  Texas, 176
Justice  Kennedy,  writing  for  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court,  used  the
European  Court  of  Human  Rights  ("ECHR")  jurisprudence
prohibiting laws against consensual homosexual conduct  not only to
rebut  assumptions  made  by  an  earlier  Court  (and  thus  support  the
overruling  of its earlier precedent)177 but also to help understand in a
substantive way the liberty protected by the U.S.  Constitution. 78  In
Grutter  v. Bollinger, 179 one of the Michigan affirmative action cases,
Justice  Ginsburg  invoked  international  human  rights  treaties
apparently  to  reinforce  the  legitimacy  of  a  constitutional  rule
expressly designed to be temporary-a major innovation for the U.S.
Supreme  Court.'80  And  in Atkins  v.  Virginia  18  the  Court  invoked
foreign practice in resolving the issue that the  execution of mentally
retarded  convicted  murderers  was  inconsistent  with  the  Eighth
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishments, returning to the
Court's  earlier  practice  of looking to  other nations'  approaches  on
Eighth  Amendment  issues.' 82  In  these  cases  international  and
comparative  materials were used in three  ways:  first, to interrogate
175.  See, e.g., Washington. v.  Glucksberg, 521  U.S.  702, 734 (1997)  (citing
to Dutch practice on euthanasia);  id. at 718 n.16  (referencing foreign debate on
euthanasia).
176.  123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003)
177.  See id. at 2481  (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 52
(1981)).  Lawrence overrules Bowers v. Hardwick, 478  U.S.  186  (1986).  See
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
178.  See id. at  2483.  After  noting  a  number of other European  Court  of
Human  Rights  cases  following  Dudgeon, not Bowers, as well  as  the Amicus
Brief for Mary Robinson and others, the Court wrote:
"The  right the petitioners  seek in  this case has  been  accepted  as  an
integral  part of human  freedom  in  many  other  countries.  There  has
been  no  showing  that  in  this  country  the  governmental  interest  in
circumscribing  personal  choice  is  somehow  more  legitimate  or
urgent."
Id.  In  so arguing the Court looked  to the practices elsewhere to help identify
integral  aspects of human freedom  and evaluate the asserted justifications  for
the government limitation.
179.  123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
180.  Id. at 2347 (Ginsburg, J.,  concurring).
181.  536U.S. 304, 316n.1  (2002).
182.  Id. at 317. (citing the Brief of the European Union filed in McCarver).GENDER EQUALITY
domestic assumptions  or answer questions about  legal facts  that the
Constitution  or the  Court's  own  caselaw  had  made  relevant  to the
domestic  constitutional  question;'8 3  second,  to  help  identify  the
scope of constitutionally protected  liberty and examine the adequacy
of justifications  for  its  restriction;' 84  and  third,  to  support  the
legitimacy  of a constitutional  innovation of a time-limited power to
take  race  into  account,  driven  by domestic  constitutional  doctrine
(that  is,  the  "narrow  tailoring"  requirement  of  the  "compelling
interest" test).'1
8 5
Though  perhaps  the  start  of  a  new  trend,  the  three  cases
discussed  above  stand  out  as  departures  from  the  Court's  late
twentieth  century ambivalence  about transnational  discourse.'86 In at
least two significant gender equality cases in recent years, Nguyen v.
INS'87  and United States v. Morrison,1 88  the Court essentially ignored
183.  That  is,  as  to  the  universality  vel  non  of  legal  condemnation  of
homosexuality,  or  the unusualness  or  cruelty  of a  penalty.  Cf  Stanford  v.
Kentucky,  492  U.S.  361,  369  n.1  (1989)  (noting  limited  purpose  for
considering  practices of other countries  in the Eighth Amendment  analysis, in
determining that views of American  people are not a "historical accident" but
reflect what is implicit in "ordered  liberty"').
184.  See Lawrence v. Texas,  123 S. Ct. at 2483 (quoted supra note 178).
185.  See Grutter, 123  S. Ct. at 2347  (Ginsburg, J.,  concurring)  (noting that
international  human  rights  conventions  on  gender  and  race  discrimination
specifically authorize temporary measures that take race into account to redress
inequality  but  require  that  such  measures  "'shall  in  no  case  entail...  the
maintenance  of unequal  or  separate rights  for different racial  groups after the
objectives  for  which  they  were  taken  have  been  achieved"'  (quoting  U.N.
GAOR  20th  Sess.,  Annex,  Supp.  No.  47,  U.N.  Doc.  A/6014  (1965));  id. at
2341-47 (O'Connor, J., for the Court)  (emphasizing that even where there is a
compelling interest in using  a racial  classification, the means chosen  must be
"narrowly tailored" and any use of race must be "limited  in time").
186.  For evidence of the continuing  disagreement in the  U.S. Court over the
relevance  of  foreign  or  international  law  in  resolving  U.S.  constitutional
questions,  compare,  e.g.,  Atkins  v.  Virginia,  536  U.S.  304,  316  n.21  (2003)
(noting views of E.U., among many other sources, and stating that "within the
world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by
mentally retarded  offenders  is overwhelmingly  disapproved"),  with id. at 347
(Scalia,  J. dissenting)  (stating that "views of...  the 'world  community'whose
notions  of justice  are  (thankfully)  not  always  those  of our  people,"  were
irrelevant  to  Eighth  Amendment  question);  id.  at  322  (Rehnquist,  C.J.,
dissenting)  (consideration  of foreign  law  in  constitutional  interpretation  is
inconsistent with federalism).
187.  533 U.S. 53 (2001).
188.  529 U.S. 598  (2000).
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efforts by amicus groups to bring transnational  human rights sources
to bear in resolving domestic constitutional questions.'  89 The reasons
for  this  stance  are no  doubt  varied,  and may  include  the relatively
well-established  character of U.S.  constitutional jurisprudence, 190  the
hesitation  of  the  U.S.  government  to  ratify  or  make  fully  self-
executing some human rights conventions, as well as inward-looking
aspects of American  legal education and training. 191  But two justices
have  persistently  objected  to  the  legitimacy  of  considering
transnational  sources  in  deciding  domestic  constitutional
questions,192  and  the  Court's  relative  reticence  in  this  area  might
reflect those concerns about the legitimacy  (or perceived legitimacy)
of transnational  discourse on constitutional  rights.' 9 3  Debate  in the
189.  See Brief Amici  Curiae  on Behalf of International  Law  Scholars  and
Human  Rights Experts  in Support of Petitioners,  United  States v.  Morrison,
529  U.S.  598  (2000)(Nos.  99-05,  99-29)  [hereafter  "Brief Amici  Curiae  of
International  Law  Scholars"];  Brief of Equality  Now, supra note  131.  In two
other cases raising significant questions of gender equality, the Court likewise
did not  address  either foreign  or international  legal  sources, though  there do
not  appear  to  have  been  significant  efforts  by  amicus  curiae  or  parties  to
inform  the Court of relevant  gender  equality  developments.  Nev. Dep't.  of
Human Res. v. Hibbs,  123  S. Ct.  1972  (2003); United  States v. Virginia,  518
U.S.  515  (1996)  (one amicus brief, by Employment  Law Center et al.,  in  one
footnote  referred  to the  ICCPR and the Race  Convention, to  support  the  idea
that remedial programs for girls or women to make up for past discrimination
might be permissible).
190.  See  McCrudden,  supra  note  1, at  523-24  (noting  use  of  foreign
decisions  to  fill  vacuum  left  by  temporary  absence  of indigenous  law  and
predicting  decline  in  use  of  foreign  law  once  national  jurisprudence  is
developed).
191.  See Jackson,  supra note  72,  at  592-600;  see  also McCrudden,  supra
note 1, at 526.
192.  See, e.g.,  Printz v.  United States, 521  U.S.  898,  921  (1997)(Scalia,  J.);
Knight  v.  Florida,  528  U.S.  990,  990-91  (1999)(Thomas,  J.,  concurring  in
denial of certiori).
193.  See  also  Jackson,  supra note  126,  at  263-67  (noting  two  kinds  of
legitimacy  concerns,  one  normative  and  the  other empirical,  and  discussing
legitimacy  in  terms  of the  audience  for  the  Court's  decision).  Note  that
concerns about audience may also reflect what materials lawyers present to the
Court. Lawyers'  perceptions of what legal materials will be regarded  as helpful
may  have  reinforced  the  Court's  disinclinations  to  consider  transnational
sources,  for  it  is  unlikely  that  the  Court  will  identify  persuasive  (but  not
binding) foreign and international  sources when neither the parties  nor amici
bring them to the Court's attention.  In light of Lawrence, see supra note  178,
lawyers may  feel more  invited to present relevant  transnational  legal  material
to the Court.GENDER EQUALITY
United  States  has  been  less  about  whether  courts  must  consider
nonbinding  international and transnational  authority, than whether  it
is permissible to do so.  I consider here two  sets of objections  to the
use  of  contemporary  transnational  legal  sources  on  interpretive
questions under the U.S. Constitution.
194
A.  Democratic  Self-Rule, the Rule of  Law and  Nondomestic
Legal Sources
One persistent objection to reliance on non-U.S.  sources  of law
arises  from  an  asserted tension  between  democratic  self-rule  under
the Constitution and reliance on transnational  sources of law.' 95 The
194.  1 am  not  here  concerned  with  such  uses  of foreign  or  international
authority as illuminating  the original intent of the Constitution's  drafters, as  in
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748,  756 (1996)  (debating understanding of
the Framers,  from English law, of scope of court  martials).  Nor  do  I further
address possible objections to the use of nonbinding authority in relatively new
constitutional  regimes  where  there  is  concern  for  the  development  of  an
authentic  internal form of constitutionalism,  see supra note  166, a concern far
less apposite in the United States.
195.  See, e.g., Printz,  521  U.S. at  921  n.l 1  (asserting  that  comparative
constitutional  law  is  relevant  in  drafting,  not  interpreting,  constitutions);
Stanford v. Kentucky,  492 U.S.  361,  369 n.1  (1989)  (Scalia, J.  for the Court)
(it  is  "American  conceptions  of decency"  with  which  evolving  law  of the
Eighth Amendment  is concerned).  However, U.S. Justices  are by no means all
in accord with this view.  Note the differing  views expressed, for example,  in
Knight, 528  U.S.  at  995-97 (Breyer, J.  dissenting  from  denial of certiorari);
Atkins, 536 U.S. 304,  316 (2002); id. at 322-23  (Rehnquist, C. J.,  dissenting);
Foster  v.  Florida,  537  U.S.  990,  991  (2002)  (Thomas,  J.,  on  denial  of
certiorari);  id. at 991-93 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).  In the
past  the Court  has, at  times, been more  receptive  to  considering  foreign  and
international sources at least on some questions.  See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 489-90 (1996); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.  86, 102-03 (1958).
The objection to the external  is analytically distinct from but reinforced
by concerns over the processes of developing  transnational legal  norms, to the
extent  that  universalized  norms  are  argued  to  be  established  by  loosely
organized processes including both practices and reasoning of an assortment of
actors,  some public,  and some  private.  See supra note  155  (noting  possible
trend towards  decentralization,  non-hierarchic,  and negotiation  approaches  to
public  law). The U.S. Court's hesitation  to  consider international  and foreign
materials  is  interestingly  (though  not  exactly)  mirrored  in  a  debate  over
whether other countries should consider international  or foreign legal norms, in
light of the asserted hegemonic influence of the United States on those norms.
See Knop, supra note 23,  at 522-23,  527; see also Schauer, supra note 26, at
253-54 (noting increased association of law with "indigeneity"  in areas casting
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tension emerges  in a  number of settings:  the effect of international
treaties  on  the scope of constitutional  powers; 196 the self-executing
character  vel non of treaties  that  the U.S. has  ratified  and the  legal
significance  of ratified  but  non-self-executing  treaties; 197  and  the
content,  status  and  application  of  customary  international  law.198
off colonial or other  forms of outside  domination  in Eastern  Europe,  former
Soviet Union and South Africa).
196.  For  scholarly  disagreement,  compare  e.g.,  Curtis  A.  Bradley,  The
Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH.  L. REV.  390 (1998),  and
Curtis A.  Bradley,  The  Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99
MICH.  L. REV. 98 (2000)  (arguing against "nationalist" view of treaty power),
with,  e.g.,  David M.  Golove,  Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical
Foundations  of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98  MICH.  L.
REV.  1075 (2000). In the caselaw, compare Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,
433-34 (1920)  (treaty may provide  constitutional  basis for federal  legislation
notwithstanding the Tenth Amendment) with Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-16
(1957)  (Black, J.,  for plurality) (treaty may not authorize  government  conduct
in violation  of individual  constitutional  rights).  Although  as a  formal  matter
binding  the  nation  to  the  requirements  of treaties  agreed  to  by  the  Senate
responds  to  concerns  for  self-rule  under  the  Constitution,  as  a  substantive
matter  some  methods  of  binding  oneself  contemplate  greater  levels  of
participation  and  awareness  than  others,  and arguably  have  greater  claim to
democratic legitimacy thereby.
197.  See  also  infra text  accompanying  note  204;  compare, e.g.,  Bradley,
supra note  89 at 1587-95  (in praise of non-self execution), Curtis A. Bradley,
Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51
STAN.  L.  REV.  529,  539-43  (1999),  and  John  C.  Yoo,  Treaties and Public
Lawmaking: A  Textual  and Structural Defense  of Non-Self-Execution,  99
COLUM.  L.  REV.  2218  (1999),  with, e.g.,  Carlos  Manuel  Vdzquez,  Breard,
Printz and the  Treaty Power, 70 U. COLO.  L.  REV.  1317  (1999)  and  Carlos
Manuel  Vizquez,  Laughing  at  Treaties,  99  COLUM.  L.J  2154  (1999)
(challenging claim that treaties should be presumptively non-self-executing).
198.  For  differing  views on the status and nature of customary  international
law  and  whether  it  is "federal  law"  for purposes  of the  Supremacy  Clause,
compare,  e.g.,  Curtis  A.  Bradley  &  Jack  L.  Goldsmith,  Customary
International Law  as Federal Common  Law:  A  Critique of the  Modern
Position, 110  HARV.  L.  REV.  815  (1997),  with  Louis Henkin,  A  Century of
Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100  HARV.  L. REV.  853,  867-78  (1987)
and Harold Koh, Is International  Law Really State Law?,  111  HARv.  L. REV.
1824 (1998).  For intermediate positions, see, e.g., Alex Aleinikoff, Ending the
Debate,  Beginning  the  Discussion:  Customary  International Law  and
Sovereignty,  AM.  J. INT'L. L. (forthcoming 2003)  (suggesting that customary
international  law today should be regarded as a form of general law applicable
in federal courts but not necessarily in state courts); Ernest A. Young, Sorting
Out the Debate over Customary International  Law, 42  VA.  J.  INT'L  L.  365
(2002) and Weisburd, supra note  147 For other settings in which international
or foreign law is  considered  in U.S. courts,  see Paul  B. Stephan, A  BecomingGENDER EQUALITY
Apart from objections to the binding character of international  norms
from  democratic  self-rule  (and  from  the  particular  demands  of
democratic  federalism), 99  scholars  have  also  argued  that  there  is
tension between the U.S. institutional  system of checks and balances
designed to make government action more difficult and cumbersome
and allowing new binding norms to be developed through customary
international  law  outside  of  those  structures  of  checks  and
balances.2 00  All of these issues concern the priority and application
of assertedly  binding  legal  norms.  But questions  have  also  arisen
Modesty - U.S. Litigation in the Mirror of International  Law, 52 DEPAUL  L.
REv. 627 (2002) (looking at cases in which US courts reach to decide issues of
foreign  law  in  an  effort  to  influence  development  of  foreign  law  and
identifying costs and risks of such "expressive" decisions).
199.  See,  e.g.,  Atkins,  536  U.S.  at  322-23  (Rehnquist,  C.J.,  dissenting)
(arguing  that  reliance  on  foreign  law  to  interpret  the Eighth  Amendment  is
inconsistent  with  federalism  because  "any  'permanent  prohibition  upon  all
units of democratic  government must [be  apparent] in the operative acts  (laws
and the application of laws) that the people have approved"'  (quoting  Stanford
v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,  377 (1989)  (Scalia,  J. for plurality)). The objection
from federalism here draws  much of its force  from the more general objection
from democratic  self-rule. Cf Young, supra note  198,  at 403-04 (arguing that
where  customary  international  law  declared  by  federal  courts  binds  states,
states  are  denied  "procedural  safeguards"  of  participation  in  the  national
legislative  process).  The  force  of the  objection  from  democracy  depends
importantly  on  whether  external  sources  are  being  treated  as  independently
binding-in which case there are questions of self rule that must be addressed
to establish the legitimacy of such bindingness.  See Aldridge v. Booth, (1988)
80  A.L.R.  1 (upholding  federal  statute  because,  Australia  having  ratified
CEDAW,  statute  prohibiting  sex  harassment  of women  came  within  federal
external  affairs  power).  Federalism  concerns  may  also  go  to  assuring  the
continued  capabilities  of  the  states  to  serve  as  counterbalances  to  central
power.  But  it  bears  noting  that  federalism  also  provides  opportunities  for
decentralized  consideration and infusion of transnational legal  sources through
decision-making  at  state and local levels.  For discussion, see,  e.g., Catherine
Powell, Dialogic Federalism:  Constitutional  Possibilities  for Incorporation  of
Human Rights Law  in  the  United States,  150  U.  PA.  L. REv.  245,  276-80
(2001)  (noting  local  implementation  or endorsement  of CEDAW in 39  cities,
17 counties, and  16 states  in U.S. despite lack of Senate ratification); see also
Jackson, Constitutional  Dialogue and Human Dignity,  supra note 143.
200.  See  Young, supra  note  198,  at 396-97; cf Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note  198,  at  861  (raising  separation  of powers  concern  that  application  of
customary international  law by the courts  is inconsistent with "political branch
hegemony"  in foreign affairs).  (The "checks and balances"  in some respects
themselves thwart the immediate expression of democratic  will, but, one could
say,  if "the  people"  have  chosen  to  bind  themselves  to  more  deliberative
methods of lawmaking that is their democratic choice.  But cf. infra note 211.)
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about  the  relevance  or  appropriateness  of  considering  the
constitutional law of other countries or of international norms not yet
having the status of binding  law, in the interpretation of a domestic
constitution,201  at  least  in  the  absence  of  explicit  constitutional
authorization.
2 02
There are genuine  tensions between commitments to democracy
and self-rule,  on the one hand, and judicial enforcement of rights, on
the  other,  a  tension  that  is  pervasive  in  constitutionalism. 2 0 3  This
tension is magnified  when the basis for judicial determinations  is a
source  of  law  beyond  the  control  of  the  judges'  own  polity.2 °4
Arguments that ignore the objections from self-rule risk undermining
important  values  of  democratic  decision-making.  Democratic
participation  in decision-making  in  smaller communities  is  in some
respects a good  in itself, and one that may be threatened by external
constraints.  Moreover,  the  efficacy  of  human  rights  norms  is
importantly  determined  by  the  mobilization  of  domestic
constituencies-within  the domestic polity-to effect change  on the
ground and  by the  development  of a  legal  culture that supports  the
practice  of rights.20 5 And  there  is much that is  attractive  about  the
201.  See Printzv. United States, 521 U.S. 898,921 n.11  (1997).
202.  See Tushnet, supra note 4, at 1270 n.215.
203.  Cf  Bahdi,  supra note  41,  at  574  (noting  a  similar  tension  in  India,
where  the  Indian  Supreme  Court,  in  Bahdi's  words,  "dismissed  the
significance  of India's reservations  to the CEDAW"  as an  example of courts
tending  to  "ignore  rules  of  international  law  that  render  the  right
nonjusticiable"  and thus one  for political branches  to  implement,  when  they
see rights  in a universalist light). For earlier discussion of Vishaka, see text at
notes 82-84.
204.  Cf  Young, supra note  198,  at  388-89  (noting  concerns  both  for  the
indeterminacy and extra-territorial sources of customary international law).
205.  International human rights sources  may, though,  help provide focus  for
effective  mobilizations  for  domestic  legal  change.  See,  e.g.,  UNIFEM,
BRINGING  EQUALITY HOME, supra note  102, at 13-14, 24-25, 33-34 (referring
to  views  of Rebecca  Cook)  (discussing  the  women's  movements'  use  of
CEDAW  in Costa Rica,  Colombia and  Uganda).  Consider  also  the argument
made  by  Sunder  of  the  value  of  internal  and  localized  engagements  over
gender equality issues  within different religious communities  including Islam.
See  Sunder,  supra note  24,  at  1434-57,  1463-64;  see  also  Andra  Nahal
Behrouz, Note, Transforming  Islamic Family  Law: State Responsibility and the
Role of Internal Initiative, 103  COLUM.  L. REv.  1136  (2003).  The  role  of
international  law  in  affecting  behavior  is  the  subject of longstanding  debate
among  international  lawyers and political  scientists, though the importance  of
domestic  governments  in human rights  enforcement  is widely  acknowledged.GENDER EQUALITY
epistemological  humility  and  value pluralism behind approaches  to
judicial  review  designed  to  enhance  the  quality  of  participatory
decision-making. 2 06  But the tensions  between  democratic  self-rule
and  judicial  rights  enforcement,  though  real,  are  also  very
complicated,  and  their existence  does not dictate simple  answers to
questions  about  the  application  or  consideration  of  foreign  or
international law.
Gerald Neuman  has characterized human rights as having three
aspects:  consensual,  institutional  and  "suprapositive." 2 07   The
consensual basis of rights, according  to Neuman, is that they "derive
their positive force from some political act that expresses the consent
For recent disagreement about whether ratification of human rights treaties has
any  effect,  and  in  what  direction,  and  by what  mechanisms,  on  effective
protection  or enforcement  of rights,  compare, e.g.,  Oona A.  Hathaway,  Do
Human Rights Treaties Make  a Difference?,  111  YALE  L.J.  1935,  2022-23
(2002)  (finding  that treaty  ratification  is associated  with a  decline  in human
rights  compliance  in  all but  the most  fully democratic  nations,  urging more
stringent  enforcement mechanisms  and less focus on widespread  ratification);
Oona  A. Hathaway,  The Cost of Commitment, 55  STAN  L. REV.  1821  (2003)
(suggesting that countries will take into account costs of compliance (including
likelihood  of compliance)  in  deciding  whether to  ratify);  Linda  Camp Keith,
The United Nations  International  Covenant on Civil and  Political  Rights: Does
It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PEACE RES. 95 (1999)
(finding no differences  in state parties behavior before  and after ratification of
ICCPR), with Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring  the Effects of  Human
Rights  Treaties,  14  EUR.  J.  INT'L  L.  171  (2003)  (criticizing  Hathaway's
empirical  study);  Goodman  & Jinks, supra note  159,  at 1783-85  (arguing for
sociological  and  institutional  model of compliance with international  law, and
favoring  widespread  ratification  efforts  because  expressive  functions  of
international  human rights  law  are likely to promote compliance  with human
rights).  For  an  interesting  argument  on  the  perverse  effects  of  legalized
enforcement  of human  rights,  see  Lawrence  Helfer,  Overlegalizing Human
Rights:  International Relations  Theory  and  the  Commonwealth Carribean
Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REv.  1832 (2002).
206.  See Dorf&  Sabel, supra note  155,  at 274-83; see also Barry Friedman,
Dialogue and Judicial  Review, 91  MICH. L. REv.  577, 580-81 (1993).
207.  See  Neuman,  supra  note  125,  at  1866-72.  As  he  argues,  the
"consensual"  (or "positive")  and "institutional"  aspects  of constitution  rights
may come into conflict with their "suprapositive"  or transnational character as
human rights. Id. at 1879-80. For an implicit challenge to efforts to demarcate
"positive" U.S. law from transnational  influence, see Resnik & Suk, supra note
48, at 1926-27,  1939-40 (emphasizing  permeability of U.S. law).
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of  relevant  political  actors,  or  of peoples." 2 0 8  In  a  constitutional
democracy, where "the people"  are the relevant "political  actors" for
constitutional  change,  the  idea  is  that rights,  like  other parts  of a
constitution, may legitimately obstruct later popular decision-making
only if they are in some sense agreed to.
The  powerful  constitutional  rhetoric  of  "We,  the  people"
notwithstanding,  the positive  aspects  of the  rights  and  government
structures  set  forth  in  our  Constitution  should  not  obscure  some
important  limitations  to  strong  claims  of  the  Constitution's
consensual character, particularly when coupled with strong forms of
originalist interpretive  methodology.  The  Constitution was  written
and  ratified  (for  the  most  part)  long  ago;  its  extension  to  current
generations  requires  some  more  indirect  narrative  of  consent  by
209 acquiescence.  We continue to live under the positive law and thus
"consent"  to  it  because  we  have  not  changed  it.21 0   The  general
intertemporal  problem of attributing  the consent of past  generations
to  new generations  is compounded  for those groups  excluded  from
participation  in  original  acts  of  consent.  Although  the  1789
Constitution  was  consented  to,  consent  came  from  a  very  limited
group that did not include women or slaves.21   Extension of the vote
208.  Id. at  1866.  Neuman recognizes that "consent"  can be determined  not
only  through  originalist  but  other  interpretive  methods,  including  more
evolutionary ones focused on current understandings of rights. Id.
209.  The  literature  on  the  more  general  intertemporal  problem  of
constitutional law is vast.  For a useful introduction,  see JON ELSTER, ULYSSES
AND  THE  SIRENS  36-111  (Cambridge  University  Press,  1979);  Bruce
Ackerman,  The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93  YALE  L.J.
1013,  1058-60 (1984).
210.  And we accept significant evolution  in the understanding of rights and
concepts,  at  least  in  part  through  a  process  of judicial  interpretation  in
important  degree under the control of unelected  and essentially  unremovable
and  very  long-serving  judges.  For  thoughtful  exploration  of  constitutional
"construction"  by  nonjudicial  actors,  see  KEITH  WHrTTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL  CONSTRUCTIoN:  DIVIDED  POWERS  AND  CONSTITUTIONAL
MEANING  (1999).
211.  To  speak of what  the polity  has "consented  to" depends  on what one
takes to be the fair baseline for measuring consent or acquiescence.  The status
quo ante of the U.S. constitution  is  a document  constructed  by  a polity  that
excluded  most of the population  at the time  of initial framing,  and  excluded
women until after the First World War, as numerous scholars have noted.  See,
e.g.,  Sullivan,  supra note  30,  at  735-38;  Mary  Becker,  Conservative Free
Speech and the Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 64 U. COLO. L. REV.  975,
976-77 (1993);  Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and  the Doctrine,GENDER EQUALITY
to  minorities  and  women  in  the  nineteenth  and  early  twentieth
centuries  does not of itself provide democratic legitimacy to the very
high threshold for amendment of the rest of the Constitution, in large
part fixed by a polity that excluded  them.212  This Constitution  still
specifies  a  procedure  for  its  own  amendment  that was  enacted  in
1789,  a  procedure  that  puts  the  Constitution's  text  well  beyond
ordinary democratic change.213
Relying  on  this  difficult-to-amend  Constitution  to  invalidate
more  recently  enacted  national  laws  designed  to  protect  against
114 HARv.  L. REV.  26, 35-39  (2000);  Kenneth  Karst,  Woman's Constitution,
1984 DuKE L.J. 447, 486 (1984).
212.  Of course, all of the current population was excluded from the decision
on the amendment process of Article  V.  In some respects,  we  are all  either
bound, or  not bound,  to respect the Constitution's  amendment process as the
legitimate  mechanism  for textual  change,  by virtue of living  in the ongoing
community  constituted  by  it.  To  the extent  that identifiable  portions of the
population  were excluded,  insistence on the legal text's interpretive  isolation
from other currents of change on grounds of democracy does not have as much
persuasive  force.  But  cf  Young,  supra note  198,  at  394-404  (expressing
concern  that  use  of  customary  international  law  bypasses  constitutional
structures  including  separation  of powers,  limits  on judicial  lawmaking  and
federalism).
213.  The double super-majority  voting requirements  in  Congress and in the
states  needed to change the U.S.  Constitution  is among the  most stringent  in
the world.  See Donald  Lutz,  Toward a Theory of Constitutional  Amendment,
88  AM.  POL.  SCI.  REV.  355,  362,  369  (1994);  cf Becker, supra note  211,  at
1025-30  (noting  as  one  basis  for  skepticism  about  binding judicial  review
concerns that the Constitution as a substantive matter better meets the needs of
elite propertied  men  than of other groups  and was created  through  a process
that  excluded women). Not only were women  excluded at the  1787 founding
but  they  were  also  excluded  from  voting  participation  in  the  process  that
produced the Reconstruction amendments, which so importantly shifted federal
power  and  moved equality  from  a subordinate  to  a  dominant  constitutional
norm.  Id. at  1026-27; see also United  States v. Virginia, 518  U.S. 515,  531-
32  (1996)  (noting women's  exclusion  from the making  of the Constitution).
Indeed,  in  some versions  of what Akhil Amar  calls "intratextualism,"  a  now
superseded  provision  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  could  be  read  as
approving  the political  exclusion of women.  U.S. CONST.  amend.  XIV,  § 2
(providing  a  rule  privileging  male  voters  by  reducing  congressional
representation  for states that  did  not permit all  adult  men  to  vote  in  federal
elections);  see  also  Ward  Farnsworth,  Women  under Reconstruction: The
Congressional Understanding, 94  Nw.  U. L. REv.  1229  (2000)  (concluding
that originalist  view  of the Fourteenth  Amendment  was not  to disturb  laws
subordinating women); cf. Amar, supra note 211,  at 52-53 (suggesting that the
Fourteenth Amendment could be understood historically as an  effort to extend
to African-Americans  the rights then enjoyed by unmarried white women).
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gender-motivated  violence,  as  in United States v. Morrison, 214 thus
itself  raises  complex  questions  about  constitutionalism  and
democracy.215   The  Court's  invalidation  of legislation  to  prevent
violence  against  women  was  in  some  sense  in  conflict  with
democratic  "self-rule"  at  the  national  level  in  a  time  of "ordinary
politics"; 216  and the constitutional  limitations  interpreted  to bar the
law were  among those  that  became  part of the  Constitution  before
women  were  allowed  to  vote.217  Bearing  in  mind  the  possible
214.  529  U.S.  598  (2000).  The  Court's  interpretation  was,  arguably,
originalist  in form,  looking  to past understandings  of limitations  on  national
power. See id. at  618("we  preserve  one of the  few  principles  that  has  been
consistent since the [Commerce]  Clause was adopted"); id. at 621  (citing  1883
cases on scope of Congress' power under the 14"' amendment).
215.  Cf Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism  and Secession, 58  U. CHI. L. REV.
633,  634-35  (1991)  (arguing  that  entrenched  pre-commitments  facilitate
democratic self-rule in a variety of ways); Walter Murphy,  Civil Law, Common
Law  and Constitutional Democracy, 52  LA.  L.  REV.  91,  101-09  (1991)
(emphasizing  that  it  is  commitment  to  human  dignity  that  underlies  both
democracy and constitutionalism).
216.  But cf  ACKERMAN,  supra note  128,  at  6-7  (distinguishing  between
"normal  lawmaking" by government and "higher lawmaking"  by the people).
The  "counter  majoritarian  difficulty"  with judicial  invalidation  of national
statutes  has,  of  course,  generated  an  enormous  literature.  Professor
Ackerman's theory responds to that difficulty by conceiving of "the people"  as
engaged  in  self-rule  in a two  track or  dualist  system of law-making,  so that
invalidation  of "ordinary politics"  legislation can  be seen  to vindicate,  rather
than  contradict,  self-rule  under  the  constitution  adopted  by  the  people  in
"constitutional  moments."  This  view  in turn  depends  on  the nature  of "the
people"  whose  capacities  to  vote  and  participate  in  public  decisions  help
legitimate giving priority to their constitutional  decisions.  See also id. at 315-
16 (arguing  that although women and African-Americans  were excluded  from
the  Constitution's  initial  creation,  the  institutional  structure  of  dualist
lawmaking provides a good vehicle for working towards full equality).
217.  Notwithstanding  amicus  briefing,  the  Court  did  not  even  refer to  the
bearing of a Senate-ratified human rights convention, the ICCPR, on the scope
of national power to protect against gender motivated violence. Cf Concluding
Observations  of  the  Human  Rights  Comm.:  United  States  of  America,
03/10/95,  CCPR/C/79/Add.50;  A/50/40,  para.  276  (noting  "the  position
expressed by the [U.S.] delegation that, notwithstanding the non-self-executing
declaration  of  the  United  States,  American  courts  are  not  prevented  from
seeking  guidance  from  the  Covenant  in  interpreting  American  law").  One
amicus brief argued that the ICCPR, to which the U.S. became a party in 1992,
provided  an  arguable  basis  for upholding  the Violence  Against  Women  Act
civil  rights remedy.  See Brief Amicus  Curiae of International  Law  Scholars,
supra note 189.  The brief argued that the ICCPR had been interpreted not only
to  prohibit  violence  against  women  but  to  require  state  parties  to  takeGENDER EQUALITY
complications  of claims  about the democratic  character of the U.S.
Constitution softens the force of objections from democratic self-rule
to considering transnational  sources in constitutional  interpretation218
(and  notwithstanding  critiques  of  international  law  as  built  on
foundations  from which women were excluded).219
affirmative  measures  to  prevent  and  remedy  such  violence.  Whether  the
ICCPR would have provided a sufficient basis for an alternative  interpretation
of  the  scope  of federal  power  under  the  Constitution  as  authorizing  the
legislation was vigorously disputed by other amici briefs. See Brief of Amicus
Curiae  Eagle Forum Education  and Defense Fund in  Support of Respondents,
at  United  States  v.  Morrison,  529  U.S.  598  (2000);  Brief  of  National
Association  of Criminal  Defense  Lawyers  as  Amicus  Curiae  In  Support  of
Respondents,  at United  States v. Morrison,  529 U.S. 598 (2000). The Court's
failure  to  address  the  issue  (even  though  it was  raised  only  by  an  amicus)
before invalidating a federal statute is noteworthy. See also infra note 266.
218.  If one were deeply committed  to the idea that constitutional provisions
are  designed,  in  Justice  Scalia's  words,  to  "obstruct  modernity"  through
originalist  interpretation,  see Antonin Scalia, Modernity and the Constitution,
in CONSTITUTIONAL  JUSTICE UNDER  OLD CONSTITUTIONS  313  (Eivind Smith,
ed.  1995), then the views of more contemporary majorities would be generally
irrelevant. My own view is that, particularly given the difficulty of amendment
and the brevity  of its terms,  the Constitution  must be read  in a way  that not
only  gives attention  to  original  understandings but also  permits  evolution of
constitutional understandings,  informed by (but also controlling  the legality of)
contemporary  legislative  enactments.  An  interpretive  theory  that allows  for
evolution  may  be  particularly  important  for  those  whose  interests  were
excluded  from consideration  in initial  lawmaking.  Cf, e.g., L'Heureux-Dub6,
supra note 1, at 33  (noting  widespread acceptance  in  Canada  of the "notion
that the rights and other provisions  in our Constitution should be interpreted,
'as  a living tree capable of growth  and expansion  within its natural  limits'  in
the words of Lord  Sankey  in a  1930  Privy  Council  case  from Canada  about
whether  the  term  'persons'  in  our  Cdnstitution  included  women");  Adam
Winkler,  A  Revolution  Too  Soon:  "Women  Suffragists  and  the  Living
Constitution," 76 N.Y.U. L. REV.  1456 (2001)  (describing women's efforts  to
develop evolutionary approach to constitutional interpretation).
219.  See HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN,  THE BOUNDARIES
OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW:  A  FEMINIST  ANALYSIS  1,  195  (Manchester
University  Press,  2000)(critiquing  international  law  for having  been  largely
developed  without  participation  from  women  and  for  privileging  male
experience  and perspectives  as shown, e.g.,  by  international  law's  failure to
place  gender  discrimination  on  the  same  plane  as  race  discrimination  for
purposes  of  being  condemned  as jus  cogens).  Although  this  may  put
international  human rights law at a disadvantage when compared to some more
modem  constitutions,  the  more  recent  development  of international  human
rights law  may have provided more  opportunities  for women's voices to help
shape  their content than  in the  draffing  of eighteenth and nineteenth  century
constitutions.  Cf  KNOP,  DIVERSITY  AND  SELF-DETERMINATION,  supra note
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The objection from democratic self-rule to judicial imposition of
outside  norms  is  not  without  force,  22   even  if  in  the  field  of
constitutional  interpretation  it  is  complicated  by  the  "democracy
deficits"  of U.S.  constitutional  history.  Other  considerations  may
also  caution  against  efforts  to  bind  the  polity  through  judicial
incorporation of international  norms that have not been agreed to by
more democratic internal processes.221 Another important component
of  constitutionalism  is  the  commitment  to  the  rule  of  law.  The
stability and consistency  generated by adherence  to the rule of law,
including  the use  of existing  mechanisms  for  legal  change  as  the
vehicle  for  change,  offer  important  goods  to  all  members  of the
polity, even if they disadvantage  portions of the population excluded
from  earlier  moments  of  decision-making.  "Hard"  features  of
established  law  provide  benefit  to  existing  rights  holders,  now
including women  in the United States, in their ability to invoke law
to protect those rights.  The rule of law also facilitates democracy in
14,  at 284-300,  349-57, 358-81(describing  women's participation  in variety
of  settings  involving,  formation,  implementation  and  interpretation  of
international  norms  and  emphasizing  importance  of interpretive  activities).
For  example,  there  were  a  small  number  of women  representatives  at  the
founding  conference  of U.N.  in  1945,  see  Hilkka  Pietili, Engendering the
Global Agenda:  The  Story  of Women  and the  United Nations, UN-NGLS
Publications,  at  http://www.unsystem.org/ngls/
documents/publications.en/develop.dossier/dd.06,  and involved  in the creation
of the Universal  Declaration  of Human Rights.  See MARY ANN GLENDON,  A
WORLD  MADE  NEW:  ELEANOR  ROOSEVELT  AND  THE  UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION  OF HUMAN  RIGHTS  35, 54, 90 (2001);  Sandra Day O'Connor,
The  Legal  Status  of  Women:  The  Journey  Toward Equality,  15  J.L.  &
RELIGION  29, 33-34  (2000-2001)  (noting insistence  by female  delegates that
Universal  Declaration  refer  to  "all  human  beings"  instead  of  "all  men").
Customary international law, by virtue of its decentralized sources of authority,
is perhaps  more open to participation  from groups historically  excluded  from
political power in long-established constitutional systems.
220.  And  it  is  a  strong  reason  for  advocates  of  U.S.  adherence  to
international legal rules  to engage with democratic processes  in  national, state
and local legislative bodies for enactment of implementing legislation.
221.  As I will argue below, giving consideration to foreign and international
norms in the resolution of domestic questions should not be seen as an effort to
bind  through  external  norms  but  as  an  effort  to  expand  the  deliberative
materials through which we, through constitutional organs of government,  give
meaning to our own law.  See also Knop, supra note 23,  at 531-32 (discussing
Jennifer Nedelsky's work); supra note  199.GENDER EQUALITY
that it specifies the procedures by which democratic decision-making
proceeds.222
But  these  rule-of-law  values  should  not preclude  resort  to the
decisions of non-U.S.  tribunals as an effort at genuine interpretation
of existing  U.S. legal  texts, including  the Constitution.223  Rule-of-
law  considerations  may  even  favor interpretive  rules  that assume  a
national  preference  to  be  in  conformity  with  international  human
rights law,  as  The Schooner Charming Betsy presumes with respect
to  statutes.224  Consideration  of  foreign  and  international  law  is
consistent with some of our oldest constitutional traditions. 225  In its
founding  decades,  the United  States  Supreme Court resorted  to the
"law  of nations" not only as a  set of independent  decisional rules  in
areas such as admiralty or cases affecting ambassadors, 226 but also as
222.  See Sunstein, supra  note 215, at 638-39.
223.  Cf Hannum, supra  note 75, at 292, 298-311 (noting countries that treat
their  own  constitution  as  supreme  over  customary  international  law  but
nonetheless  refer to international  human rights norms  in resolving cases). I do
not mean to  suggest that international  law would "trump"  U.S.  constitutional
law but that it may  be helpful in its interpretation.
224.  Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
Bradley and Goldsmith have stressed the more  expansive  and intrusive scope
of international  law today  as compared to  in the Founding period as a  reason
for  resistance  to  treating  it  as  binding  in  U.S.  courts.  See  Bradley  &
Goldsmith,  supra  note  198,  at  821.  The  difficulty  of  constitutional
"translation"  here, see Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint,  65 FORDHAM
L. REv.  1365,  1371-76  (1997),  is  considerable.  In  this  context,  should  we
assume  that the more important value to be translated  is preserving areas  for
state resolution or instead is compliance with  international  law?  Rule of law
arguments  may exist on both sides of this question,  though given the strong
desire  of the Constitution's  framers  to  provide  for a unitary voice  in foreign
affairs  and  the  foreign  affairs  difficulties  state  noncompliance  with
international  law may entail, there  would plainly be grounds for concern about
treating  clearly  established  customary  international  law as without any  legal
force  with  respect  to the  states. For illuminating  disagreements,  see  sources
cited supra note 198.
225.  The  U.S.  Constitution  does  not  include  an  explicit  authorization  to
consider foreign or international  law  in interpreting  the Constitution, as is the
case  in South  Africa. See Tushnet, supra note  4,  at  1270  n.215  (questioning
authority of courts absent  such authorization).  Certainly the presence of such
an  explicit  provision  largely  eliminates  legitimacy  based  challenges  to  the
practice  of considering  foreign  law.  But judicial  practice  can itself generate
legitimacy for particular interpretive practices. See also Harding, supra note 5,
at 460.
226.  See William A. Fletcher,  The General Common Law and Section 34 of
the Judiciary  Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97  HARV.  L.
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an interpretive  guide to constitutional  meaning.  Sometimes  the law
of nations was explained as a background norm that the Constitution
was intended to depart from.227 In other cases the law of nations was
treated  as  a  form  of persuasive  authority  for  one  constitutional
22 interpretation  over  another.28  Consideration  of transnational  legal
REv.  1513,  1517  (1984);  (describing  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  century
understandings in U.S. of "general common law,"  a law "not attached  to any
particular sovereign," that  "rather...  existed by common practice and consent
among a number of sovereigns").
227.  For pre-Civil War opinions treating  the  law of nations  as  a "negative"
precedent that particular constitutional  clauses were intended to modify, see for
example,  Nelson  v. Carland,  42  U.S.  (1 How.)  265,  280  (1843)  (reprinting
opinion of Catron,  J.,  sitting as Circuit Justice in  In re Klein,  14.  F. Cas. 716,
718  (D.  Mo.  1843)) (contrasting  bankruptcy decrees  under the law of nations,
which relied only  on  comity to secure respect of decree by other sovereigns,
with  Congress'  bankruptcy  power,  intended to provide  for discharge  binding
on all of the states); Prigg v. Pennsylvania,  41  U.S. (16  Pet.)  539,  611  (1842)
(referring  to  law of nations, which would have allowed  one  state to refuse to
recognize  slave property  based  on municipal  laws  in another state, as reason
for fugitive slave clause in the Constitution).
228.  For examples  of persuasive  uses of the  law of nations in  construing
constitutional  powers,  see Worcester  v.  Georgia,  31  U.S.  (6  Pet.)  515,  561
(1832)  (relying  on the law of nations  to help determine  Indian  tribes'  status
within the United  States  and  concluding that,  under the Constitution,  Indian
tribes retained rights of self government with which  state could not interfere);
Holmes  v.  Jennison,  39  U.S.  (14  Pet.)  540,  569-72  (1840)  (Taney,  C.J.,
opinion for 4 justices) (interpreting the Constitution's provisions on  treaties  in
light  of the  practice  of nations  as  to the subjects appropriate  for treaties and
concluding  that because  treaties  dealt with  surrender  of fugitives  the federal
treaty  power  should  be  read  to  preclude  state  governor  from  deciding  to
extradite a fugitive to  Canada); Gibbons  v.  Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)  1, 227
(1824)  (Johnson,  J. concurring)  (relying  in part on law of nations to conclude
that the federal power to regulate  interstate commerce  must be exclusive).  For
other  uses  of or  references  to  the  law  of nations  in  early  Supreme  Court
decisions  touching on federal powers, federal  relations or federal  statutes, see,
for example,  Schooner  Exch. v. M'Faddon,  11  U.S.  (7 Cranch)  116,  137-38
(1812)  (looking to practices of the "whole  civilized world" in  concluding  that
vessel of foreign sovereign has sovereign  immunity from in rem jurisdiction in
U.S.  ports);  United  States v. The  Schooner  Amistad,  40 U.S.  (15  Pet.)  518,
594,  596  (1841)  (treating  the law of nations  as  constraining  U.S.  in  dealing
with  foreign subjects);  Charming  Betsy, 6 U.S. at  118 (indicating  that federal
statutes  should  generally  be construed  in ways  consistent  with  international
law); Davis v. Packard, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)  276,  284-85 (1833)  (referring  to the
law of nations and practice  in England  to hold  that a  foreign  consul  did  not
waive immunity by failing to object at the trial level); Ware  v.  Hylton, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.)  199,  281  (1796)(Wilson,  J.) ("When the  United States declared their
independence,  they  were  bound to  receive  the law of nations,  in  its modemGENDER EQUALITY
materials  as  interpretive  sources,  then,  consists  with  some  of our
oldest forms of constitutional interpretation.
229
Apart  from this general  receptivity  to considering  transnational
sources  in  the  older  cases,  there  are  particular  reasons  within  our
interpretive  traditions  to consider  those  sources  in  gender  equality
cases. 23 0   First,  the  legal  movements  for  women's  suffrage  and
gender equality  in the United States developed  in conjunction with,
were  influenced by and exerted  influence  on, similar movements  in
other countries.231  From its inception, the idea of women's suffrage,
state  of purity  and  refinement.");  see  also James  H.  Lengel,  The  Role  of
International  Law in the Development of Constitutional  Jurisprudence  in the
Supreme Court: The Marshall Court and American Indians, 43 AM.  J. LEGAL
HIST.  117 (1999);  cf.  Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13  Pet.)  519, 589-90
(1839)  (applying  rules  of international  comity  to  the  question of whether  a
corporation chartered in one state could make a contract  in another).  Until late
in  the  nineteenth  century,  U.S.  courts  treated  international  law  as  routinely
applicable  in  a  variety  of  cases,  including  admiralty,  cases  affecting
ambassadors and public ministers, and disputes between  American  states. See
Koh, Transnational  Public  Law Litigation,  supra  note 33, at 2353-54.  And in
ascertaining  the scope of that domestically applicable  law of nations, the Court
commented  that  "[t]he  decisions  of the  Courts of every  country...  will  be
received,  not as  authority,  but with  respect."  Thirty  Hogsheads  of Sugar  v.
Boyle,  13 U.S. (9  Cranch)  191,  198  (1815).
229.  See  Martin  v.  Hunter's  Lessee,  14  U.S.  (1  Wheat)  304,  335  (1816)
(noting that the Constitution's grants of subject matter jurisdiction to Article III
courts  meant  that the jurisdiction  over  cases  under  the  Constitution,  federal
laws  and treaties  would  "affect  not only  our internal policy, but our foreign
relations  [and  it]  would,  therefore,  be perilous  to  restrain  it  in  any  manner
whatsoever, inasmuch as it might hazard the national safety"); id. (noting other
categories  of  federal  jurisdiction,  including  admiralty,  "in  the  correct
adjudication  of which foreign nations  are deeply interested...  [and]  in which
the  principles  of the  law  and  comity  of nations  often  form  an  essential
inquiry.") That the Court may have manifested  greater attention to the law  of
nations  in  its  early  years  of decisions  than  it  does  today  is  perhaps  not
surprising.  Cf McCrudden, supra note 1, at 503,  514,  523 (noting reasons of
economy,  given absence  of legal  development  in early years of constitutional
regimes,  that may lead courts to look to other courts'  decisions as aids).  What
is less understandable  is the  strong resistance to the legitimacy of considering
foreign or  international  sources  as aids  to  interpretation  that Justices Thomas
and Scalia have at times expressed.
230.  For additional  reasons to consider such transnational  sources, see infra
text accompanying notes 259-62.
231.  The  transnational  origins  of the  women's  movement  in  the  United
States are  both  intellectual  and political  in character.  Mary  Wollstonecraft's
Vindication of the  Rights of Women, published  in Britain  in  1792  and  soon
translated  into German  and French,  see  LEILA J. RUPP, WORLDS  OF WOMEN:
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its implications  and the principles for which it stood were the subject
of  a  rich  transnational  discourse  and  some  formal  international
organization.232 Looking to comparative and international  sources  on
THE  MAKING  OF  AN  INTERNATIONAL  WOMEN'S  MOVEMENT  14  (1997),  is
widely regarded  as  the intellectual  inspiration  for the early women's  suffrage
movement.  And  the  political  spur  to  the  relationships  among  women
abolitionists that  then  led  to the  Seneca  Falls  Convention  of  1848,  with  its
ringing  declaration  of  women's  rights,  was  the  ejection  of  women
representatives  from a meeting in Britain of the Anti-Slavery Society in 1840.
See Judith Resnik,  Women, Meeting (Again), in and Beyond the United States,
in  THE  DIFFERENCE  "DIFFERENCE"  MAKES  203-06  (Deborah  Rhode  ed.,
2003);  CHARLESWORTH  &  CHrNKIN,  supra  note  219,  at  14-20.  On
transnational  aspects  of  the  women's  movement  and  the  U.S.,  see  Judith
Resnik, Sisterhood,  Slavery and Sovereignty: Transnational  Antislavery Work,
Women's  Rights  Movements,  and  the  Ambivalent  Role  of  United  States
Lawmakers,  in  SISTERHOOD  AND  SLAVERY  (Katherine  Sklar  and  James
Stewart  eds.,  Yale  Univ. Press)  (forthcoming  2004)  (manuscript of Sept.  12,
2003  on  file  with  author)  (describing  how  "transatlantic  crossings"  in
antislavery  movement  of  nineteenth  century  established  paradigms  for
subsequent women's activities on behalf of equality carried forward  in various
ways at the international  level  and noting U.S. leadership in international  anti-
trafficking  initiatives).  For individual  examples,  note  that  Carrie  Chapman
Catt, whose organizational  skills are  widely credited  as important to securing
passage and ratification  of the Nineteenth  Amendment, had served  for several
years  as  head  of the  International  Council  of Women.  Rosika  Schwimmer,
whose application for U.S. citizenship was famously rejected  by the Supreme
Court  (because  she  refused  to  swear  to take  up  arms  for the U.S.  at  a time
when  she  would  not  have  been  allowed  to  do  so,  see  United  States  v.
Schwimmer,  279  U.S.  644  (1929)),  and who  was  originally  from  Hungary,
served  as  the International  Press  Secretary,  headquartered  in London,  of the
International  Women's  Suffrage  Alliance  before  coming  to  the  U.S.  See
Stephanie  A.  Levin,  Women and Violence: Reflections on Ending the Combat
Exclusion, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV.  805,  818  (1992).  Mary Clark's study of the
first 20 women  admitted to the bar of the U.S.  Supreme Court reveals  that a
number  were  also  involved  with  international  women  lawyer  associations,
international  conferences  and  organizations.  See  Mary  Clark,  The  First
Women  Members of the Supreme Court Bar, 1879-1900, 36  SAN  DIEGO  L.
REV.  87, 88,  120-26 (1999).  See also Sylvia Law, Crystal  Eastman: Organizer
for Women's Rights, Peace and Civil Liberties in  the 1910s,  28  VAL.  U.L.
REV.  1305  (1994)  (noting  Crystal  Eastman's  involvements  in  both
international women's suffrage and U.S. suffrage activities)
232.  See supra  note 231; see also KECK & SIKKINK, supra note  12, at 51-60.
Connections  between  the  women's  suffrage  movement  in  the  U.S.  and
international  women's  organizations  have  in recent  years  become the subject
of significant  scholarship. See  Rupp, supra note 231  at 4 (explaining how her
research  on the U.S.  National  Women's Party led  to her  "discovery  of U.S.
women's  involvement  in  the  transnational  struggle  for  equal  rights").
According  to  Rupp,  trans-border  organizations  of women  began  in  the  lateGENDER EQUALITY
gender  equality  in  law  as  part  of the  process  by which  we  now
interpret  our  constitutional  commitments  to  equality  is  thus
consistent with the broader history that gave rise to the constitutional
change and may accordingly shed light on its meaning.233
Second,  as  I  argue  elsewhere,  comparative  constitutional  law
may be of particular assistance to the United States in addressing the
enduring  problem  of  how  to  integrate  newer  constitutional
commitments  with older ones.234  Ours  is a constitutional  system  in
which  governmental  structures  and  liberty-protecting  rights  were
nineteenth  century:  the  first  international  women's  conference  was  held  in
Paris  in  1878;  the  second,  called  by  the  U.S.  National  Women  Suffrage
Association took place in Washington D.C. in  1888  and led to the creation  of
the  International  Council  of Women.  Id.  at  13,  15.  International  women's
organizations  and  national  chapters  grew  in  numbers  and  cross-affiliations.
See id. at  16-18; Nitza Berkovitch,  The International  Women's Movement, in
CONSTRUCTING  WORLD  CULTURE:  INTERNATIONAL  NGOs  SINCE  1875  100,
104,  117  (John  Boli & George  M.  Thomas  eds.,  1999).  The  International
Alliance of Women  for  Suffrage  and  Legal Citizenship  (now  known  as  the
International Alliance of Women) was founded in 1904 at a meeting in Berlin,
through  earlier  work  of representatives  from  the  U.S.,  England,  Australia,
Canada, Norway,  Sweden,  Germany,  Russia, Turkey  and Chile;  its  founding
declaration  of principles  asserted  that "men  and women  are  equally  free and
independent  members  of  the  human  race  and  equally  entitled  to  the  free
exercise of their individual  rights and liberties." Id. at  105.  By  1913,  twenty-
six countries had national sections. See Rupp, supra  note 231,  at  16.  Members
self-consciously  identified  bonds  of commonality  with  women  from  other
nations  in pursuit  of their  goals.  See  id. at  82-83,  218-22;  Jane  Connors,
NGOs and the  Human Rights  of Women  at  the  United Nations, in  THE
CONSCIENCE  OF  THE  WORLD:  THE  INFLUENCE  OF  NON-GOvERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS  IN THE  UN  SYSTEM  147,  149-50  (Peter Willetts  ed.,  1996)
(discussing involvement of at least twenty women's organizations in League of
Nations related matters in Geneva after World War I including "British and US
women's  societies");  CHARLESWORTH  &  CHINKIN,  supra note  219  at  14
(noting that over  1500 women met in an International  Congress of Women  in
the Hague  to discuss  linkages between women's  participation  in politics  and
the prevention of war).
233.  Cf  Sandra  Day  O'Connor,  The  History of the  Women's  Suffrage
Movement,  49  VAND.  L.  REv.  657,  659,  665  (1994)  (noting  exclusion  of
women from the 1840 London meeting and also noting that in the early  1900s,
the American  suffrage movement received a "necessary jolt" from the political
tactics of women suffragists in England).
234.  Vicki  C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation, Comparative Constitutional-
ism  and Fissian Freedoms, U.  MIAMI  L.  REv.  (forthcoming  2003-04)
[hereinafter  "Fissian  Freedoms"];  Vicki  C.  Jackson,  Holistic Interpretation:
Fitzpatrick  v. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated Constitution,  53 STAN.  L. REv.  1259,
1298-1301  (2001)  [hereinafter Holistic  Interpretation].
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adopted  well  ahead  of commitments  to  human  equality,  including
women's equality, as bedrock principles. 2 35 We have had to "evolve"
our understandings  of equality  in the  Fourteenth  Amendment  from
one  focused  on  slavery  and  racial  discrimination  to  embrace  the
equality  of  women,236  arguably  reading  that  equality-protecting
amendment in the light of the Nineteenth Amendment's expansion of
suffrage237  in  order  to  develop  even  the  most  basic  anti-
discrimination  principles  on  gender.  After a  seventy-year  struggle
for  gender  equality  in  voting  (from  1848  to  1920),  it  was  another
fifty  years  before  the  Court  began  to  realize  the  impact  of this
commitment more pervasively  on our understandings  of earlier parts
of the Constitution, including the general guarantee of equality rights
in the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  Newer  constitutional  systems  from
their  inception  have  combined  commitments  to  liberty  with
commitments  to  equality  and  have  had  to  integrate  those
commitments  together  with structural  aspects of their  systems  (e.g.
federalism)  in their constitutional jurisprudence.238  Their courts have
235.  I have argued elsewhere  that human equality was  a subordinate  theme
of the  original  constitution  that  only  became  central  to  constitutional  self-
understanding after the Civil War.  See Jackson, Fissian  Freedoms, supra note
234.  For a different view, see ROBERT GOLDWIN, WHY BLACKS,  WOMEN AND
JEWS ARE NOT MENTIONED  IN THE CONSTITUTION,  AND OTHER UNORTHODOX
VIEWS 9-15 (1990)  (arguing that Constitution was from the beginning founded
on principles of equality and that  Constitution neither approved  of slavery nor
excluded  women,  but  required  amendment  to  overcome  state  practices
inconsistent with basic constitutional vision of equality).
236.  See, e.g.,  Winkler, supra note 218,  at  1457  (describing  arguments  of
suffragists  for  interpretive  method  of "living  constitutionalism");  see  also
Farnsworth, supra note 213, at 1291-95.
237.  See Reva  B.  Siegel,  She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex
Equality,  Federalism  and the Family, 118  HARV.  L. REv. 947,  960-77 (2002);
Michael  C. Dorf, Equal Protecion  Incorporation,  88  VA. L. REv. 951,  979-80
(2002);  Amar,  supra  note  211,  at  51-52,  107-09;  Jackson,  Holistic
Interpretation,  supra  note 234, at 1284-92.
238.  See, e.g.,  Jackson, Holistic Interpretation,  supra note 234, at 1299-1301
(discussing Canadian decision in which Justice Frazer, of the Alberta Court of
Appeals,  read  the  federal  power  over  criminal  law  expansively  in  light  of
Charter  commitments  to  women's  equality).  Countries  that  have  developed
their basic constitutional  framework  with participation  from women  as well as
men  may cast valuable  light on  how  a twenty-first  century constitution  now
committed  to  gender  equality  and  representative  government  ought  to  be
understood.  In  this regard the Canadian  Charter of 1982,  the South African
Constitution  of 1996,  the Colombian  Constitution  of 1993,  and  the UgandanGENDER EQUALITY
elaborated  on  equality  norms  in  their  relationship  with  other
important  human  rights  values  in  polities  less  encumbered  by  a
binding  eighteenth  century  document  (in  whose  framing  women
were  excluded  and which was  committed  only to  a very particular
understanding  of who  was  entitled  to  be  treated  equally).  Their
jurisprudence  might  thus be  of particular  assistance  to  developing
understandings  of  how  to  integrate  our  relatively  newer  found
commitment  to  gender  equality  into  the  rest of U.S.  constitutional
law.
239
B. Judicial  Discretion,  Expertise and Constraint
Discretion and Power. A distinct objection to the consideration
of foreign  precedents  focuses  on the  question of judicial  discretion
and constraint in interpretation.  Professor Charles Fried has recently
argued  that  a judge, unlike  a  scholar,  is  constrained  (by  virtue  of
having  the power  of judgment)  to engage  only  in  interpretation  of
legal materials, and has suggested that "expand[ing]  the authoritative
canon"  of  sources  for  constitutional  interpretation  to  include
comparative  materials  would  threaten  that  constraint.24°   But  a
Constitution of 1995 are among those notable for the organized involvement of
women in their development.
239.  For discussion  of possible  differences  between  decisions  of domestic
courts  and general  statements  of international  human  rights,  for purpose  of
influencing domestic  legal  interpretation,  see  infra text  accompanying  notes
250-55.
240.  See Charles Fried, Scholars and Judges: Reason and Power,  23  HARV.
J. L. & PUB.  POL'Y 807, 818-29  (2000)  (arguing  that judges, unlike scholars,
exercise power and in so doing are bound by a limited interpretive canon).  In
contrast  to scholars,  who may  redefine  what  the interpretive  canon is,  Fried
says, a court must be confined by law.
What does it mean to be confined by the law? It means that however
much freedom  the interpretative  task may seem to  leave judges, still,
they do  interpret  the  law. They  interpret  the legal  materials  out  of
which  they  construct  a legal  theory that  carries  them  forward  to the
new decision they must make, and there is a limit beyond  which it is
simply no longer plausible to claim that a decision is interpreting those
materials rather than twisting or ignoring them.
Id.  at  811.  Fried  describes  Justice  Breyer's  dissent  in  Printz,  invoking
comparative  constitutional  law  as  "one  of the few  instances  of a  deliberate
attempt by a Justice to expand the canon of authoritative  materials from which
constitutional common law reasoning might go forward." Id. at 819.  Professor
Fried thus  appears implicitly  to  approve  of Justice  Scalia's  effort  to prevent
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commitment  to interpretation  as a distinctive feature of judging does
not of itself rule in or out particular sources.  Early uses of the "law
of  nations"  in  constitutional  interpretation  suggest  that  our
authoritative canon may have been more inclusive in the past and is
capable  of change  over  time.241   Rather  than  increasing  judicial
discretion  by  expanding  the  sources  available  to  be  considered,  a
practice of considering  other courts'  approaches  to analogous issues
may, by eliciting reasoning about distinctions or similarities between
U.S. constitutional commitments  and conditions  and others,  increase
the deliberative quality and accountability of  judging.242
Professor  McCrudden  and  others,  however,  have  questioned
whether resort to foreign decision  is not more likely simply to reflect
a judge's predisposition,  and  to  allow judges  to give  vent  to their
preferences  because  it expands  the  range  of views  for which  some
precedent can be found.243 I think this objection is best answered by
Professor  Glenn's  observation  that  having  to  confront  foreign
decisions offers far greater opportunity for critical reflection on one's
own  first instincts  than  otherwise.244  A judge's instincts  are  likely
conditioned  by  the legal  system  in  which  she already  functions;  it
seems  most  unlikely that  a judge would  be predisposed  to a result
that  had  no  support  already  in her  own  tradition  (or that  judges
this  expansion  of the  canon  because  it  would  allow  too  much  room  for
"twisting" interpretation beyond any sense of constraint.  See id. at 811.
241.  See supra notes  225-29;  Fontana,  supra note  4,  at  544-52;  Jackson,
Ambivalent Resistance,  supra note 72, at 584-91.
242.  See Jackson, Narratives,  supra note 126, at 259-61; see also id.  at 263-
71  (noting  possibility  of moderating  effects  on U.S.  concerns  from  broader
comparative knowledge  of other constitutional  systems); cf Klug, supra note
44,  at  616  ("The  emergence  of a  world  constitutionalism...  provides  an
opportunity  to  United  States judges  and  lawyers...  to  advance  their  own
constitutional  endeavors  . . . . [B]y  joining  this  emerging  constitutional
discussion, the United  States Supreme Court would  enrich its own  discussion
of constitutional  alternatives  ...  even  if it distinguished  or rejected  foreign
arguments...").
243.  See  McCrudden,  supra note  1,  at  507.  There  is  no  question  that
international  legal  sources  stand  for  multiple  values  and  will  be  subject  to
divergent  interpretations  in  different  courts  of  different  countries.  See
generally Knop,  supra note  23,  at  526-31  (emphasizing  role of culture  in
interpretation  of  international  law).  For  conflicting  approaches  to  gender
equality and customary law in Africa, see, e.g., cases cited supra note 99.
244.  See Glenn, supra note 63,  at 264.GENDER EQUALITY
would  act upon such a view on finding foreign support).245  It seems
more  likely  that consideration  of foreign  decisions  and  approaches
would  produce  decision-making  more  aware  of the  possibility  of
interpretive  choices,  and thus  more  likely to  respond  by reasoning
rather  than  by  an  instinctive  assumption  that  one  has  the  right
answer.
Expertise. A more  substantial  objection to transnational judicial
discourse  goes to expertise or competence.  Most U.S. judges today
were  not educated  in  law  school  or in practice  about  international
and foreign law.246 Contextualized understandings of other countries'
legal  systems  are important  for fair use of foreign cases;  there  is  a
significant  risk that doctrines,  rules or principles that make sense  in
one  context will  change  meaning  or  lose  value  in another context.
And there are risks of sheer confusion,  about  the scope  and content
of  international  law  and  of  how  to  understand  constitutional
decisions  of other  courts.247  Given  the  varying  degrees  to  which
foreign  or  international  law  is  likely  to  be  helpful  in  resolving
domestic  constitutional  issues,  judges  may  be  understandably
reluctant either to invest the time needed to feel comfortable relying
on those sources or to risk error in relying on them without adequate
knowledge and understanding  of their meaning and status. Until  law
schools  do  more  to  train  lawyers  to  understand  these  external
materials  and lawyers  in turn  alert domestic judges  to the  possible
utility  or  applicability  of  foreign  or  international  legal  sources,
judicial hesitation will likely continue.
Foreign judgments  and  international law.  Whatever  the
outcome  of current  debates  over  the  self-executing  character  of
treaties  or the  status  of customary  international  law,248  or of what
245.  Thus I do not deny that judges sometimes cite selectively  to foreign  or
transnational  sources  because  they conform  to the judge's views of how the
case should  be resolved.  Rather, I am  skeptical of the capacity of foreign  or
international  materials  to  influence  a judge's  choice  beyond  those  choices
already supported within the domestic interpretive tradition.
246.  See Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance, supra  note 72, at 592-95.
247.  For example,  Canadian  Section  1 rights cases  cannot be read  without
some understanding of the proportionality doctrine. For a brief explanation, see
Jackson,  Transnational  Legal Discourse,  supra  note  108, at 385 n. 45.
248.  See supra notes 196-98.
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norms  are  embraced  within  the jus  cogens,249  it  is  clear  that  a
decision  of the  Canadian  Supreme  Court  on  the  meaning  of the
federalism  and  equality  provisions  of  its  own  Charter,  or  of the
Indian  Supreme  Court  on  the  need  for  the  government  to protect
women from sexual harassment  (however helpful they may be to a
fuller  understanding  of what  it  may  mean  to  be  constitutionally
committed to equality2 5°) are not "binding"  in the United States.  Yet
those judgments are binding in their own polities.  To the extent that
other  nations'  reasoned judicial  decisions  reflect  actual judgments
affecting  real litigants by judges with responsibilities in  an ongoing
government,  they  may  be  regarded  by  other  judges  as  more
persuasive  accounts  than  those  found  in  scholarly  writings  or  in
unenforceable or under-enforced  standards of international  law.
Among  nonbinding  "outside"  sources,  it may bear  considering
whether  there  are  systematic  differences  between  comparative
constitutional law and international human rights law with respect to
their  helpfulness  to  or  influence  on  domestic  courts.  Unlike
international  human rights  law,  the  constitutional  law  of individual
rights  in  other  countries  is  embedded  in  an  entire  system  of
governance;  judicial  judgments  on  constitutional  questions  in
domestic courts thus may not only reflect the special concentration of
the mind to which Professor Fried refers but an awareness of how the
judgment  fits  with  an  overall  system  of  governance.2 51   Thus,
domestic  court  decisions  upholding  claims  of right  may  in  some
respects  be  more  persuasive  than  statements  of  human  rights
249.  See  CHARLESWORTH  &  CHINKIN,  supra  note  219,  at  16-17.
(complaining that gender discrimination is not treated asjus cogens); cf Ladan
Askari,  Girls Rights Under International  Law: An Argument for Establishing
Gender Equality as Jus Cogens, 8 S. CAL.  REV.  L.  & WOMEN'S  STuD.  23
(1998)  (arguing that gender discrimination should be treated asjus cogens).
250.  See infra text at notes 291-98.
251.  Cf Fried, supra note 240, at 823  ("one substantial  advantage  the judge
enjoys  over  the  scholar  comes  from  the  fact  that  just  because  the  judge
exercises  power,  because  her  decision  directly  effects  lives,  she  will  have
thought  differently  and  perhaps  more  deeply,  more  responsibly....
Responsibility  - like  the  prospect  of hanging  - concentrates  the mind.").
Some of the objections raised to customary international  law seem to resonate
with Judge Fried's point about how the greater responsibility of  judges (to give
actual judgments) requires them to think differently ("more responsibly") than
scholars.  Cf, e.g.,  Bradley  & Goldsmith,  supra note  198,  at  839  (raising
concern  that  today  customary  international  law  is  less  tied  to  actual  state
practices and based more on international pronouncements).
344GENDER EQUALITY
principles  issued  by  bodies  with  no  other  governmental
responsibilities.  To the extent that part of the  special responsibility
of judging  comes  from the power of giving  a coercive  or effective
judgment within a governmental system,252 domestic courts may fmd
more  reason  to pay attention  to  what their judicial  counterparts  in
other countries have to say.253  Yet to the extent international  sources
reflect an actual international  consensus about human rights, such as
the  meaning  of  gender  equality,  they  may  be  more  readily
assimilated  into domestic  legal interpretation  through presumptions
favoring  interpretations  of ambiguous  law  in  ways  consistent  with
international law.254
C. National  Distinctiveness  and Gender  Equality in the U.S.
Supreme Court: The Sounds of Transnational  Silence
One important function of a constitution is to give expression to
a  distinctive  national  identity  and  historical  experience.  I  have
noted  elsewhere  the possibility that the Court's ambivalence  about
referring to foreign authority might reflect concern about diminishing
the  acceptability  of the  Court's  reasoning  and  results  before  its
relevant  domestic  audiences,  particularly  when  "exceptionalist"
strands  in U.S.  political  thought  are  ascendent.256  But there  is  no
252.  See supra note 251; Fried, supra note 240, at 823 ("The prospect of the
real life effect of her decision gives off the vapors  which the judge inhales to
nourish her prophetic utterances."); see generally id. at 821-26 (distinguishing
judicial decisions on constitutional  questions from scholarly writings).
253.  See  also  Kirby,  Road from  Bangalore, supra  note  136  (noting
skepticism  about international tribunals and committees, and the generality  of
expression in many international human rights instruments); Kirby, Role of  the
Judge, supra note  129,  at  523  (noting  concerns  for  "hypocrisy  and  double
standards"  in the process of norm development  in international  law in which
"authoritarian  regimes indifferent to human rights" purport to lay down law for
others in "vaguely worded instruments").
254.  These presumptions might have particular appeal where an international
instrument  is binding on the country (because,  for example, a  treaty has been
ratified),  but is not independently judicially enforceable  (because the treaty is
non  self-executing).  A non-self executing  treaty provision  is one that is not
judicially enforceable without implementing legislation.  For critical discussion
and debate over this doctrine, see sources cited supra  note  197.
255.  See Tushnet, supra note 4, at  1270-81,  1307; Choudhry, supra note  6,
at 835,  838 (on dialogic uses of comparison and other countries'  constitutional
experience  as negative precedent.)
256.  See Jackson, Narratives,  supra note  126, at 265-66.
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reason why a constitutional  democracy,  including the United States,
cannot  see itself as having  a national  legal  identity concerned  with
whether its own practices meet transnational and international norms,
and  at  times  in  its  history  the  United  States  has  embraced  such
concerns.257  It may now be particularly  important for the stature  of
the  United States in the international  legal community  for its courts
at least to acknowledge  widely held views  on human rights  norms,
including gender equality, whatever position is ultimately taken as a
matter  of  U.S.  law.2 58  Considering  other  sources  of  law  and
explaining why they are or not persuasive or relevant in the domestic
setting  permits  a  broader  dialogue  within  the  course  of  the
adjudication  and may increase  participants'  sense of fair process.259
And  if  the  Court  increasingly  incorporates  consideration  of
international  and transnational  sources  on human  rights,  legitimacy
for this interpretive practice is likely to follow.
257.  See supra notes 225-29; cf United States v. Bums, [2001]  1 S.C.R. 283
(Canadian  Supreme  Court  clearly  aligns  Canada  with  leadership  in
international  human  rights  on  death  penalty,  as  part  of national  identity).
Despite  recent  scholarly  interest  in  the  Bricker  Amendment  (a  proposed
constitutional  amendment  in  the  1950s,  one  version  of which  would  have
provided that treaties  can be effective  as internal law only through  legislation
valid in the absence of the treaty),  it is important to remember that the Bricker
Amendment  (unlike  the ERA)  never  passed  out  of Congress.  See  Golove,
supra note 196, at 1273-78.
258.  Some  prominent. jurists  have  suggested  that  national  supreme  courts
that  ignore  transnational  judicial  discourse  do  so  at  the  risk  of declining
influence.  See, e.g.,  L'Heureux-Dub6,  supra note  1, at  29-30.  Although
influencing  the courts  of other nations may not be high  on the list of what  a
national supreme  court should care about, the Court's and the nation's interest
may  well  be served  by at  least  demonstrating  knowledge  of and respect  for
what goes on  elsewhere.  Cf Hilton  v. Guyot,  159  U.S.  113,  163-64  (1895)
(defining  comity  of one  nation  to  another  as  "neither  a  matter of absolute
obligation,  on  the  one  hand,  nor of mere  courtesy  and good  will, upon  the
other").
259.  Professor  Glenn  interestingly  suggests  that  too  internal  a  view  of
"binding" national law may be dangerous  for the very concept of law itself:
In seeking  to bind it fails to persuade and resistance becomes easier to
justify  than  adherence.  Opponents  to  laws  made  by  the  State  are
excluded  from  the  world  of  law  and  are  driven  to  attack  it.
Multiplying  the  sources  of  law,  however,  means  multiplying  the
sources of legal dialogue.  Law is less precise but more communal and
there are more possibilities of persuasion ....
Glenn, supra  note 63,  at 297.GENDER EQUALITY
Yet  there  remains  the  question  why  domestic  courts  in  the
United  States  should  invest  the  effort  required  to  understand
transnational  legal  sources.  U.S.  legal  practice  has  made  real
contributions  to the idea of gender equality  and its  legal protection;
we  have  a  rich  body  of domestic  law  and  research  that  bears  on
gender  equality  issues.  Why, given  the time and effort required to
avoid  misunderstandings,  should  lawyers  and judges  look beyond
U.S. law?
Among  the  reason  for  comparative  study  generally,260  the
capacity  of comparative  study  to provide perspective  on  one's  own
situation  has  particular  resonance  for  legal  approaches  to  gender
inequalities.  The  deeply  entrenched  sense  of the  "naturalness"  of
gender  distinctions,  in  the  hearts  and  minds  of many,  provides  a
special  opportunity  for  the  benefits  of reflective  comparison  with
external sources and practices-its  capacity to challenge assumptions
that  existing  ways  of proceeding  are  "necessary"  or  "natural. ''261
Moreover,  the  mistreatment  of  women  thrives  on  darkness  and
obscurity, often associated with the realm of the "private."  Insistence
on the autonomy of the "private" from "public" intervention has been
a  tool  of the  continued  subordination  of women,  for  example,  as
victims of domestic violence.262  Shedding light, making information
260.  Benefits to judges'deliberative process  from comparative  constitutional
knowledge include  illuminating  shared  constitutional concepts such as human
dignity and equality; better understanding one's own  tradition by comparing  it
with  others;  developing  knowledge  of the  range  of functional  solutions  to
constitutional  problems  and  of  their  consequences;  and  in  so  doing,
strengthening the reason-giving  capacities of courts.  See Jackson, Narratives,
supra note 126,  at 254-63.  Further, some degree of comparison with what one
believes  about constitutional  experience  in other countries  is inevitable  in the
highly interconnected  information age in which we live; given the inevitability
of  comparison,  it  should  be  well-informed.  See  Jackson,  Ambivalent
Resistance, supra  note 72, at 600-01.
261.  Cf  VICKI  C.  JACKSON  &  MARK  TUSHNET,  COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  169  (Foundation  Press  1999)  (noting  potential  for
comparative  constitutional  study  to  dispel  a  sense  of false  necessity  about
existing arrangements).
262.  See, e.g.,  Berta Esperanza  Hemandez-Truyol,  Sex, Culture and Rights:
A  Re-Conceptualization  of Violence for the Twenty-First Century, 60 ALB.  L.
REv.  607,  629-32  (1997)  (discussing  relationship  between  rape,  domestic
violence  and  the  "public/private"  divide  in  law);  Celina  Romany,  State
Responsibility  Goes  Private: A  Feminist  Critique of  the  Public/Private
Distinction in  International Human  Rights  Law,  in  HUMAN  RIGHTS  OF
WOMEN: NATIONAL AND  INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES  85  (Rebecca J. Cook
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available,  about  different  practices,  good  and  bad,  in  different
contexts  around  the  world,  is,  I  believe,  likely  in  the  long run  to
improve  the  conditions  of those who  are  oppressed-including,  in
many  parts  of the world  and  in  many  aspects  of life, women.  So
apart  from  the  benefits  to  the  deliberative  process  that can  accrue
from  informed  awareness  of international  and  foreign  approaches,
insisting  on  the  legitimacy  and  sharedness  of  the  enterprise  of
promoting gender equality as both a human right and a right secured
by national law holds the promise of improved conditions for women
around the world, as well as in the United States.
There  are,  of course,  important  differences  in  the scope of the
rights  recognized  in  international  and  regional  legal  regimes and  in
other constitutions  that in particular  settings may limit the utility  of
transnational  materials  except  for the  purpose  of differentiation.
263
For example, to the extent that the U.S.  Constitution is read to stand
generally  against principles  of "positive  rights,"  international  legal
norms  requiring  states  to  affirmatively  take  action  may have  little
traction;  consider  United States v.  Morrison, 264  where  the  Court
struck down the civil rights remedy in the Violence  Against Women
Act  in part because  there was  insufficient  "state  action."265  To the
extent  CEDAW  (which  the  U.S.  has  not  ratified)  requires
governments to take positive action, it may be dismissed by some as
inconsistent  with  basic  normative  commitments  of  the  U.S.
Constitution to protecting  a broader realm  of private  liberty through
the requirement of "state action., 266  Moreover,  given the wide range
ed.,  1994); see also Tracy  E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110  HARV.
L.  REV.  1657,  1671-75  (1997)(summarizing  feminist  objections  to  "public-
private" dichotomy).
263.  The U.S.  First Amendment  law  is  a leading  example.  Another  is  the
absence of social welfare rights in the U.S. Constitution.
264.  529 U.S. 598, 621-25 (2000).
265.  See  id. at  621-27. For  an  important  challenge  to  the Court's  current
understanding  of Fourteenth Amendment rights as "negative"  only, see ROBIN
WEST,  PROGRESSIVE  CONSTITUTIONALISM:  RECONSTRUCTING  THE
FOURTEENTH  AMENDMENT  (Duke  University  Press  1994)  (arguing  that  the
requirement of "equal  protection of the  laws" should be understood to impose
affirmative duties of protection on government).
266.  Comparative  constitutional  decisions  on  federalism  might  also  have
been  thought  relevant  to  the  issue  in  Morrison, notwithstanding  important
differences  among federal  systems. In both Canada and Australia, courts have
upheld  expansive  understandings  of national  government  power  to  prevent
gender-motivated  harassment or violence.  See Reference  re Firearms Act, 219GENDER EQUALITY
of actual  practices  with respect  to  gender  equality  by  nations  that
have  ratified  both  the  ICCPR  and  the  CEDAW,267  appeals  to
transnational  practices  under  such  instruments  may  have  less
persuasive force.
Moreover, the institutional settings of different constitutions and
constitutional  courts  vary  widely,268  and  may  yield  complex  and
highly  particular  doctrine  not  easily  amenable  to  transnational
comparisons.  In  Nevada  Department of Human  Resources  v.
Hibbs,269  which  concerned  the  enforceability  of  the  Family  and
Medical  Leave Act (FMLA), there was no  discussion in the Court's
A.R. 201  (Alta Ct. App.  1998)  (Fraser, C.J.A.)  (relying inter alia on national
interest  in preventing  domestic violence  to support  national  power to require
gun licensing and registration), affd, [2000]  1 S.C.R. 783,  2000 Can. Sup. Ct.
LEXIS  29,  discussed in Jackson,  Holistic Interpretation,  supra note  234,  at
1299-1301;  Aldridge v. Booth,  80 A.L.R.  1 (Austl.  1988)  (upholding federal
sex harassment statute against challenge to its scope as beyond proper exercise
of external affairs power to implement CEDAW). Although the United  States,
unlike Australia, has not ratified CEDAW, it did ratify the ICCPR, which bars
gender  discrimination  in  the  rights  it guarantees.  See Brief Amici  Curiae  of
International  Law  Scholars,  supra note  189  (arguing  that  VAWA  could be
upheld  as  an implementation  of the ICCPR obligations,  or  as  an exercise  of
Congress'  power  to  define  offenses  against  nations  in  light  of  customary
international  law).  On the  difficulty of direct  comparison of the meanings  of
power-allocating  clauses  in  federal  constitutions,  see  Jackson,  Constitutional
Federalism,  supra note 163.
267.  Cf Kirby, Road from Bangalore, supra note  136;  Kirby, Role of the
Judge, supra note  129, at 523 (noting  concerns about hypocrisy in ratification
of international human rights standards and the vagueness of those standards in
international  documents).  The  failures  of many  parties  to  comply  with  the
ICCPR  or  CEDAW  may undermine  the willingness  of a  U.S.  court  to  give
those  documents  significant  weight  in  determining  what  customary
international  law requires. See supra text at notes 251-53.
268.  See generally Neuman, supra note 125,  at 1869-72.  The United States,
for example,  has a  decentralized  system of constitutional  review which  may
require more bright line approaches than in smaller countries with more unified
judiciaries or with specialized constitutional courts.
269.  123  S.  Ct.  1972,  1976-77,  1981-83  (2003)  (upholding  FMLA  as
exercise  of Congress'  power under  Section  5 of the  Fourteenth  Amendment
and thus upholding  provisions permitting suits for violation of the Act against
a  state).  The  arcane  complexity  of  the  Court's  current  doctrine  on  the
amenability of states to suits under federal  law holds that states cannot be sued
under valid and applicable  federal  statutes  enacted  under Congress'  Article I
powers,  but may be sued under valid and applicable statutes enacted under the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,  517 U.S. 44
(1996).  It  appears  that  no  party  or  amicus  brief in  Hibbs (searchable  on
WESTLAW) referred to comparative materials.
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opinions of the wide range of European and other approaches to how
to achieve  more gender  equality  in the  distribution of employment
and  family responsibilities  and  benefits.2 70  The  question  in Hibbs
was whether the FMLA could be regarded as Fourteenth Amendment
legislation in order to authorize suit for violation against the state;27'
under the Court's recent cases,  this question  turned on  tests of the
"proportionality"  and  "congruence"  of  the  statutory  means  to  a
constitutional  purpose,  an  analysis  to  be  based  in  significant
measure  on the nature  of the record  before  the Congress. 2 72  The
complexity  of  U.S.  jurisprudence  on  the  constitutional  questions
presented,  and  its  internal  focus  on  what  Congress  considered,273
may  help  account  for  the  Hibbs Court's  silence  on  transnational
sources on the role of different  forms of family leave  in promoting
gender equality.
2 74
270.  For a helpful  description  of one European  system,  see Amlaug  Leira,
Caring as Social Right:  Cash for  Child Care and Daddy Leave,  5  Soc.
POLITICS  362,  370-73  (OUP,  1998)  (describing  Norway's  adoption,  in
connection with a general expansion of family care benefits, of a "use it or lose
it 'daddy leave"' designed to encourage fathers to take leave).
271.  Hibbs, 123  S. Ct. at 1976.
272.  See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89-91  (2000); Bd. of Tr.
of  Univ.  of  Ala.  v.  Garrett,  531  U.S.  356,  368-71  (2001);  Fla.  Prepaid
Postsecondary  Educ.  Expense Bd. v. Coll.  Sav. Bank,  527 U.S.  627,  637-41
(1999);  Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530-32 (1997).
273.  See, e.g.,  Garrett, 531  U.S.  at 368-71;  Kimel, 528  U.S.  at  89-91.  It
appears that at least some  in Congress considered  the practice of other nations
in arguing for adoption of the FMLA. See, e.g.,  139 Cong.  Rec.  H379, H384
(daily ed. Feb. 3, 1993)  (statement of Rep.  Schroeder) ("[L]et us get real about
that  and  let  us  realize  that  we  do  have  to  be  both  care-givers  and  good
employees. If every other country can get it, we can get it.").
274.  To  the  extent there  were  questions whether  the particular  statute  was
sufficiently likely  to avoid or prevent  gender discrimination,  the comparative
approaches  of other  countries  similarly  committed  to  gender  equality  might
have been helpful in providing a context  for deciding the "appropriateness"  of
Congress'  judgment.  Cf U.S.  CONST.  amend.  XIV,  § 5.  But  divergence  in
international and comparative legal authorities on whether, and to what degree,
commitments  to  gender  equality  should  permit  or  forbid  "protective"  or
differentiated  treatment of women and men  in employment  settings may have
made resort to such  materials less  attractive. See,  e.g.,  Leira, supra note 270
(noting  disagreement  over  whether  social  rights  should  be  based  on
"sameness"  or "difference,"  and citing Carole Pateman's work);  Case  184/83,
Hofnann v. Barmer Ersatzkasse,  1984 E.C.R. 3047 (1984)  (European Court of
Justice  decision upholding  paid  maternity  leave  only  for  women);  CEDAW
convention  art.  11.2,  available  at  http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/
cedaw/econvention.htm  (last visited Sept. 22, 2003)  (requiring  maternity leaveGENDER EQUALITY
A  notable  example  of  a  decision  whose  reasoning  and result
might  have  been  improved,  within  the  Court's  own  doctrinal
framework  for  decision,  by  some  engagement  with  comparative
constitutional  decisions  is  Nguyen  v.  INS, 275  upholding  a  gender
discrimination in the capacities of U.S. citizen mothers and fathers to
pass on U.S. citizenship  for children born out-of-wedlock  abroad. 276
Under  the  relevant  federal  statute,  children  born  abroad  to  an
unmarried  U.S.  citizen  father  had  to  meet  requirements  for
citizenship that went beyond those imposed on those born abroad to
unmarried  U.S.  citizen  mothers,  including,  for  children  claiming
citizenship  through  unmarried  fathers,  a  requirement  that  certain
formal  proofs  of parentage  were  established  before  age  eighteen.
The  Court  in  a  five  to  four  decision  upheld  the  statute.277   It
concluded  that  the distinction was  appropriately  designed to  assure
opportunities  for parent-child bonds  to develop  because mothers  (in
contrast  to  fathers)  are  inevitably  present  at  birth, 278  so  reasoning
notwithstanding  the  fact  that  in  Nguyen  itself, the  child  had been
but not  referring  to  paternity leave  and authorizing  the  provision of special
protection at work  to pregnant women, subject to  scientific assessments).  For
discussion of tensions between the protective model for women workers and a
more  gender-neutral  non-discrimination  model  in the ILO  standards,  see,  for
example,  Aida Gonzalez-Martinez,  Human Rights of Women,  5  WASH. U.J.L.
& POL'Y  157 (2001);  Sean  Cooney,  Testing Times for the ILO: Institutional
Reform for the New International Political  Economy, 20  COMP.  LAB.  L  &
POL'Y J.  365, 369  (1999);  Jane Dwasi,  1999 Kenya: A  Study in International
Labor Standards and  Their  Effect  on  Working  Women  in  Developing
Countries: The Case  for Integration  of Enforcmeent  Issues in the World Bank's
Policies, 17 WIS. INT'L L.J.  347, 397 (1999);  Katarina  Tomasevski, European
Approaches to  Enhancing Reproductive Freedom, 44  AM.  U.L. REV.  1037,
1043-44  (1995).
275.  533 U.S. 53 (2001).
276.  Id. at 57. Nguyen was born out of wedlock in Vietnam to  a U.S. citizen
father and a Vietnamese  citizen mother.  Although  from an early  age he  lived
in  Texas  with and was raised  by his  father, a state  court  order of parentage,
based on DNA testing, was not obtained until well after he was  18. Id.
277.  Id. at 73.
278.  ld. at  64-66.  The  Court  also  found  that the  statute  served  a second
important government interest, that of assuring  a biological  connection with a
U.S. parent.  See id. at 62-64.  As I understand  the facts, however, the major
barrier  to  Nguyen's  citizenship  claim  was  that  the  proof  of  biological
connection  requirements  were satisfied too  late.  And in its discussion of the
age limit the Court placed weight on the argument described in text above. See
id. at 68-69.
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raised in the United States by his U.S. citizen father since the age of
six. 279  The  result  was  in  considerable  tension  with  what  many
believed to be the requirements of "intermediate  scrutiny" of gender
classifications,  as  the  dissent  vehemently  argued.28°  It was  also  at
least  arguably  inconsistent  with  the  ICCPR,  to  which  the  United
States is a party,28'  and with CEDAW. 282 Decisions of several other
279.  533 U.S.  at 57.
280.  Under  intermediate  scrutiny,  use  of  a  gender  discriminatory
classification  is  prohibited  unless  it  is  "substantially  related"  to  the
achievement  of an  important  government  interest.  See 533  U.S.  at 60.  As
Justice  O'Connor  argued  in  dissent,  intermediate  scrutiny  is  intended  to
prohibit  reliance  on  stereotypes,  even  when  they  are  true,  if individualized
determinations  are possible.  See id. at 74-79  (O'Connor, J.,  dissenting).  To
the  extent  that  the  government  had  an  important  interest  in  extending
citizenship  only to those children born abroad to unwed U.S. citizens  who had
opportunities  to  develop  a  parent-child  bond,  there  were  individualized,
gender-neutral  alternatives  available  to  meet  that  interest  (including  proof,
after  age  18,  that a  parental  bond had been  established earlier).  See id at 85
(O'Connor, J. dissenting). Likewise,  to the extent that the government interest
was in assuring a biological  connection, requiring  fathers, but not mothers, to
establish  that link before  age  18  did not  substantially advance  that interest  as
required by intermediate  scrutiny, especially in light of the availability of DNA
testing. See id at 80-81 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
281.  See e.g., Aumeeruddy-Cziffra  v. Mauritius, U.N. GAOR, Human Rights
Comm.,  12th  Sess.,  Comm'n No. 35/1928,  U.N. Doc.  CCPR/C/12/D/35/1978
(1981)  (finding  ICCPR  violation  in  distinctions  made  between  males  and
females  for purposes  of obtaining  residency permits  for foreign  spouses).  In
contrast to Morrison, where the ICCPR would have provided an arguable basis
to  uphold  a  federal  statute,  in  Nguyen  the  ICCPR  might  have  supported
invalidation of a federal statute.  One might hypothesize  that a Court would be
more hesitant to consider a non-self-executing  treaty  in making an interpretive
choice to invalidate, rather than to support, national legislation.
282.  CEDAW, which the United  States has signed but not ratified, provides
in  article  9,  paragraph  2  that  "States  Parties  shall  grant  women  equal  rights
with men with respect to the nationality of their children."  See CEDAW, supra
note 18,  at art. 9, para. 2.  The CEDAW Committee has emphasized in General
Recommendation  21  its  view  that the  equality  rights CEDAW  secures  with
respect to parents are  symmetrical:  "States  parties should  ensure that by their
laws both parents, regardless of their marital status and whether they live with
their children or not, share equal rights and responsibilities for their children."
U.N. G.A.O.R. 49th Sess. Supp. No. 38, at 1. See also Knop &  Chinkin, supra
note  156,  at  584-85  (describing  International  Law  Association's  position
favoring  gender  equality  in  nationality  and  citizenship  rules,  including
nondiscrimination  based  on sex  in identifying  the "personal  relationships  that
form  the  basis  for preferential  treatment  under  immigration  and  nationality
rules").GENDER EQUALITY
tribunals  have stricken gender qualifications  related to citizenship  or
rights  of  residency  in  Canada, 283  Botswana,284  Costa  Rica,2 85
Zimbabwe,286  and  in  the  European  Union. 287   Gender  based
distinctions  in  citizenship  laws  have  been  upheld  in  Bangladesh288
289 and  Pakistan,  in the  latter  case  on reasoning,  aspects  of which
283.  See Benner v.  Canada,  [1997]  1 S.C.R. 358  (holding unconstitutional  a
gender distinction that discriminated against mothers in the capacity  to pass on
Canadian  citizenship); see also id. at 399 (citing Elias v. U.S. Dep't of State,
721 F. Supp. 243  (N.D. Cal. 1989)  in support of a finding of standing).
284.  See  Atty  Gen.  v.  Unity  Dow, (1992)  103  I.L.R.  128,  reprinted in  13
Hum. Rts Q. 614 (1991).
285.  Inter-American  Court  of  Human  Rights,  Amendments  to  the
Naturalization  Provisions of  the Constitution of Costa Rica/Advisory Opinion,
5 HuM. RTs. L.J.  161 (1984).
286.  See Rattigan v. Chief Immigr. Officer,  103  I.L.R.  224 (Zimb. Sup. Ct.
1994).
287.  See Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom,  1985 Eur. Ct. H.R.  9214/80,  7 Eur.
H.R.  Rep.  471  (1985)  (striking  down  United  Kingdom's  gender  distinction
between foreign  spouses entitled to remain in the UK based on other spouse's
citizenship).  According to the Women's Human Rights Resources database of
the Bora Laskin Law Library at the University of Toronto,  in Judgment No. 30
of 28 January  1983,  Italian Constitutional Court, (1983)  62 Raccolata Ufficiale
delle  Sentenze  e  Ordinanze  della  Corte  Constitutionale,  "the  Italian
Constitutional  Court  declared  a  law  unconstitutional  that  provided  that  the
child of an  Italian father was Italian  by birth, without also  providing that the
child of an Italian mother was Italian by birth."  WHRR  Web page, supra  note
84, at http://eir.library.utoronto.ca/whrr  (last modified Nov 2, 2003)  (Note that
a  direct  URL  is not  available;  to  find  this  case  description,  go  to  "subject
areas"  of "WHRR database",  select  "Nationality and Citizenship,"  then select
"Documents").  For a  more  detailed  analysis  of decisions  around  the  world
addressing issues of gender discrimination in nationality laws, see Final  Report
on Women's Equality and Nationality in International  Law, International  Law
Assocation  (London  Conference,  2000)  (prepared  by  Karen  Knop,
Rapporteur);  Kif  Augustine-Adams,  Gendered  States:  A  Comparative
Construction of Citizenship and Nation, 41  VA. J. INT'L L. 93  (2000); see also
KIM  RUBENSTEIN,  AUSTRALIAN  CITIZENsHIP  LAW  IN  CONTEXT,  55-58,  91,
95-99 (Lawbook Co. 2002).
288.  See  WHRR  Web  Page, supra note  84,  (last  visited  Feb.  9,  2004)
(providing description  of unreported  decision in Bangl. v.  Malkani,  Supr. Ct.
Writ No.  3192  (1992))  (Malkani description  last  modified Feb.  9,  2004)  (on
file with  Loyola  of Los Angeles  Law  Review)  (note that  direct URL  for this
description is unavailable.  To access the description, enter the word "Malkani"
into the search function at the WHRR index page);  see also KNOP & CHINKIN,
supra note  156,  at  534-35,  547-48  (describing  Malkani case  and continued
inability of Bangladeshi mothers to pass on citizenship to their children).
289.  See Sharifan v.  Fed'n of Pakistan, P.L.D.  1998 Lahore 59,  50 All Pak.
Legal  Decisions  59  (1997)  (Lahore).  The  challenged  law provided  access  to
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would  in  all  likelihood  not  be  accepted  in  the  United  States.29 °
Consideration of foreign constitutional approaches,  then, would have
informed the U.S.  Supreme Court that in at least some countries with
arguably  analogous  legal  regimes  and  roles  of courts  (including
countries  that  are  recipients  of  immigrants),291  arguably  similar
gender discriminations in citizenship laws had been disavowed.
For  example,  the  Canadian  decision  emphasized  the  lack  of
equality  between  men  and  women  that  was  conveyed  through  the
gender  discrimination  in the ability to pass on citizenship  to a child
born  abroad.  In  invalidating  a  statute  that  provided  for  easier
acquisition  of  Canadian  citizenship  for  children  born  abroad  to
Canadian fathers  than to Canadian mothers, the  Court wrote, "[t]his
legislation  continues to suggest that, at least in some cases, men and
women are not equally capable of passing on whatever it takes to be
Pakistani  citizenship  for  a  foreign  female  spouse  but not  to  a  foreign  male
spouse of a  Pakistani  citizen.  See id. at 61.  One of the reasons given in the
judgment  was  that  granting  citizenship  to  foreign  husbands  of  Pakistani
women  would  result  in  an  uncontrollable  influx  of  foreigners  becoming
citizens,  a  national  concern  trumping  equality  rights.  See  id. at  63.  This
concern has some resonance  with Nguyen's discussion of the larger number of
male  than  female  soldiers  abroad,  and  the  concomitant  concern  about
potentially  large  numbers  of  claims  for  "citizenship  by  male  parentage"
resulting from the activity of American  servicemen.  See Nguyen v. INS,  533
U.S.  53, 65-66 (2001);  cf President of the Republic of South Africa v. Hugo,
1997  (6)  BCLR  708  (CC),  1997  SACLR  LEXIS  91,  *91,  *74,  *63-65
(upholding  pardons  for  incarcerated  mothers  of  young  children  against  a
discrimination challenge brought by an incarcerated  father and noting the large
numbers of male, as opposed to female, prisoners, and the likelihood of fathers
having less responsibility for childrearing than mothers).
290.  See  infra text  accompanying  note  303  (describing  Pakistani  court's
reliance on a rule that  a woman's  domicile  must follow  her husband's);  note
306.
291.  One  could imagine  the Court  distinguishing  decisions  from countries
that do not face the prospect of many applicants for citizenship, but in Canada
and  the EU there  is net immigration.  Canada  accepts  more  immigrants  per
capita  than  any  other  country  in  the  world,  see  International  Immigration
Agency, Immigration and Relocation to Canada, at http://how2immigrate.net/
canada/  (last  visited  Sept.  23,  2003),  and Canada  has  had  net  in-migration
since  as  early  as  1900.  See  U.C.  DAVIS  MIGRATION  NEWS,  at
http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=294902-0  (last  visited  Sept.
23, 2003). The EU, as well, has enjoyed net in-migration  for many years.  See
THE  EUROPEAN  UNION  ONLINE,  at  www.europa.eu.int/comm/
eurostat/Public/datashop/print-product/EN?catalogue=Eurostat&product=-3-
po020in-EN&mode=download.  (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).GENDER EQUALITY
a  good  Canadian  citizen. 292  The U.S.  Court, by contrast,  ignored
the  expressive  meaning  of gender distinctions  as  to the capacity to
pass  on  citizenship,  albeit  in  a  case  in  which  the  classification
disadvantaged  men,  not  women,  in  their  capacity  to  pass  on
citizenship.293
292.  Benner  v.  Canada,  [1997]  1  S.C.R.  358,  403.  Although  the
discrimination  at  issue in Benner (one  imposing  greater burdens  on  a  born-
abroad  child claiming  citizenship  through  a  Canadian mother  than through a
Canadian father) is similar, it is not identical  to that in Nguyen.  Nonetheless
the Canadian  Court's reasoning suggests that, were it faced with  the identical
discrimination, it would have scrutinized the statute more aggressively than did
the majority in Nguyen.
293.  The U.S.  Court may  have reached  the  conclusion  it  did because  of a
concern  about  permitting  a wider  range  of persons  to become  U.S.  citizens
than Congress could have intended.  See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 66; see also id. at
73 (Scalia,  J.,  concurring) (doubting whether Court had constitutional authority
to permit citizenship  to be granted where Congress  had not so  specified);  see
generally David  A.  Martin,  Behind the  Scenes  on  a  Different Set:  What
Congress Needs  to Do  in  the  Aftermath  of St.  Cyr and Nguyen,  16  GEO.
IMMIGR.  L.J.  313,  333-35  (2002)(suggesting  that  it  was  fear  of the  large
consequences  for  many  would-be  citizens  that  motivated  the  decision  in
Nguyen, given the Court's commitment to a rigid rule that its decisions must be
given complete  retroactive  effect).  Both U.S.  and foreign  constitutional  law
may have  offered  alternatives  to  the  feared  result,  possibly  by delaying  the
effective  date of the decision  to allow  time  for a  constitutionally  acceptable
legislative response, though such efforts would have raised other constitutional
questions.  See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr.  Co. v. Marathon  Pipe Line Co., 458
U.S. 50, 88  (1982)  (the Court stayed its judgment for several months  to allow
Congress time to enact a replacement scheme);  Re Manitoba Language  Rights,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 721,  721-22 (holding that all statutes in Manitoba were invalid
for not having been enacted simultaneously  in French  as well  as English, but
staying the effect  of its decision by concluding  that the unconstitutional  laws
were to have "temporary force and effect" in order to allow the legislature time
to enact substitute legislation). For discussion of the Canadian case, see PETER
HOGG,  CoNsTIrUTIoNAL LAW OF CANADA  § 37(d),  § 55.8  (3d ed.  1997). On
proposed  solutions  to  the  Nguyen  concern,  see  Martin,  supra  at  336-37
(arguing that Court could have  given its holding prospective  effect  only and
urging  Congress  to  redress the  statutory  discrimination  in Nguyen  but  with
prospective  effect  only).  But  cf.,  e.g.,  Teague  v.  Lane,  489  U.S.  288,  316
(1989)  (implying that it would offend Article  I  judicial power to announce a
new  rule of constitutional  law but not  apply it to  release  the petitioner  who
brought the challenge);  Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation,  509 U.S.  86, 95-97
(1993)  (indicating  that  non-retroactive,  prospective  decisionmaking  is  for
legislatures, not courts).
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Nguyen  was  not  a  "new  technology"  case,  nor  was  it  as
intensely divisive a case as some discussed earlier. Yet Nguyen was a
case in which reasonable jurists might well have considered  available
transnational  sources, not least because the subject matter was one of
295 international  concern  whose  result  could  affect  other  nations.
Moreover, as noted earlier, gender equality cases may be particularly
likely  to  raise  divisive  questions  as  deeply  engrained  attitudes  and
belief,  derived  from  custom,  tradition,  family  experience  and/or
religion,  are  challenged.296  The  Court's  willingness  in  Nguyen  to
accept  the  mother's  supposed  opportunity  based  on  physical
childbirth  to  develop  a relationship  with  the  child  as  a  basis  for
excluding  fathers  from  the  same  ability  to pass  on  citizenship  may
reflect  at least  a tolerance  for such engrained attitudes.  Where  such
deeply held beliefs  are  in confrontation  with emancipatory  equality
commitments,  a  judge's  greater  knowledge  of how  other  courts
around the  world have responded may help  clarify reasoning  about
both human rights and judicial roles.297
Cases  vindicating  gender  equality  as  against  traditional  norms
may  have  persuasive  value  through  the  force  of their  reasoning
combined  with  respect  for  the  particular  tribunal's  willingness  to
issue  and  reach  a judgment  of condemnation.298   Cases  rejecting
294.  See supra text accompanying  notes  167-68. However,  members  of the
majority  in  Nguyen  may  have  been  influenced  by  awareness  that  new
technologies made it increasingly  easy to establish paternity long after a child
was conceived  and born.
295.  The Court's determination that a party lacks U.S. citizehship  may quite
directly affect another country by leaving it responsible for another national.
296.  Cf Karst, supra note 211,  at 470-71  ("The chief mechanisms  by which
the personal becomes political lie in the deepest recesses of the psyche. Neither
little  boys  nor  adult  male judges  consciously  choose  to  define  the  idea  of
woman around their own needs for masculine self-identification.  Each of us -
male or female...  is born into a family and a culture.")
297.  See Bayefsky, supra note  13,  at  352-69; Knop, supra note 23, at  531-
34.  One  cannot, of course,  assume that gender equality  decisions from  other
countries  or  international  tribunals  will  always  be progressive.  See Jackson,
Transnational  Legal Discourse,  supra note  108,  at  391  n.76;  supra text
accompanying  notes 288-90 (discussing Hugo and Sharifan cases).
298.  As  a  general  matter,  moreover,  the  persuasive  value  of particular
foreign  decisions  may also  be reinforced  if the  passage  of time  and  events
demonstrates that the decision's consequences  are positive (or not destructive).
On  consequentialism  and  comparison,  see,  for  example,  Printz  v.  United
States,  521 U.S. 898, 976-77 (1997)  (Breyer, J., dissenting).GENDER EQUALITY
gender  equality  challenges  to  discriminatory  laws  may  also  be
helpful for courts to consider.  Such cases may persuade positively-
the  majority's  reasoning  in  Hugo bears  a haunting  resemblance  to
aspects  of the  majority  decision  in Nguyen.299  But  they may  also
engender  more  critical  stances,  by  making  explicit  the  premises
behind  gender  distinctions  and  illuminating  their  subordinating  or
invidious effects.  One should consider  here not only the  dissent in
Hugo,3 00  but also  the Sharifan 3 0 1 case  in Pakistan.  The court there
rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of allowing foreign wives
of Pakistani husbands to  claim Pakistani  citizenship while  access to
Pakistan  citizenship  based on marriage  is denied to the husbands  of
Pakistan wives.3 0 2  A significant aspect of the court's reasoning was
that  a  woman's  domicile  must  follow  that  of her  husband  under
"private  international  law,"  recognized  in  (older)  Commonwealth
case law;3 0 3 the court suggests that its interpretation of the Pakistani
Constitution and the statute itself were justified as in conformity with
international  law.304  Invoking  Pakistani  decisions  requiring  a
299.  See supra text accompanying notes  109-11; supra note  289 (discussing
South Africa v. Hugo,  1997 (6)  BCLR 708 (CC),  1997 SACLR LEXIS 91)
300.  See supra text accompanying notes  110-11.
301.  Sharifan v. Fed'n  of Pakistan,  50 All Pak.  Legal  Decisions 59  (1997)
(Lahore).
302.  The  challenge  was  based  on  article  25  of the  Constitution,  which
provides that:  "(1)  All citizens  are equal before  law  and are entitled  to equal
protection  of law.  (2)  There  shall  be no  discrimination  on  the basis  of sex
alone.  (3) Nothing  in this  Article  shall  prevent  the  State  from  making  any
special provision for the protection of women and children."  PAK.  CONST.,  pt.
II, ch. , art. 25. The  Court first reasoned, formalistically,  that because  foreign
spouses  are  not already  "citizens,"  they were  outside  the reach  of Article  25.
See  Sharifan,  50  All  Pak.  Legal  Decisions,  at  61  (further  indicating  that
citizenship,  according to the Constitution, was to be determined  by statute and
thus distinctions between men and women in access to citizenship could not be
"discrimination").  Alternatively,  the  Court  said,  the  easier  access  of foreign
wives  to  citizenship  could  be  regarded  as  a  "special  provision  for  the
protection of women" under Article 25  (3) (that is  for the foreign noncitizen
spouses, not the Pakistani women with foreign husbands). Id.
303.  Id. at 62 (emphasizing  that a "woman by virtue of her marriage acquires
the domicile of her husband").
304.  As  noted earlier, the Court also  invoked national  interest  on behalf of
the  discrimination,  assuming  it  did  violate  fundamental  equality  rights,  but
stated that "[i]t  is impossible to  allow every foreigner to acquire citizenship  of
Pakistan just by means of a marriage with a Pakistani lady," which could result
in  a  "flood  and  influx  of foreigners  becoming  citizens...  in  indiscriminate
manner."  Id. at  63.  See supra note  289.  The  Court  commented  on  the
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woman's domicile to follow that of her husband, the court seemed to
suggest the pervasiveness  and naturalness  of gender  discriminations
relating  to  marriage  and  its  effects.3 0 5   Here  is  a  case  invoking
international law and the decisions of other nations to support gender
discrimination  in access  to citizenship based  on marriage,  choosing
sources that embrace a rule that women's domicile must follow their
husbands but offering  no reasoned basis other than highly gendered
traditions. For those with "eyes to see,"  a court decision upholding a
gender  distinction  in  citizenship  for  such  a  reason  may  prompt
reconsideration  of how other gender  distinctions should be regarded
in societies that would reject rigid gender-based rules of domicile. 306
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Constitutional  law  is  an  important  location  for  expressing
fundamental  commitments  to gender  equality  and  for  giving  those
commitments  meaning  and  enforcement.  But  constitutions  do  not
function solely as a charter of self-government, or  an expression of
unique  national  identity.  They  also  function  to  establish  and
proclaim  a  country's  status  as  a  member  of  the  community  of
nations,  an  independent  state entitled to  be treated  as such by other
"wisdom" of the current policy restricting citizenship rights,  citing, inter alia,
the  decision  in  United  States  v.  Cruikshank,  92  U.S.  542  (1875),  and
suggesting  that  citizens  are  members  of the  body  politic  entitled  to  vote.
Sharifan, 50 All  Pak. Legal  Decisions  at 62.  (A concern  to limit "outsider"
voting  influence  could,  however,  be  advanced  through  gender-neutral
numerical limits or other exclusions.)
305.  Id. at  63.  Notwithstanding its  earlier approval  of the "wisdom"  of the
statute, the Court goes on to invite legislative change.  Id. (acknowledging that
"women are no  longer to be treated as a property of the male members of the
society"  and that the "equal participation  of the women..,  in all walks of life
is essential" to national progress).
306.  Although  in  the nineteenth century  some  U.S. Supreme  Court justices
were willing  to deny  a wife, legally separated  from her husband, the capacity
as  a citizen of a  diverse  state to bring an action  against her spouse  in federal
court,  see  Barber  v.  Barber, 62  U.S.  (21  How.)  582,  603  (1859)  (Daniel,  J.
dissenting), it is difficult to imagine that today a state law requiring that wives
be  treated as having the domicile of their husbands would pass constitutional
muster.  See, e.g. Reed  v. Reed,  404  U.S.  71  (1971)  (invalidating  a statute
giving  a  preference  to  men  over  women  for  purposes  of  appointing  the
executors of estates of intestate decedents).GENDER EQUALITY
national  states  and  to  engage  with  other  nations  on  that  basis.3 0 7
Constitutions are thus adopted, and interpreted,  not only with an eye
to  the  internal  demands  of the  polity  but  also  with  an  eye on  the
stature and position of the nation state in the international arena3 0-
even arguably "dualist" constitutions like that of the United States.309
And  courts,  in  cases  legitimately  before  them,  are  organs  of
communication  about the content of international law, though within
different procedural paradigms  than the political branches.31 0  As the
307.  See  Unity  Dow  v.  Atty  Gen.,  103  I.L.R.  128,  159-60  (Bots.  Ct.
App.1992)(1996)  ("Botswana  was,  at  the  time  the  Constitution  was
promulgated, about to enter the comity of nations ..  ").
308.  See,  e.g.,  H.W.O.  Okoth-Ogendo,  Constitutions  Without
Constitutionalism:  Reflections  on  an  African  Political  Paradox,  in
CONSTITUTIONALISM  AND  DEMOCRACY:  TRANSITIONS  IN  THE
CONTEMPORARY  WORLD  65-80 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds.,  1993)  (noting
constitution's function in demonstrating the sovereign existence of the polity).
309.  The  Federalist  Papers,  for example,  reveal  a pervasive  concern  about
how  the  United  States  would  be  viewed  by  other countries.  See,  e.g.,  THE
FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay)(discussing fear of war and interest  in commerce
with  foreign  countries  and  noting  importance  of having  federal  courts  to
provide  uniform  interpretations  to  treaties);  THE  FEDERALIST  No.  79
(Alexander  Hamilton) (explaining that federal courts have jurisdiction over all
cases involving citizens of other countries  in order to prevent creating  a cause
for  war  from  an  unjust  judicial  decision).  These  comments  are  also
noteworthy:
An  attention  to  the judgment  of other nations  is  important to  every
government  for  two  reasons:  the  one  is,  that,  independently  of the
merits  of any  particular  plan  or  measure,  it  is  desirable..,  that  it
should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable
policy;  the second  is,  that  in  doubtful  cases,  particularly  where  the
national  councils  may  be  warped  by  some  strong  passion  or
momentary  interest, the presumed  or known opinion of the impartial
world may be the best guide that can be followed.
THE FEDERALIST No. 63  (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison)  (discussing
role of Senate).
310.  Cf.  Stephan,  supra  note  198  at  644-46,  648-49,  654-55  (noting
"expressive"  decisions  in  U.S. courts which have a pedagogical  purpose  with
respect  to  the  content  of  foreign  law  and  raising  cautions  based  on  the
comparative institutional advantage courts  have in deciding on concrete facts).
Professor Stephan's analysis may undervalue  the  degree to which courts also
may  have  relative  institutional  advantages  in  habits  of  principled  reason-
giving. "Expressive"  decisionmaking  by courts is  likely, then, to  differ  from
that  of the political  branches,  for whom  decidedly  different  norms  of reason
giving  and  consistency  apply.  But cf  Keith  E.  Whittington,  Extrajudicial
Constitutional  Interpretations: Three Objections and Responses, 80  N.C. L.
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international  legal  order itself has evolved,31' rigid insistence on the
autonomy  of  its  own  constitutional  law  from  developing  world
understandings  of  rights  apparently  shared  among  domestic
constitutions and the international  human rights order may be seen in
the community  of nations  as  inconsistent  with  the obligations  of a
national  state.  The  local  and  global  functions  of  a  domestic
constitution  can  be  mediated  by  appropriate  consideration  of
international  and  foreign  legal  developments  insofar  as  they  are
helpful, even if not binding.
There  is particular reason to look outside,  as well  as within, in
resolving constitutional  claims  that relate to  gender  equality.  Most
of the  world community of nations profess adherence to the norm of
gender  equality,312  although  there  is  significant  divergence  in both
practice  and  in  the  legal justifications  offered  for  deviations  from
stated  norms.  Given  the  widespread  subordination  of women and
their exclusion  from domestic  or international  power until  the mid-
twentieth  century, many polities have had to grapple  in roughly the
same  time  period  with  how  to  realize  newfound  constitutional
commitments  to  gender  equality. 313  A  number  of constitutional
REV.  773,  813-25  (2002)  (challenging  idea  that  courts  are  unusually  well
suited to reasoned deliberation).
311.  The nineteenth and first  part of the 20th century view  was based on  a
strong  idea  of  sovereignty  and  independence,  under  which  each  state's
"[c]onsent to the regime of international law..,  becomes the vehicle by which
the  sovereign  independence  of  states  is  reconciled  with  the  practical
imperatives of co-existence with  other states."  0. Schacter, Sovereignty, Then
and Now,  in ESSAYS  IN  HONOUR  OF  WANG TIEYA,  671,  675  (R. Macdonald
ed.,  1993).  The  expansion  of human  rights  law,  as  widely  noted,  pierces  a
state's  sovereignty  to  insist  on  norms  of conduct  between  the  state  and  its
citizens.
312.  See supra text accompanying  notes 8-10.
313.  It  should  come  as  no  surprise  that  women's  groups-in  Canada,
Uganda,  Colombia-have  been  among  the  leaders  in  calls  for  broader
participation  in constitution  making, or that the CEDAW  review process  has
focused so much attention  on female participation.  See Lorraine E.  Weinrib,
Canada's Charter of Rights: Paradigm  Lost?, 6  REv.  OF CONST.  STUD.  119,
139  n.51  (2002);  Penelope  E.  Andrews,  From Gender Apartheid to  Non-
Sexism: The Pursuit  of Women's Rights in South Africa, 26 N.C.J. INT'L L. &
COM.  REG.  693,  717-18  (2001);  Hart,  supra note  155;  CHARLESWORTH  &
CHINKIN,  supra note  156,  at  189-216;  cf  Judith  Resnik,  Reconstructing
Equality: Of  Justice, Justicia,  and the Gender of Jurisdiction, 14 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM  393,  399  (2002)  (critiquing  "the  maintenance  of jurisdictionalGENDER EQUALITY
courts,  as  well  as  international  tribunals,  have  deliberated  and
pronounced judgment on questions of gender equality,314 sometimes
in directions  that  I think are consistent with  stated commitments  to
equality  and  sometimes  not.  In  the  face  of  highly  gendered
distributions  of benefits  and  responsibilities  in most  societies,  the
struggle to re-understand our constitutional world through the lens of
gender equality, is ongoing.  It is  an effort that can benefit from  all
the  thinking  and  rethinking,  in  local,  national  and  transnational
locations,  informed  by  the  experience  of  others,  that  can  be
mustered. 315
distinctions  that constrain  national powers  to reduce the inequality  of women
and men").
314.  Although  many  would  argue  that  gender  equality  norms  (including
those in  CEDAW)  represent  customary  international  law, see e.g.,  UNIFEM,
BRINGING EQUALITY  HOME, supra note  102, at  9; Chantalle Forgues, Note, A
Global Hurdle: The  Implementation of an International Nondiscrimination
Norm Protecting  Women from Gender Discrimination  in International  Sports,
18  B.U. INT'L L.J.  247,  262  (2000); Cf  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  FOREIGN
RELATIONS  LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,  §  702, comment I  (noting possibility
that  freedom  from  state  policy  of gender  discrimination  "may  already  be a
principle  of  customary  international  law"),  others  disagree.  See,  e.g.,
Weisburd, supra note  147,  at  117-20 (doubting  that CEDAW and the ICCPR
are  now part of customary international  law); An-Na'im, supra note  125,  at
168  (stating  that  it would  be "difficult  to  establish  a principle  of customary
international  law  prohibiting  all  forms  of  discrimination  on  grounds  of
gender");  cf supra notes 219,  249 (noting feminist objections to exclusion of
gender discrimination fromjus cogens).
315.  See Glenn, supra note  63,  at 263.  Glenn argues that legal development
preceding  modern national  states rested on a view  of law necessarily  open to
persuasive  authority  and that  widespread reliance  on nonbinding  persuasive
authority represented  an "ongoing commitment to better ideas."  Id. at 268. As
law became  an  instrument of securing  national  states  in  Europe, concepts  of
binding national  law began  to displace  reliance on persuasive  authority  from
other  sources,  according  to Glenn,  while outside the West the  idea of law as
national  response  was  less  persuasive  and  the  idea  of law  as  enquiry,  as  a
search for better ideas, persisted. See id. at 278-88.  Although Glenn's historic
description  associates  nationalism  with  the idea of binding law  and pluralism
with  the  idea  of law  as  enquiry,  see id. at  278-88,  he  concludes  that  both
concepts  can co-exist  because it  "is  in the nature of persuasive authority..  .to
tolerate assertions of local particularity."  Id. at 289.
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